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By A. H. VANDENBERG

**The Greatest American: Alexander Hamilton
If Hamilton Were Here Today
The Trail of a Tradition**



JACQUES REICH

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A Hamilton

The Trail of a Tradition

"Nationalism"—not "Internationalism"—is the
indispensable bulwark of American independence.

* * * * *

"I was born an American; I live an American;
I shall die an American."—DANIEL WEBSTER.

By

Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, A.M.

Author of

"The Greatest American" and "If Hamilton Were Here Today"

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1926

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TO THE HONORABLE
WILLIAM ALDEN SMITH

a Senator of the United States from
Michigan, whose public service was
an expression of true American
fidelities, and whose loyal friendship
continues an inspiration and a joy

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED.

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Oct 20 '43

Foreword

WE contemplate a journey upon the trail of a tradition. The "journey" is time-tabled within the pages of this swift-moving book. The "trail" is the epic history of the United States, leaping down the years from Washington and Hamilton, who set us apart from alien contagions, to the seasoned American maturities which won a World War and refused to lose the sequent peace. The "tradition" is intelligent, tenacious "Nationalism" in all its implications and autonomies, as distinguished from emotional "Internationalism" in all its threats, dilutions and impracticabilities. The "journey" is a pilgrimage beneath an unblenched Flag. The "trail" leads from patriot-Founders whose early prescience warned us against foreign entanglements down to latter-day electorates which have preferred, in the same spirit, to serve civilization by serving "America First." The "tradition" is our Independence—not our "isolation," which is a totally different thing—and our continuing privilege and purpose to captain our own souls. The "trail" has been blazed progressively by one courageous, steadfast Amer-

ican after another—as thrilling a tale in sturdy achievement as ever made legend out of romance. The “tradition,” disclosed in cameos of fact, is the cumulative testimony of American experience that we want friendly and co-operating intercourse with all the nations of the earth, but constricting alliances and leagues with none; that we distinguish between dishonorable, supine pacifism and honorable, independent peace; that we owe no greater obligation to the world than to our own posterity; and that, while no man can live unto himself alone, we consent—with Timothy of Holy Writ—in terms of nationality, that “if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel.”

There are so many transcendent traditions in this American inheritance that an entire library might undertake their catalogue and still fail a finished task. We shall confine ourselves to this one of paramount vitality—the tradition of our independence in contact with the outside world—an independence which kneels to no invasion of rights and prerogatives whether of citizen or State or Constitution—an independence which asks nought but justice of any neighbor, yet will compromise with nothing less—an independence which shares its puissance with all other Republics in this New World, but which declines to yield its own freedoms of decision and of action to any precarious partnerships, no matter how nobly

meditated, with other governments and other lands. Even within these limitations, the latitudes are wide. But to the best of an earnest and resolute endeavor, which at the outset humbly acknowledges its inadequacy for such cardinal address, we shall keep to the appointed trail. "Nationalism" is a complex into which a great diversity of duties enters. We consider only those factors which generically are challenged by so-called "Internationalism." We summon history, tradition and experience to confront the theory and formula recommended by "voices in the air." The literature of "Internationalism" continues at flood-tide. Ours is the case for the defense—the "National" defense. "What avail the plough, or sail, or land or life, if Freedom fail." Ours is the trail of self-sufficient, self-reliant, self-determining America—by no means free of casualty, nor of intermittent improvidence, but always saved by traditional vigilance against the ultimate surrender.

Back in pre-Revolutionary times—when France was rendering indispensable assistance to the Colonies, struggling against imperial yoke—we find the thin beginnings of this trail. Under Washington and Hamilton—eschewing reciprocal French alliance, despite the intimate pressure of a seeming debt—we discover the tradition in its great initial precedent, when a Proclamation of Neutrality set us apart from the Old World's convulsions and insisted that America was en-

titled, on her own decision, to order the character of independent existence she might choose to live. Supported by the luminous monitions of the "Farewell Address," this ritual of separate American existence became the greatest of all the legacies bequeathed by these master builders to generations yet unborn. The great name and the great heart that gave it validation were Washington's: but the great wisdom, the great courage and the great fidelity out of which it sprang were Alexander Hamilton's. Indeed, of all the encyclopedic labors of this rare genius who made more dynamic contribution to the American foundation than any other patriot who ever lived, perhaps this was the greatest.

But a principle of government, however great, could not have graduated into a tradition, confirmed by time and event, except as others, taking up the Republic's subsequent labors, made its faith their own and carried on. That is precisely what did happen—and hence the trail. Other Presidents embraced "neutrality" in the midst of other alien alarms—reiterating the intention not to subordinate our precious independence to the shifting vagaries of Europe. Then still other Presidents insisted that the hemispherical divorce must be complete, and that as we kept out of Europe, so Europe must leave the Americas alone. The "Monroe Doctrine" was born—and born to many prideful triumphs. But it was one thing to proclaim: another, to per-

sist. Down the trailing years, this tradition of articulating independence faced many challenges: but rarely did it want for implacable defenders, vigilant and successful defenders, whether the challenge was a foreign threat or a domestic surrender. Always, in the end, it won. There have been thrilling episodes en route. There have been dangerous days. There have been skirmishes and ambushes. There have been those, upon the treacherous seas, who have denied our right to be free of others' ails and who have tried to rob us of our vantage. There have been those, at home, who have envisioned a beautiful worldwide brotherhood of man—a vast polyglot brought out of Babel and to the promised land—to which their zealotry has been willing to offer up our independence as an experimental sacrifice. There have been those, abroad, who to their sorrow have treated our protestations with contempt. A stirring gauntlet, the trail has run. But the more the glory that the tradition has survived. Such a tradition, thus bulwarked, never should be lightly abandoned by America. Statesmen of all parties have rallied to its standard. The spirits of Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt are at one upon this score; and Hamilton himself was not more determined than Grover Cleveland, who fervently declared that “this philosophy cannot become obsolete while the Republic shall endure.”

This independent “Nationalism” is not a chauvinistic thing—of brags and boasts—of magnilo-

quence and fanfaronade. It is far too solemn in its dedication and its purpose. Perhaps it seems to take on alarming swagger when the provincial orator lifts his tremolo on July Fourth. Perhaps it seems to suffer from unwarrantable ego in the presence of subsequent recital—since this book is at the disadvantage, on this score, of having to take isolated examples from numerous eras and to parade them as though they were serial. But intelligent “Nationalism,” though justly proud, is not flamboyant. Neither is it cavalier. Indeed, it is sobered by its stewardship. It is tempered by its responsibilities. But it knows the independent rights that are singularly America’s by rule of justice and tradition: and it proposes that they shall be preserved.

True, it is a thing of sentiment—but worthy sentiment. The “Nationalist” is not that most miserable of all creatures—a man without a country—or perhaps what Channing called a “friend of every country but his own.” He holds no communion with intellectual expatriates. He agrees with Bulwer-Lytton that “patriotism is a safer principle than philanthropy” and that “Sancho Panza administering his island is a better model than Don Quixote sallying forth to right the wrongs of the universe.” He is not willing to toss his national idols, his national ideals, his legitimate national aspirations into one common melting pot, there to be fused into a colorless, shapeless, puerile, futile “internationalism” that

shall undertake the impossible task of being all things to all men. He demands the preservation of his national identity. He respectfully declines to trade his independent citizenship for the doubtful status of a cosmopolite. Furthermore, he believes that just as no man can neglect his own house and home and compensate society by taking a benevolent interest in his neighbors, so America cannot forsake her "Nationalism" and yet retain those elements of peculiar and righteous eminence which make for greatest service not only to herself, but also to the general human weal. This isn't truculent vanity. It is faith. It is fidelity to yesterday's tradition and tomorrow's untrammelled destiny. The "jingo" may rant ominously, belligerently, from a noisy pulpit of self-assumed superiorities which are egotistically careless of offense and contemptuous of international opinion. But intelligent "Nationalism" denies relationship with any such bombast. It does not require the inculcation of scorns or hatreds or distrusts for other lands and other peoples; it is not a doctrine of external depreciation or destruction. It is a constructive ritual. It seeks maximum friendliness and understanding and self-ordered reciprocal relations with every sector of civilization, no matter what its flag. But it insists that the surrender of American independence is not pre-requisite for these conquests of desirable trans-oceanic amities and of practical international fraternity: nay, more, it insists that

the surrender makes the conquest impossible. Never was "Nationalism," in this phase, reduced to more sterling code than when opposing American adhesion to the Geneva League, Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa declared: "I would stand—if I stood alone—for an America with the right to choose from time to time the company she keeps; for an America at liberty to follow her own conscience as the events of the future transpire; for an America which all the nations of the earth are powerless to order from right doing or command to wrong doing; for an America concerned for the world, but devoted first and always to the protection and welfare of her own people."

Some advanced thinkers find patriotism a collection of shams—and perhaps, sometimes, as Samuel Johnson said, it really is "the last refuge of a scoundrel." Quite readily let it be admitted, unhappily, that all patriotic pretense is not what it pretends. Yet a Republic without patriotism would be a mere soulless group of persons. Certainly it would not be America. "Nationalism" claims no monopoly of patriotism: but it undertakes to live a patriotism that is effectually faithful. It is quite the habit of some higher intellectuals to frown upon what they deem the blind and stupid fidelity of Stephen Decatur—"Our Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be right; but our country, right or wrong!" Yet, under cold analysis, what other

sentiment is practical? Shall the critical citizen retain unto himself the right to desert his country in the event that her solemn, Constitutional decisions in foreign affairs do not happen to be honored by the validation of his personal, private approval? What essential difference distinguishes him, in such a posture, from the draft-evader who runs away from the colors? As a practical element of government—as discriminated from the individualisms of anarchy—does it not become ultimately necessary for the American's apostrophe to address his country "right or wrong"? Can he retain an option of fidelities? In the process of rendering the nation's decisions, it is entirely possible and proper for the citizen to say, with Carl Schurz—"Our country, right or wrong! When right to be kept right; when wrong to be put right!" But when the country speaks through its constitutional authorities, it speaks, necessarily, for the whole country, and no citizen—however much he may scorn what he likes superciliously to pretend to be Stephen Decatur's unenlightenment—reserves a right of veto. "Nationalism" accepts the spirit of Decatur's dedication; acknowledges its authority; and is unashamed to confess an Americanism in harmony therewith.

But "Nationalism"—this traditional independence—does not snarl at peace. Because it distinguishes, as the late Senator Henry Cabot Lodge once said, between "visions" and "visionaries,"

merely proves it to be discriminating. Because it does not patronize elaborate theories for fabricating a world fraternity—as though human nature could be factored like an algebraic equation—confesses no desertion of the beatitudes. It is no automatic proof of wisdom and heartfulness to trail with nostrum venders rather than with a tradition, tried and found not wanting. On the contrary, the livery of seeming “peace” is worn by many a Greek horse. The “internationalist” often succumbs to the very menace from which he tries to chart escapes. Truth is that this radiant American tradition took its dominant inspiration from a love of the realities of peace. It was to save “engagement in frequent controversy” that Washington and Hamilton urged us to a destiny apart. The essence of “neutrality” is peace. The whole genius of this tradition is at war with war. The prime motive which urged it to the recent rejection of the League of Nations was the incalculable obligation of a subtle Covenant which bound us, like soldiers of fortune, into all the wars of all the world—a perpetual recruit to Mars. A tradition which abjured the “Holy Alliance” of a Metternich scarcely could submit to subsequent experiments, kindred in their apostrophes to force though not to power. As long ago as Hamilton, his “Federalist Papers” were saying this: “A sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities as contradistin-

guished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy." It is easier, declares the history and experience of nations, for leagues and alliances to cause than to cure wars. "Nationalism" refuses to paint these perpetual clouds upon the horizons of America. It loves justice: it hates force—except as the last recourse of self-ordered honor. Its passion is real peace. From its independent vantage it has given the world greater leadership and example in the arts of mediation and arbitration—the peaceful composition of justiciable controversy—than all the statesmanship of other lands combined. It stands incorrigibly for the integrity of international law. It has in the past—it will in the future—embrace whatever independent international tribunals are devised for the determination of international justice. It can never quarrel with World Courts—free to balance impartial facts and to resolve impartial equities—shorn of the politics and the intrigues that serve ambitions instead of amities. But these are all devices in which nations meet as sovereigns—just as Britain and America have met as sovereigns since the Treaty of Ghent and lived more than a century of model peace. In none of them is legitimate and essential "Nationalism" shorn of its self-determination and its

moral authority. Whenever these latter emascuations shall occur, not only will our tradition die and its trail terminate, but America will have lost the primal sources of her influence—her influence for justice—her influence for peace. "Nationalism" refuses to mute its oracle. It declines chains for its ideals. The last letter George Washington ever wrote looked across 3,000 miles of sea and expressed "the ardent wish, from principles of humanity and for the benevolent purpose of putting a stop to the further effusion of human blood, that the successful powers may know at what point to give cessation to the sword for the purpose of negotiation." That aspiration is warp and woof of our tradition. But so also is our independence of liability if such decisions shall be wrongly made. "Nationalism" applauds President Woodrow Wilson, at the beginning rather than at the end of his eruptive term, when he said of America—"a Nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world."

A stream can rise no higher than its source. The source even of "Internationalism" is and must be "Nationalism"—because the latter is the inevitable unit upon which the former must build. Destroy the latter, and the former immediately and automatically becomes anomalous. Just as the home is the basis, *sine qua non*, of the

Nation, so in turn the Nation is the basis of world co-operation. The "Nationalist" puts first things first. The "Internationalist" puts first things last. And fortunate it is that correct priorities have been observed on the trail of this tradition—as fortunate for effective world-wide progress as for bulwarked American independence. Take an independent America, unshackled and uncowed, out of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—substitute a dependent America, nodding when foreign Caesars nod, and throttling its democracy beneath the fingers of alien repressions and intrigues: then say for yourself whether the advancement and advantage of the world would have been proportionately served! It is traditional "Nationalism," in term of practical result, which spells true altruism. The "Internationalist" pulls up altruism by its very roots.

Another thing should be made clear. The "independence" which "Nationalism" strives to preserve is not the literal "isolation" which "Internationalism" hurls upon it, in an anathema of scorn, as if to demolish it with a derisive phrase. Since Washington and Hamilton looked upon America as a separate geographical estate, time and space have been annihilated. The oceans no longer are a moat around our citadel. Yet, they still give us a unique identity; and it still is powerfully true that the Old World has "a set of primary interests" unrelated to our own. Lord Milner described a physical fact when he spoke

of "the shrinkage of the world." The late Ambassador Walter Hines Page was quite right when, in 1914, he wrote that "this war is showing how we are a part of the great world whether we wish to be or not." Indeed, we are a part—a most important part. Our own colonial frontiers, by gradual expansion, have been pushed far beyond that "distant and detached" position to which the Founders looked for an element of national security. Commerce and industry are a world unit. "The United States is by no means self-sufficient," declares Herbert Hoover in answer to an interrogation intended for this survey. "If we would maintain the standards of living of the American people, we must import many things from foreign countries. Many of the commodities which we cannot produce are a vital part of our necessities and comforts." Intelligent "Nationalism" denies none of these material and physical facts. But it insists that the material and the physical shall not be confused with the political and the moral. As recently as July 6, 1925, the London *Daily News* was saying that "the enmities distracting Europe arise . . . from jealousies and fears from which America is free . . . through historical and geographical accidents." Thus do history and geography—and tradition—give us uninterrupted sanctuary even though miles have become as but minutes in this modern dispensation. Comparative "isolation"—in the elements that "Nationalism" cherishes—

persists. "Nationalism" means that they shall not voluntarily be surrendered. Thus, while "Nationalism" readily co-operates on its own volition—this latter being the crux of independence—with humanitarian enterprises invoked by the League of Nations or under any other trans-oceanic auspices, it refuses to forget that America has separate and different standards of life and government and it refuses either to merge these advantages in a general averaging of the standards of other lands, or to expose them, in any untoward degree, to the mandate of massed foreign pressure or duress. This is not a pose of superior virtue. It intends no invidious comparisons. On the contrary, it expressly seeks to avoid comparisons by avoiding dubious contacts. It proposes "to live and let live." It recognizes Europe's virtues as well as Europe's faults. It claims no monopoly in the one direction nor immunity in the other. But it demands the right of self-decision as to what America shall do with her own national life in those concerns that are the exclusive prerogative of a really free people. "Independence"—not "isolation"—is the actual aim: and tradition borrows the latter only in such practical and indispensable degree as the realities of the former may require. It is sound hygiene to quarantine against disease. That, in terms of world politics, is the only "isolation" which intelligent "Nationalism" envisions. As William R. Castle, Jr., Chief of the Division of Western

European Affairs in the Department of State, said at the Williamstown Institute of Politics for 1925, speaking particularly of the League of Nations: "We are not afraid of the League; we applaud its every accomplishment of good: . . . but to throw this country into the political activities of the League, almost exclusively European, would mean a betrayal of the vital interests of the country." If this is selfishness, it is enlightened selfishness—and the world, as well as ourselves, will continue to be the gainer by it—because "Nationalism," acting on inspiration gleaned from within, has never yet set beacons in the watch-towers of our beloved America without flashing signals of new hope and service all round the globe.

The tradition is "Independence" first—and "isolation" only as a practical contributor thereto and then only in a practical degree. The tradition's line of cleavage must be maintained. "Let Americans disdain to be the instrument of European greatness," cried Hamilton—and his soliloquy survives the years. "Peace and trade with all nations," was his motto: "but beyond our present engagements, political connections with none." His vision roamed the world: but his allegiance stopped at the shore-line of his America. He left us many shibboleths, but none of his emancipating precedents deserve better than his "Nationalism" the late President Harding's tribute: "The greater modern familiarity with Hamilton-

ism may become, the greater will be modern fidelities to essential American institutions."

"My policy," said Washington, "has been and will continue to be . . . to maintain friendly relations with but to be independent of all the nations of the earth." This trail of a tradition finds America perpetually faithful to that example and to the trust thus devised to the ages. "Nationalism" has made us what we are. Through "Nationalism," democracy has been encouraged out of darkness into light—a servant to America—then a servant to the world. "Nationalism"—not "Internationalism"—is the secret of our beneficent authority. The history of progress is the history of great "nationalities," inspired from within themselves and impulsed by their own unity. These "nationalities" may rise and fall: but, rising, they are the prime expression of civilization; and, falling, they are the natural prevention of world decay. Ours shall not fall or fail if we cling to intelligent American tradition—if, admonished by Isaiah, we "look unto the rock whence we are hewn."

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In presenting this study to the American public, I am conscious of its imperfections. No critic's barb is necessary to point them out. I am conscious, too, of a great debt to those who have sympathetically loaned a hand upon the trail—and to those consulted authorities which I have

endeavored scrupulously to acknowledge in footnote credits. If the labor shall do no more than inspire new and better inquiries into our great American inheritance, it will not have been in vain.

ARTHUR HENDRICK VANDENBERG.

EDITOR, *The Herald*,
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN,
November 1, 1925.

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The Trail of a Tradition

PART I

France Indispensably Aids American Independence

France Indispensably Aids American Independence

OUR tradition of intelligent and discriminating Nationalism—the doctrine of self-determining freedom from dangerous and avoidable foreign involvements—takes specific inception in America's official decision in 1793 to stand aloof from the Franco-British war and its far-flung involvements. But the trail of this tradition necessarily threads its tell-tale way back through that prior inchoate era when France played a major rôle in competitive North American explorations, in belligerent European rivalries for New World power, and in America's precarious achievement of its own epochal independence.

If in 1793 there were particular and emphatic reasons, born of this prior historical circumstance, which urged the young Republic into French partnership—reasons which, in stressful intimacy, never subsequently could be duplicated in contact with any other foreign power—it becomes primarily important to search them out. Then if, in spite of such a paramount challenge, it was the deliberate decision of the Founders of the

government that neutrality and comparative political isolation were America's logical and necessary posture, the authority of the precedent becomes impregnable. The trail of the tradition, therefore, must wend its fortuitous but significant way back into those kaleidoscopic days when time and events conspired to precipitate the miracle of American Independence.

The preliminary inquiry must discuss the extent of French assistance in America's Revolutionary triumph, and—in the light of these historical disclosures—must fix the fact that in all human probability the Colonies could not have won their independence at the time without French aid. This premise is the point at which we pick up the trail.

French motives in sustaining the revolt of the Colonies—first covertly, finally in the open—were far from altruistic, and their primarily selfish purpose becomes, at a later moment, a pertinent matter of illuminating examination.¹ But what-

¹ In his introduction to James Breck Perkins' *France in the American Revolution*, ex-Ambassador Jusserand says: "Two distinct influences acted together to bring about the alliance of France with the new Republic: that of the statesmen and that of the nation. Among certain statesmen the desire for reprisals was a potent factor, and the rebellion of the Colonies was welcomed chiefly because they rebelled against England. Among the French people at large, it was quite otherwise; the rebellious Colonies were popular, not especially because they wanted to throw off an English yoke, but because they wanted to throw off a yoke."

ever the motive, it cannot be gainsaid that from the dismal moment when the humiliating Treaty of Paris was exacted from France by Britain in 1763 terminating the "French and Indian War," down to the climax when Cornwallis surrendered Yorktown to French-American allies in 1781, there was never an hour when French influence—in one way or another—in one place or another—did not stimulate the Colonies, encourage their aspirations for independence, and facilitate their victorious separation from the oppressive Mother Land.¹ It may well have been that the pertinacity of this French assistance confessed an ulterior motive: but the results in terms of American advantage and salvation were the same, regardless of whether France was primarily interested in reprisals that should cripple her historic and perennial British foe.

¹ The Treaty of Paris, dated February 10, 1763, terminated a great international quarrel known in Europe as the Seven Years' War, and in America as the French and Indian War. From the British standpoint this struggle was simply a continuation of the long conflict between France and Great Britain for political supremacy and economic triumph. In North America "the territorial rivalry between France and England had been manifested as early as 1689, and continued without interruption until 1763, when France was compelled to accept peace upon terms which meant the annihilation of her proudest colonial ambitions, and the abandonment of a western empire which her adventurous subjects had made a heroic effort to retain." *History of North America*, Vol. VI, by Profs. Veditz and James.

When the Duc de Choiseul signed the bitterly offensive Treaty of Paris in 1763, he is said to have consoled himself with the thought that it soon would be broken: and within five years—encouraged by the monitory frictions of the “Stamp Act”—he had devised a plan to be followed by France at the moment when the Colonists should declare their independence, and he had sent Baron de Kalb to America to watch and aid the processes of revolution.¹ Though he shortly fell from power, his intriguing aspirations were soon caught up and galvanized by Comte de Vergennes to whom Louis XVI committed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To Vergennes, England was France’s enemy in peace as well as war.² Though his zeals were spasmodic—rising and falling in cautious reflections of the fluctuating fortunes, in the field, of the warring Colonials—Vergennes was constant in his hopes and equally in his ultimate decisions.

In 1775-76 there were continuous secret negotiations between France and the Colonial leaders. Turgot, the great French Minister of Finance, was the chief opponent of Vergennes’ counsel: but as early as May, 1776, the latter had secured the King’s consent to a loan to America of one million livres (equivalent to \$181,500)—the first open and tangible encouragement the Colonists ever externally received—and the loan was formally

¹ Doniol’s *Participation de la France*, Vol. I, p. 637.

² Van Tyne in *The American Nation*, Vol. ix, p. 203.

voted on December 23, 1776. Meanwhile, surreptitious assistance was organizing on a large scale. America was permitted to buy arms and ammunition in France. Vergennes, Foreign Minister, and M. Caron de Beaumarchais, indefatigable semi-official partisan of the Colonial cause, were the French liaison. At first Silas Deane and then Benjamin Franklin were the American Commissioners. All transactions were clothed in secrecy because France still was nominally at peace and still dissembling in the face of vehement protests by Lord Stormont, British ambassador in Paris. Indeed, when Franklin—destined to capture the French mass imagination even as did Rousseau and Voltaire—arrived, he was “obliged to sulk about Paris in obscurity,” according to the words of John Adams. Yet, by October, 1776, Deane was able to send home clothing for 20,000 men, muskets for 30,000, gunpowder, cannon, shot and shell in large quantities.¹ Franklin’s success in winning not only material resources, but also the hearts of the French Court and people is a matter of common information. Indeed, French aid to America was perhaps never more effective than during these two years when she was ostensibly at peace with England.² All the necessities of war, even the gold to pay the soldiers, were sent to America through the agency

¹ Wharton’s *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, Vol. II, p. 148.

² Van Tyne in *The American Revolution*, Vol. IX.

of a new mercantile house on one of the main streets of Paris—"Hortalez et Cie."—which was the creation of Beaumarchais, with the approval of Vergennes, for the sole purpose of aiding America. But the essential contemplation is that they were sent. The mask of French neutrality prevented maximum potentialities and caused frequent embarrassments—as when a great show of official hindrance interfered with the departure of the brave young Marquis de Lafayette in March, 1777. But there is no doubting the embattling influence—spiritual as well as material—which France flung into the Colonial equation during these initial years of studiously veiled alliance.

Then came the momentous Battle of Saratoga,¹ and Burgoyne's surrender in the North. If this providential victory was epochally decisive, it was not alone because of its military and moral effect upon the Colonies, but also because it precipitated French decision, previously hesitant, to stand forward as the open and avowed champion of American Revolution. When the news reached Paris December 7, 1777, Beaumarchais dislocated his arm in his mad rush to get this thrilling word to the King,² and Vergennes sped his Colonial

¹ The Battle of Saratoga is listed in the *Standard Dictionary of Facts*, p. 22, as one of the fifteen decisive battles of the world, and as the battle which "virtually decided the fate of the American Revolution."

² *The American Nation*, Van Tyne, Vol. IX, p. 223.

program lest Great Britain should acknowledge America's independence and France thus lose the American gratitude which an open and effective alliance would win.¹ Terms of a Treaty were quickly composed; signed by the Commissioners on February 6, 1778; ratified by the American Congress on May 4, 1778. There were two conventions: one, a commercial Treaty; the other, a political and defensive military alliance between France and America. It was the first, last and only Treaty of alliance ever made by the United States.² It came at a critical moment when the scales of American destiny, despite Saratoga, balanced precariously in the hands of fate. When Gerard, the first resultant French Minister, arrived in America and was received by the Continental Congress that primitive parliament piously acknowledged "the hand of a gracious Providence in raising them up so powerful a friend."³ If the alliance did not actually save the American cause, it greatly shortened the struggle⁴ and in all human probability—so far as such a speculation may be judged—the overt appearance of France on the side of the Colonies, facilitating French support on

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

² "The one entangling alliance of our history, the indispensable instrument of our deliverance as a nation."—Corwin's *French Policy and the American Alliance*, p. 358.

³ *History of North America*, Veditz and James, Vol. VI, p. 319.

⁴ *The American Nation*, Van Tyne, Vol. IX, p. 226.

land and particularly on sea, was the turning point and the controlling factor in Revolutionary fortunes.

Since this survey aspires to no detail as an intimate Revolutionary chronicle—being concerned solely with an objective estimate of the part France played in liberating the Colonies—we may pass the indecisive era that followed from 1778 to 1780 and rely upon subsequent summaries for a sufficient picture. It is enough to say that the name of Lafayette—trade-marking the heroic heartfulness of France—is written so constantly upon these pages that it is easily appreciable why fourteen decades later the faithful legend of historic Franco-American fraternity should have become articulate, in another century and on another continent, in the famous reciprocal apostrophe—"Lafayette, we are here!"¹ Though the King withheld permission, though the British Minister to France protested, though family and home and kindred beckoned the youthful nobleman to return, he left all to fight the battle of freedom in this new and uncertain world.² Fitting a vessel at his own expense, he eluded all patrols and with the brave De Kalb³ and a small company of adventurous followers he reached George-

¹ This pregnant address is commonly but erroneously attributed to General Pershing. As a matter of fact, it was uttered at the tomb of Lafayette July 4, 1917, by Colonel Charles E. Stanton, U. S. Army, now retired.

² Ridpath's *History of the United States*.

³ De Kalb was wounded eleven times and finally killed at the Battle of Sanders Creek, South Carolina, August, 1780.

town, South Carolina, in April, 1777; he at once entered the patriot army as a volunteer and three months later was commissioned a Major General. He was only in his twentieth year—the same precocious age, it might be said parenthetically, as young Alexander Hamilton who was destined to become his great and constant friend and who is soon to loom large upon this trail of a tradition. Lafayette was no dress-parade cavalier. He became a partner in the Revolution's hardest travail and a veteran in its heaviest campaigning. He commanded Washington's right wing at Brandywine where he was severely wounded. He went through the terror and the sacrifice of Valley Forge. He led the cavalry at Monmouth when the British had evacuated Philadelphia after the first French fleet under d'Estaing had been despatched to America and up the Delaware. He was in the unsuccessful coup launched at Newport. Indeed, he was so constant a figure in every phase of the active Revolution that he richly deserves the canonization which American history and the emotions of the American heart have given him. Yet he was but one of many loyal Frenchmen—indeed, of many Knights not only from France but other foreign strands—who put their swords upon the altars of this momentous adventure in new freedom. To attempt the roll would either trespass too lengthily upon our space or threaten the injustice of cruel and ungrateful omissions. Suffice it to emphasise

Lafayette—as our commonly accepted habits of thought always have done—and present him as a type.

The Revolution moved into its final phase from July, 1780—when Admiral de Ternay arrived at Newport with his French squadron conveying 6,000 land troops under Count Rochambeau—to October, 1781, when the consolidated French-American arms, by land and sea, won the convincing and conclusive Battle of Yorktown. For the purpose of estimating the importance of French aid in this final glorious Revolutionary epoch, we shall turn aside from beaten paths of history and consult an exhibit which here sees the light of day for the first time. It is particularly significant because it discloses the candid trepidation which controlled the high commanders of the Colonial forces even within a year of Yorktown. It bears emphatically upon the measure of French potency because it circumscribes the fateful area of final Revolutionary decision as being in the South, and confidentially confesses that France alone could be the source of Republican salvation there. And it fits into the ultimate scheme of this general inquiry—when we reach and pursue the main trail of this tradition—because it is from the pen of Alexander Hamilton, destined to become the master pilot in charting the safe courses—whether domestic or foreign—for this new Ship of State.

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After Rochambeau and his French Army had debarked at Newport, it was agreed that Washington and the new French soldier-chieftain should confer upon co-operative strategy at Hartford, Connecticut, because this town was about equidistant between Newport and Washington's headquarters.¹ Washington was accompanied to this vital rendezvous by Lafayette, Knox, Hamilton and five other aides.² They reached Hartford on September 20 or 21, 1780. As a result of the deliberations, all jointly signed a memorandum asking the French government for further assistance both in men and money. They particularly sought a French naval force which might be sufficient to insure the success of future operations, and re-emphasised the pressing need for more

¹ According to the unpublished statistical record of the Continental Army under Washington's immediate command—a huge manuscript folio in the Clements Library at the University of Michigan—Washington's headquarters at this time moved about in New Jersey and New York within a limited circle just beyond the British lines. In the summer and fall of 1780, this record notes Washington's headquarters on August 12 as Orangetown; on September 16 as Steenrapie; on October 14 as Totowa. Orangetown is on the Hudson just opposite Phillipsburg, a few miles above Yonkers. Totowa, according to a 1776 map, is a few miles above Hackensack on the Passaic River. We know, too, that Washington and his staff, including Hamilton, went to Hackensack to attend the funeral of General Poor on September 10, 1780.

² *France in the American Revolution*, by James Breck Perkins, p. 314.

funds. But behind all this formality was a deep and burning American conviction that the response to this prayer would determine the final outcome of the Revolution. Proof to this end lies in a letter which is now disclosed for the first time.¹

Just as Hamilton was preparing for this journey to Hartford with Washington he poured out his heart to a distinguished Frenchman who possessed formidable "influence in the councils of France." Who this high correspondent may have been can be only a matter of conjecture because the first four pages of the letter and its salutation are missing. But it is dated at the bottom—"Newbridge, September 13, 1780."² During the month of September, 1780, most of Washington's actual letters are dated—"Headquarters, Bergen County." One of this series is more closely identified with the superscription—"Headquarters, Newbridge, Sept. 15, 1780." Newbridge is a small town in Bergen County, New Jersey, about a mile north of Hackensack. Therefore, it is a reasonable presumption that this Hamilton letter was written at Washington's chief Headquarters; and, in the light of history at Hartford and subsequently, it may be taken as an intimate and confidential reflection of the inner fears and

¹ The original of this letter, written in Hamilton's hand and bearing his signature is in the possession of the author of this book.

² It is an interesting coincidence that this was the fortnight of Benedict Arnold's treason at West Point.

the inner hopes which commanded the troubled thoughts of the Revolution's high command in this perilous hour so fraught with far-flung consequences to America and to the world. Here is what Hamilton wrote to his influential confidante in the "councils of France":

"This would be the most dangerous stroke they could give to our cause—it would not only conciliate the greatest part of the people immediately in their power; but would prepare the minds of their neighbours to yield an easy submission. This argument aided by the prevailing eloquence of military force would become almost irresistible. I would not for the world that the Tories throughout the Continent were armed with such a weapon to extend the influence of their parts. It may be objected that the Commissioners offered everything, which I suppose in this case to be granted—and that the popular voice as well as that of Congress rejected their offers. But you, my dear sir, know too much of human nature not to perceive there is a wide difference between the same thing in prospect and in practice. When it was nothing but an offer to people out of their power, it was an affair of speculation—there was room to insinuate doubts about the sincerity of the offers—to give what interpretations suited our purpose—to influence the opinions and passions of the people as we wished. But if the enemy, after having subdued two States, should exemplify their offers by establishing government agreeable to the

ancient habits of the people, it will be urged as a proof of their moderation and sincerity. The people feeling themselves in the same situation in which they formerly were will soon be reconciled to it—and emissaries from among them will endeavor to persuade those of the neighbouring States that they have gained by the change. These, tired of resisting under discouraging circumstances, and seeing those in the conquered States in the same predicament in which they were formerly happy, will insensibly learn to think that they are contending for an unreal good and incurring certain ills—they will feel no aversion, or not enough, to returning to the dominion of Britain.

“Two things ought to be well attended to in this matter—one that this contest was undertaken on a speculation of evils that were expected to result from a usurpation on the rights of this country—not from oppressions actually subsisting and felt by the people. As the people commonly act more from their feelings than from their understandings, there is great danger that present sufferings will overcome the apprehension of speculative ills, and make them regret having drawn upon themselves the former to avoid the latter.

“The people of the Southern States are not actuated by the same principles with those of the Northern—a hereditary hatred of the English nation—a hereditary love of Republican govern-

ment—the enthusiasm of a different and once persecuted religion. The only motive in the first instance with the Southern States was an attachment to Liberty, with a predilection however in favor of monarchical government which has since worn off but has not been succeeded by an aversion to it. In the progress of the Revolution, a desire of independence has infused itself, but this passion will act less powerfully on the minds of the common people than of their leaders, and cannot be relied on for a perseverance in opposition under all extremities.

“The result of these observations is that it is of the greatest importance France should give the most vigorous assistance to this country and at this juncture, particularly to remove the war from the Southern States—and that if the war continues, she should do everything possible to procure for us a considerable loan, or we must sink under it—tis impossible a country can carry on a war without finances and we have no sufficient funds within ourselves.

“I beg you, my dear sir, to understand me rightly. I am not one of those who forget the gratitude we owe to France for saving us hitherto from ruin, in an expectation of greater services, as if we paid her a subsidy to be at our disposal. Do the justice to my sentiments to believe that I have the liveliest sense of our obligations to your country—and that I speak as one sincerely anxious for her interests as well as those of Amer-

ica. If I had the honor to be a Frenchman, and had influence in the councils of France, my advice would have been from the beginning—'Transfer the weight of your exertions to the American Continent and do the rest afterwards.' Your situation and still more your talents give you that influence; and I use with confidence the liberty you have indulged me with of offering you my ideas of our affairs."

Here is a letter, written by Hamilton when scarcely across the threshold of maturity, which shows all of that incandescent cogency of expression for which his pen was destined to become internationally and eternally famous. Though composed in and intended only for the sanctuary of private correspondence, it reads like a sustained thesis—breathing the sincerity which was the soul of his opinions, and carrying the commanding authority of his convictions. Perhaps the finality with which it pronounces diagnosis upon events that were safer left to the prescriptions of Time, confesses the over-weaning zeals of youth; yet the constant characteristic of this rare patriot's life and works was the assurance with which he spoke and the certainty with which he moved, no matter how tremendous or far-reaching might be the implications of the successive crises which he served. Nor, let it be remembered, was he a neophyte at this moment, despite his tender years. Six years before, he had electrified the Colonies—and set Tory gold to bidding for his

homilies—with his pamphleteering defenses of the Continental Congress.¹ For three years already he had been General George Washington's Military Secretary—creating a martial literature of which he was the recording artist, if not the initial inspiration. It was, after all, a seasoned authorship, which inscribed this quoted letter to an unknown, but evidently important, French correspondent; and it was an authorship more intimately close to the root-sources of contemporary history than any other of its time. This was, in other words, an authoritative view of Colonial exigency and portent as fateful 1780 was drawing to a close upon desperate crusaders.

The first section of this letter, unfortunately shorn of its missing preliminary text, permits only a speculation as to its purport. But the reference to "two subdued States" at the time fits nicely into existing facts in Georgia and South Carolina—the former having fallen completely before the British arms, despite the assistance of Count d'Estaing and his French fleet in a futile

¹ *A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress from the Calumnies of their Enemies, in Answer to a Letter under the Signature of a West Chester Farmer, Whereby his Sophistry is Exposed, his Cavils Confuted, his Artifices Detected, and his Wit Ridiculed*, issued in December, 1774; also *The Farmer Refuted; or a More Comprehensive and Impartial View of the Disputes between Great Britain and the Colonies, Intended as a Further Vindication of the Congress*, issued in February, 1775.

effort to recapture Savannah—the latter having been potentially lost when Charleston, the principal city of the South, was taken by Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot. Hamilton's obvious fear was that unexpected wisdom and moderation—ordinarily so spectacularly absent from the Cabinets of George III—might inspire a British experiment in favorable Colonial autonomies in these two States, to the end that the power of this happy example might reassure Colonial neighbors and weaken their morale. Lending substance to the possibility of such a British gesture was the fact, to which he adverts, that in 1778 the British sovereign—perhaps momentarily sobered by the Franco-American Alliance—assented to two Bills, sponsored by Lord North and passed by Parliament, conceding every privilege the Colonists had claimed; and the fact that Royal Commissioners had visited America and stressed this composition even to the extent of intrigue and bribery. Not even the knowledge that the Continental Congress had spurned these belated concessions and demanded complete independence as the price of armistice sufficed to assuage the young patriot's doubt because he counted the frailties of "human nature" as likely to yield "in practice" to what it had been speculatively willing to contest "in prospect."

But this phase of the letter is pertinent to this inquiry only as it emphasises Hamilton's localiza-

tion of menace in the South. It is this latter physical fact which is the prime basis of his appeal for French aid as being vital to the cause of the Colonies. He frankly doubts the tenacity of Republic fidelities in this Southern sector—not as a reflection on its patriotism, but as a logical expression of its natural and traditional inclinations. With him it was a matter of mass psychology which demanded prompt and effectual attention. Certainly it was not an indictment—because no one knew better than he that in these self-same Colonies of Georgia and South Carolina there was as noble and persistent a demonstration of implacable resistance, in spots, as glorified any of our Revolutionary pages. There are no epics of superlative heroism surpassing the stories, for instance, of brave Sergeant Jasper, the hero of Fort Moultrie, or of Colonel Thomas Sumter with whom young Andrew Jackson began his career as a soldier, or of intrepid Francis Marion and his “Ragged Regiment.” Ridpath says in his *History of the United States*, that “it was the territory, and not the people, who were conquered.”

Yet here stands the record of Hamilton’s candid doubts—expressed not in rancor but in a blunt assessment of conditions. We know that during the year 1780 military operations at the North were, for the most part, suspended; and that when Sir Henry Clinton, with a division of 5,000 men from the army in New York, set sail for Charleston, the plan of campaign was to con-

centrate upon the subjugation of the South. We know that this presented a crushing menace to the Colonial cause—because an alienated South, regardless of the reasons behind its withdrawal from the war, would have created a fatal division in American resources. And we have here the frank suggestion from Washington's Military Secretary and confidante, no doubt echoing the opinions of the Commander-in-Chief himself, that American arms alone never could dislodge this conquest if once accomplished and consolidated.

That the South did have an ethnic, economic and environal viewpoint different from the North was quite as true then as it proved to be throughout the first three-quarters of a century of the life of the organized Republic. To acknowledge that difference intends no reflection on the lofty qualities of heart and mind which the Southern Colonies contributed to the American creation—any more than an acknowledgment of the fact of a subsequent Civil War, climaxing these differences and liquidating them for all time, is an untoward denial of native Southern virtues. Were there no other exhibits—an absurd presumption—the fact that Washington was a Virginian would be answer enough to any calumny imputing to these Southern States a lack of vivid and effectual Revolutionary contributions. No such meditation, we may be assured, resided in young Hamilton's heart—a heart which beat in perfect and life-long devotion to this Virginian. In his

letter he merely was submitting physical fact and prospect to a clinical examination; and the findings included the disclosure of a special exposure and a special hazard in this Southern area.¹ When John Adams of Massachusetts in the Continental Congress moved Washington's selection as Commander-in-Chief, one motive frankly was to identify this area more intimately with the North and East where practically all of the overt acts precipitating Revolution had occurred.² No less acute an analyst than President Coolidge³ has said that "Adams saw, and made others see, the peculiar reasons that urged Washington; the Middle Colonies dominated by their landed aristocracies, had much in common with the social

¹ One of the symptoms of the thing discussed might be the relative attitudes of the sectors towards slavery as an institution: another might be the discovery that South of the Potomac educational facilities "were irregular and generally designed for the benefit of the wealthier classes, whereas in the times preceding the Revolution there was not to be found in all New England an adult, born in the country, who could not read and write."—Ridpath's *History of the United States*, Vol. I, p. 282.

² Spectacular exceptions to this rule might be noted: Patrick Henry's labors in the Virginia Assembly; the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence in North Carolina in 1775; the initiative of Richard Henry Lee and Thomas Jefferson, both of Virginia, in the Philadelphia Declaration of Independence.

³ Speech at Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3, 1925, celebrating the 150th anniversary of the day Washington took command of the Continental Army.

and economic system of the South; to them Washington meant the enlistment of property, substance, and eminent respectability." Hamilton, in 1780, then, was merely recording what Adams had sought to forefend in 1775 and what Coolidge echoed in historical perspective in 1925. There was a root-difference in the social and economic structure, North and South; and by 1780, military exigency, born of deliberate British purpose, had magnified this difference into the most ominous conspiracy of intangible forces and fortuitous events which the doubtful cause of independence confronted. The control of this critical focus was Hamilton's apostrophe to France.¹

We may pass the speculation as to the tenacity of Southern motives and adherences on the one hand and congenital habits and traditions on the other. We may confine ourselves to physical fact: and the external fact wholly vindicated

¹ Bearing upon these differences of conditions, Profs. Veditz and James, writing in the *History of North America*, Vol. VI, pp. 10 and 17, say: "These three separate groups (of colonies) differed not only from a geographical point of view, but also because the people, the customs, the manners, and the occupations in each of these groups were unlike those of the others. . . . Class distinctions were most notable in the South. In Virginia and Maryland, property passed to the eldest sons, as in England. This system naturally tended to keep up the family name and position, and to establish a permanent landed aristocracy. Education, moreover, was in the South almost a monopoly of the rich."

the internal doubts which Hamilton so bluntly insinuated, despite the super-essential contributions which the South made to the attainment of independence at every step of the tortuous way. As a matter of fact, too, it was a confession of Northern incapacity quite as much as an arraignment of Southern exposure because the one could not handle the other. France was asked "to remove the war from the Southern States." France was told that this responsibility was critical. France was acknowledged, in plain words, to have "saved us hitherto from ruin."¹ France was promised unforgettable "gratitude" for the past—but faced with paramount obligation for the future. There was subtle reminder of a collateral, if not the principal, French motive—obviously that of clipping British talons—in the admonition to concentrate French effort at the moment on the American Continent "and do the rest afterwards." The "rest" was unrelated to the cause of American independence. But, regardless of motive, the letter plainly indicates that Hamilton felt the eventuality of American victory rested upon French initiative and co-op-

¹ Prof. O. W. Stephenson of the University of Michigan, writing in *The American Historical Review*, January, 1925, says: "It may be stated with some degree of assurance that if it had not been for the great quantities of powder obtained by importations from France before the Saratoga campaign, the Revolution would have broken down long before that time."

eration, particularly in this exposed and, therefore, susceptible Southern sector.

That the British were acting on this theory of effecting a Southern conquest and thus breaking the Revolution by severing its unity—quite as Hamilton's letter fearfully prophesied—is the military record of history. The story of 1781, the climaxing Revolutionary year, was written almost exclusively in this Southern area. While Washington remained impatiently upon the Hudson—holding Clinton in New York, feverishly alarmed by false despatches written for the purpose of falling into his hands and misleading him into constant expectation of attack—the theatre of actual action was largely in Virginia and below. The traitor Arnold, rewarded for his crass treason with a British commission, commanded British detachments which entered James River and wrought ruthless havoc. Succeeded by General Phillips, with a force of 2,000 British regulars, the fertile districts of Lower Virginia were submitted to the sacrifice of fire and sword. Then came Lord Cornwallis to lead the consolidated drive that should complete these Southern conquests which Hamilton painted as the maximum menace to American independence.

But Hamilton was partially wrong, events proved, in the notion that American self-sufficiency could not handle itself in this moot area. It was General Greene, General Morgan, General St. Clair, Colonel William Washington and their

faithful Continentals—ever supported by the stabbing thrusts of Sumter's and Lee's and Marion's indefatigable irregulars—who swept Georgia and the Carolinas once more free of Britishers and Hessians in all territory south of Virginia except only the cities of Charleston and Savannah, which remained under the King's arms. It was native militia, too, which largely set the stage for the ultimate achievement in Virginia.

Whether that ultimate achievement could have been possible, however, without French support is a question likely to be resolved in keeping with Hamilton's prophetic pleas. The defense of Virginia had been entrusted to the intrepid young Lafayette. He was unequal to the risk, at first, of meeting Cornwallis in the field; but he watched and waited and maneuvered with ceaseless vigilance. Suffice it to say that the hour finally struck, in August, 1781, when Lafayette conceived the situation ripe for the *coup de grace*. Urgent despatches besought Washington to hasten South for this final blow; and Washington responded—moving his Army under cover of one more of those strategic silences which marked him as a genius of command. Rochambeau joined the momentous pilgrimage with about 5,000 French troops.¹ It was the only successful movement

¹ The only returns of the French Army in the Revolutionary War on file in the War Department at Washington show the effective force of that Army to have been 5,350 on August 1, 1781, and 4,803 on August 27, 1781.

of major importance in which the French and American Armies fought side by side and in common ranks; but it was the moment of fateful destiny—as Hamilton had foreseen, and as history was soon to record. These converging forces had to march overland on foot 350 miles in two months—all the while outwitting the vigilance of a flanking foe. It was a miracle of military skill thus to consolidate these forces on the Virginia Peninsula, and the genius of Washington was the prime factor in this achievement, yet it does not seem an idle speculation to assert that without Rochambeau and Lafayette and de Grasse and de Barras, Yorktown might have been but one more inconclusive skirmish instead of a great decision in the history of Liberty's emancipations.

Cornwallis was entrenched in Yorktown. A powerful French fleet, under command of Count de Grasse and numbering twenty-eight ships of the line with nearly 4,000 troops on board, reached the Chesapeake and safely anchored in the mouth of the York River. Count de Barras, commanding the French flotilla at Newport, joined de Grasse with eight ships of the line, ten transports and cannon for the siege. These French naval forces easily—but roughly—routed the British squadron under Admiral Graves. Cornwallis, with the British Army, was blockaded both by land and sea. It was the beginning of the end. On the 18th of October, 1781, Cornwallis capitulated.

The whole British force, numbering 7,247 English soldiers and Hessian mercenaries, marched from their trenches and with 840 sailors laid down their arms, delivered their standards, became prisoners of war, acknowledged an American independence impregnable from that day to this. These figures are not impressive in the presence of modern familiarity with the vast and awful enginery of modern war: but they describe an authority which once all but changed the whole course of history and destiny.

It was a victory of the allied ranks of France and America. As Hamilton had written from Newbridge thirteen months before, the full weight of French exertion was transferred to the American Continent and became the major factor in accomplishing the aspiration he had addressed. And he was there to see the eventuality. Commanding a light corps, he led his men, with dashing impetuosity, against the first British redoubts and made the spectacular capture which set the pace for the confounding of Cornwallis and the accomplished independence of the federated Colonies. "Few men," wrote Washington of this final exploit, "have exhibited greater proofs of intrepidity, coolness and firmness than were shown on this occasion."

It seems a reasonable assumption that Cornwallis could not have been defeated at Yorktown without French assistance. "The outcome of the American Revolution without French aid

may be problematical," one student has declared¹; but it is certain that without that aid, the army under Cornwallis could not have been captured. The siege of Yorktown could not have been attempted without the co-operation of a fleet, and the Americans had no fleet; while of the forces which took part in the operations on land, one-half were French." Says another authority²: "The last great victory over England was due to the aid given at Yorktown by the French fleet and army." Just as the carefully planned attack on Newport failed in the summer of 1778 because d'Estaing was driven to sea by Admiral Howe, so Yorktown unquestionably could not have bottled Cornwallis with finality without deGrasse and deBarras in control of the York River and its approaches.

A different eventuality at Yorktown might not have ended the Revolution in permanently accepted American disaster because "Liberty or Death" was a reality of alternatives in the brave hearts of countless Colonial leaders. But an honest assessment of the difficulties which Washington was having with his unpaid, illy fed and wretchedly clothed army puts us on warning that not even his matchless command of American affections could have been proof much longer against cabal and disintegration. Meanwhile,

¹ *France in the American Revolution*, by James Breck Perkins, p. 10.

² Van Tyne in *The American Nation*, Vol. IX, p. 226.

candor cannot dismiss the hypothesis of possible disaster which Hamilton described in his prophetic Newbridge letter. In whatever degree Yorktown was essential to American independence, France—climaxing thirteen years of sympathetic helpfulness—cannot be foreclosed from dominating credits.

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Surveying the general Revolutionary picture in composite summaries, certain sustained conclusions become well-nigh inevitable. They point the correct answer—as near as any metaphysical hypothesis can claim to be thus definitely resolved—to this primary question: Could the Colonies have won their independence without French aid? And they ultimately answer: No.

Barring the magnificent fidelities of individual cavaliers who came to us with the flaming and chivalrous zeals of veritable crusaders, and excepting the final crowning episode at Yorktown, it probably must be admitted that France was comparatively negligible as a contributor of effective land forces—so far as the actual conquests of those forces are concerned. The eventful campaign of 1781 was really the only year in which American and French armies fought effectively side by side.¹ The importance of this

¹ *France in the American Revolution*, by Perkins, p. 343. Ridpath says that it was the destitution of Washington's Army which made immediate co-operation with Rocham-

campaign is not to be discounted. But even here the paramount French factor was naval. In other words—given, all other elements of support—it would be doubtful judgment to say that the Colonies could not have succeeded in their land fighting without imported re-enforcements. The numbers under arms—so far as conflicting authorities can be resolved—present such relative disparity that this fact alone, disregarding the clear implication of movements in the field, would suggest inherent Colonial self-sufficiency in this branch of service. The aggregate number of organized French land forces which at all times assisted the Americans was not over 15,500, according to the best data available in the War Department, and even this is believed to err on the side of liberality.¹ On the other hand, the

beau's French forces at Newport in 1780 impractical. Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 207, quotes Washington as writing the President of the Continental Congress at this time and in reference to furnishing the basis for effectual Franco-American liaison: "The die is cast; and it remains with the States either to fulfill their engagements, preserve their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in disgrace and defeat."

¹ So far as can be ascertained, the organized land forces contributed by France were between 4,000 and 6,000 under d'Estaing participating in the assault on Savannah, Georgia, in October, 1779; between 5,000 and 6,200 under Rochambeau at Newport and later at Yorktown; and between 3,000 and 3,300 under Saint Simon, brought by de Grasse from San Domingo to co-operate with Rochambeau at Yorktown.

American land forces were much more than twice this figure. It has been estimated that there were 395,330 American "enlistments" during the Revolution. But this figure cannot be a census of individuals, for it is common knowledge that numerous patriots "enlisted" two, three or more different times or performed several "tours" of service. According to returns on file in the War Department, the American army attained its greatest strength in the latter part of 1778. The only specific figure available is 34,644—the total strength on November 1, 1778, although this does not include a dozen regiments for which no individual returns of that date have been found.¹ Then, too, there were many Colonial irregulars engaged in the conflict. On land, in other words, French aid, either numerically or strategically, was not the decisive factor that it was in at least two other directions—on the sea and in finance. Yet no one would care, of course, to deny that these French reserves, by the sheer encouragement of their sustaining presence, were not a powerful and nourishing influence upon

According to B. J. Lossing, a careful historian, the French King had intended to send a corps of 12,000 men to Rochambeau at Newport, but only the First Division was given him.

¹ A monthly return of the Continental Army for about November 30, 1778, shows a strength of 34,754, but does not include the cavalry for which no return of that date has been found.

wavering American army morale, even though their martial effectiveness except at Yorktown was comparatively inconsequential. "Weariness of the conflict was widespread when the alliance with France was made," writes one analyst.¹ "It grew stronger each year that the conflict endured. Even with French aid Washington with difficulty maintained a small army of poorly equipped men; without that aid it is hard to see how he could have kept an army in the field at all."

But it was not French soldiery—again excepting individual volunteers² to whom debt must be forever acknowledged—which spelled the paramount French aid to American independence. Indeed, the character of key-assistance rendered in other directions seems to have been so indisputably essentially that French land forces might largely be dismissed from the equation and still leave France in the rôle of America's indispensable Revolutionary "first friend."

One of these latter theatres was the sea. "Were the records of the American Navy for this period of its service complete," declares one authority,³

¹ James Breck Perkins in *France in the American Revolution*, p. 9.

² Among these individuals it is impossible not to note the gallant Colonel de Fleury who led one of two attacking columns—Wayne led the other—in the spectacular recapture of Stony Point in July, 1779.

³ *History of North America*, by Veditz and James, Vol. VI, p. 388.

“the part played by it in the Revolution would be seen to have had very much more importance than is commonly attributed to it.” This may be pridefully admitted—aye, proclaimed—and still leave the final verdict that French fleets were vital to American victory. It is true that during the Revolution no less than 70,000 Americans fought the British upon the sea—a greater number than was enrolled at any one time upon the land. It is true that from the very first, these naval forces were highly effective in their guerrilla harassments.¹ It is true that the heavy numerical superiority of Great Britain over the United States in ships, guns and men at the outbreak of hostilities was practically overcome by the time hostilities ended. It is true that the losses inflicted upon British shipping by the American navy were the most unvarying sustained by that great maritime power. It is true—gloriously true—that intrepid Captain John Paul Jones conducted audacious warfare off the coast of England with a bravery, an abandon, and a skill which challenges comparison in all the annals of history and time since men have gone down to the sea in ships. It is true—superbly true—that

¹ During the year 1776 the American ships, despite their small numbers, captured 342 British vessels; in 1777, 467 vessels, despite the fact that during this latter year the American coast was patrolled by seventy powerful British cruisers.

when his *Bon Homme Richard*¹ lashed itself to the British *Serapis* on September 23, 1779, and, despite its own silenced batteries and the normal presumption that it was hopelessly overwhelmed, swept through to unparalleled victory, the story of the sea was jeweled with an incandescent epic which never will cease to illuminate the ages. All these achievements are, of a right, part of our most precious historical inheritance. Still the fact remains—and its acknowledgment involves not the remotest disparagement of these native credits—that this American naval activity was essentially sporadic. It was largely a war of privateersmen which preyed primarily upon British commerce. It was the strategy of “hit and run.” It was commercially destructive—no mean factor, true, in influencing the outcome of an international duel—but it lacked the convincing authority of battle-fleets and organized maritime offensives that could support land campaigns, clear native harbors, hold home ports, and deal really lethal blows to the fighting forces of the enemy.² For these major services we relied largely

¹ Outfitted in France and named for Benjamin Franklin—*Poor Richard*.

² It is casually interesting to note that James Boyd in his recent novel, *Drums*, which claims historical accuracy, puts the following words into the mouth of John Paul Jones: “Privateers! Skulking buzzards! All for prize money and a whole skin! . . . Ye’ll gain nothing by privateers, do ye mind, and ye’ll lose much. The object of a war is not to annoy the enemy, but to annihilate him.

upon our ally. Time and again the most critical of Revolutionary situations within the domestic zone of action hung upon the issue of sea support. The British evacuated Philadelphia the Colonial capitol, in '78 only because the approach of d'Estaing's ships drove Howe's squadron out of the Delaware. The descent by land upon Newport only failed because the descent by sea was frustrated. New York was held by fleets rather than by regiments. Rochambeau's army never would have reached America without de Ternay's convoy. Lafayette was unable to attack and capture Arnold at Portsmouth in '81 solely because de Barras' fleet, checked by a British squadron, was unable to co-operate. Yorktown, as we have seen, would have been hopelessly inconclusive without the grim French battle-line which closed the ocean against support or retreat by sea. No authority ever can say with finality that American perseverance—and a natural aptitude for maritime adventure—would not have overcome even these naval handicaps in the course of time: but, on the other hand, no frank assessment of realities can deny that French sailors and French ships contributed the assistance which largely influenced the martial outcome as event actually befell.

But the greatest of all tangibles contributed

Your lousy privateers will capture a few stray merchantmen, pocket their booty and leave ye to fight the men of war which their raids have brought into these waters!"

by France to the winning of American independence was money. As Hamilton said in his Newbridge letter: "'Tis impossible a country can carry on a war without finances and we have no sufficient funds within ourselves." The titanic efforts—the unselfish and personally impoverishing devotions—of Robert Morris who put his all at Washington's disposal and strove relentlessly to sustain a Continental credit; these fiscal energies—and those of others like Morris—are not discounted by the confession of their inadequacy. Rather, such a confession testifies to the staggering extent of the burden; and, by the same token, to the critical importance of French aid in helping to carry it. We were not financially self-sufficient. Almost every page of Revolutionary history—including scores of Washington's own letters—thus testify. Our resources were inadequate; our fiscal expedients were unsound, and all but fatal; our deadliest menace was neither Tory nor Hessian—it was a yawning, empty Treasury threatening death by fiscal starvation.¹ The longer the war lasted, the more threatening became this dread. When Laurens went to France to plead for additional loans in the spring of 1781, Franklin wrote him imploringly as follows:

"Day does not follow night more certainly

¹ "We have lived upon expedients until we can live no longer," wrote Washington to a friend the same week of Hamilton's Newbridge letter. Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 210.

than it brings with it some additional proof of the impracticability of carrying on the war without the aids you were directed to solicit. As an honest and candid man, as a man whose all depends on the final and happy termination of the present contest, I assert that without a foreign loan, our present force, which is but the remnant of an army, cannot be kept together this campaign, much less will it be increased and in readiness for another."¹

This was all too true. When Laurens arrived in Boston with 2,500,000 livres in cash, it was a most seasonable gift, to state the matter mildly; for it is hard to say how, without it, it would have been possible for Washington to conduct successfully his final and decisive expedition to the South.² Even as it was, Rochambeau had to send Morris \$20,000 in gold from the French Military Chest, at one juncture, in order to allay dissatisfaction in the illy clad, under-fed, and unpaid Continental ranks. Such significant incidents could be multiplied almost without limit. The Colonial fiscal situation from first to last was nothing short of uninterruptedly desperate. Whether in Paris where poor, distraught Franklin continually faced drafts drawn upon him, in sheer abandon, by the Continental Congress, and where only Vergennes repeatedly stood between this staunch old American patriot-philosopher and

¹ *Writings of Washington*, by Sparks, Vol. VIII, p. 5.

² *France in the American Revolution*, by Perkins, p. 335.

bankruptcy; or whether in America where the scandal of long past-due army pay rolls repeatedly threatened to smother even the warmest patriot devotions; it was as Hamilton flatly confessed in his Newbridge letter—either France helped or “we sink.”

France was the only country where the Colonies could get money. Nothing, after one initial, indirect loan, could be obtained from Spain whom Vergennes constantly but futilely sought to join the Franco-American alliance. The Dutch, though secretly favoring the Colonies and finally broaching negotiations for a commercial treaty similar to that already existing with France, would not lend a guilder to the United States except as Louis XVI “endorsed the note.”¹ Frederick the Great, though wishing them well, would not yield so much as a single groschen. No other European country would risk a penny in aid of the Colonies or discount their promises to pay at any price. In terms of hard money, our Ministers were friendless throughout the world except in one life-saving spot—Paris. It is difficult to conjure a successful outcome for the American Revolution if the French capitol and Court had been similarly deaf.

An effort to specify the exact amount involved in direct French loans and less direct French “subsidies”—including those originally handled by “Hortalez et Cie”—always invites a dispute.

¹ *France in the American Revolution*, by Perkins, p. 333.

The surest authority would seem to be the Treasury Department at Washington. From this source has issued an official memorandum¹ which shows four loans aggregating 35,000,000 livres—the American equivalent is \$6,352,500—and four “subsidies” aggregating 11,000,000 livres, or \$1,815,000. The same memorandum shows the detail of complete re-payment, including interest; and refers to Bayley’s History of National Loans of the United States which declares that the latter settlements included an over-payment of 1,426,787 livres, or about \$250,000, to the heirs of Beaumarchais.² “We paid and we paid in full: there were no gifts in the nature of loans which were not taken care of before the final adjustment of the obligation,” declared Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the course of a Senate speech on the subject of war debts, January 22, 1925. The fact that we funded and paid our debts in those difficult and dangerous yesterdays, thanks to the uncompromising fiscal sanities of Alexander Hamilton, is to our everlasting credit. But the fact does not detract from the physical importance

¹ Attached to Senator Borah’s speech on the floor of the United States Senate, January 22, 1925, and printed in the Congressional Record, 68th Congress, Second Session.

² In 1881, under the direction of Secretary of the Treasury Windom an exhaustive study of all these loans was made and concludes that the Beaumarchais account was over-paid in the sum here indicated.

of the loans from whence these debts originally sprang. They were incalculably essential.

So we come back to our initial inquiry. Could the Colonies have won their independence without French aid? At the time and under the circumstance—No. Ultimately a Revolution, unsupported externally, might have succeeded. But the challenge of logic and the weight of available authority recommends the answer we have given. Above and beyond all tangible assistance rendered by France was the vast and inestimable value of the intangibles—the moral encouragement, the sustenance of the spirit, the stimulus of fraternity—influences which unquestionably had the authority of battles. “The generous conduct of the French monarch and nation toward this country renders every event that may effect his or their prosperity interesting to us,” declared President Washington in an official message to the Senate shortly after his inauguration.¹ Such was the truth. Hamilton’s Newbridge letter expressed gratitude for the French aid that “saved us from ruin.” Such was the literal fact.

Never can the written or spoken word do adequate justice to the brave Colonials who dared unequal combat with the most powerful monarch of his time and who, in a sublimity of faith, courage, vision and devotion, wrested our institu-

¹ Message of September, 29, 1789, transmitting official word of the death of the Dauphin, heir apparent to the French throne.

tions of freedom from the greed and tyranny of the Dark Ages. They put posterity—the beneficiaries of their heroism—in greater debt to their service and example than to any other cause or precedent possibly existent. No comparative history can dull the brilliance of their achievement. Yet the brave are invariably generous and they would be among the first to acknowledge that French arms, French money and French ships were among the decisive factors—largely indispensable factors—in the establishment of American independence at the time it was achieved.

This, then, is the background out of which this “trail of a tradition” shall wend its way down the highways of History and Time.

PART II

**The Second Declaration of
Independence**

The Second Declaration of Independence

DESPITE the fraternity which bound France and America together spiritually—first in covert liaison from 1763 to 1778, then in open active alliance from 1778 to the peace of Versailles which formally acknowledged American independence in 1783—the United States officially refused, within a decade of the Revolution, to confess any obligatory entanglements arbitrarily tying us to the hectic and uncertain destinies of Europe. Within ten years, under the enlightened and prescient spokesmanship of Washington and Hamilton, the first Presidency of the Republic officially refused to sanction a reciprocal Franco-American partnership in the theatre of continental war. Instead, it set us apart from these trans-oceanic vicissitudes; it declared us to be as independent of Old World contracts, actual or implied, as of Old World sovereigns and parliaments; it announced our first “neutrality,” established our primary tenets of practical Nationalism, and consolidated a vigorous tradition which has blessed us from that swaddling era down to the present hour.

In the light of the conclusions which are as

fresh on a preceding page as they were in the hearts of the Fathers and the Founders, this apparent inhospitality to subsequent French necessities may seem, at first glance, to confess the scandal of gross and unworthy ingratitude—a characteristic habitually attributed to Republics. There were plenty of domestic zealots at the time who voiced this lurid imprecation and shouted violent maledictions upon a statesmanship which insisted on consulting reason rather than a sentiment which, under precise analysis, proved spurious. But events were not slow to vindicate an official judgment which was hard to pronounce yet which was vital if this new government was not to die within ten or fifteen years of its birth. It would be impossible to over-estimate the difficulties of such a decision—not alone because Washington and Hamilton themselves had the liveliest sense of honorable attachment to their erstwhile battle-allies, but also because many believed, as Benjamin Franklin put it, that “the French having served an apprenticeship in America, set up for themselves in Europe.”¹ Yet a decision was necessary that should assess realities and establish the following permanent conclusions: first, that France came to our assistance only when the Colonies demonstrated a reasonable self-sufficient assurance of crippling Britain; second, that France came to our assistance for the immediate self-serving purpose of

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 121.

facilitating this vicarious blow to her ancient and hated rival, both in the New World and the Old; third, that this created a commanding precedent for the primary consultation of self-interest in international relations; fourth, that the consultation of our own self-interest indubitably recommended "neutrality" and a permanent severance of all European partnership.¹ Meanwhile, it was equally necessary to remind enthusiastic Republicans upon this side of the sea that the France which bulwarked the American Revolution was not the France of the *sans-culotte* and the guillotine which was now embroiling Europe; also that this transformation, far from rightfully intensifying our inherited obligation, was in reality an exigency which left us comparatively free to deal with a new situation on its own merits or its lack of them. The validation of this thesis ultimately fell to Hamilton's invincible pen.² That he proved his case and sustained the patriotic logic of his great chieftain will subsequently appear. But the very extent of the burden which the decision perilously involved—precipitated, as it was, upon the very heels of

¹ "I have been particularly interested in these pages in emphasising the idea that France's intervention in the American Revolution was motivated primarily by her desire to recover her lost pre-eminence on the Continent of Europe."—Dr. Edward S. Corwin in his introduction to his *French Policy and the American Alliance*.

² Aaron Burr once declared: "He who puts himself on paper with Hamilton, is lost."

Yorktown—puts surpassing emphasis upon the policy thus initiated as a cardinal principle of the new United States. In other words, as we already have observed, if comparative isolation and independence of European concerns was America's logical and necessary posture in such a crisis and under the implications of such understandably intense emotionalism, the authority of the precedent—the power of the tradition thus invoked—is a thing not easily evaded in any later and less intimately challenging situations in which America could be involved. It, therefore, becomes important to inquire into the verities of this initial historic decision, to the end that we may be sure the main sources of this tradition which we undertake to trail are honorable and righteous; and it becomes equally important to understand conditions in France as bearing upon our own decisions, even as it previously was necessary to understand conditions in America as bearing upon French relations to our own Revolution.

The crimson predicament which had befallen France in the decade after Yorktown may be sketched, for the purposes of this study, in a single paragraph. Around the throne of Louis XVI rolled the thundering storms of a Republican revolt which was destined swiftly to leap beyond the control of its original high-purposed leaders; to consume its own ravenous evangelists, one after another; to sweep all decent conceptions of

ordered freedom into a hideous parody upon "liberty"; to make death the only instrument of government, and all but sink French civilization in cess-pools of weltering blood. Whereas, in the beginnings of this ultimate unspeakable terror—this ultimate molten chaos—Lafayette and Rochambeau, fresh from the inspiration of American emancipation, were earnest servants of this broadened apostrophe to an expectation of broadened French Constitutionalism, they became—within a relatively few mad months—the disillusioned victims of waxing Revolution which burst its bounds of sanity.¹ But what continence could be expected in a mob-lust which cheered a Danton in his pulpits of merciless violence; then glorified a Robespierre for out-screaming Danton and rolling his neck beneath the sleepless guillotine; then gorged itself in sheer blood-delight when Robespierre rode the tumbrils and added his sev-

¹ Lafayette wrote to Washington from Paris as late as March 15, 1792, as follows: "The danger for us lies in our state of anarchy, owing to the ignorance of the people the number of non-proprietors, the jealousy of every governing measure, all which inconveniences are worked up by designing men, or aristocrats in disguise, but both extremely tend to defeat our ideas of public order. . . . That liberty and equality will be preserved in France, there is no doubt; in case there were, you well know that I would not, if they fail, survive them. . . . Licentiousness, under the mask of patriotism, is our greatest evil, as it threatens property, tranquillity and liberty itself."—*Old South Leaflets*, No. 98, p. 16.

ered head to the ghastly toll in the saw-dust basket! From 1789 to 1795 France submitted itself to manias that beggar description. Behind it all was the accumulation of crushing exploitation which deserved heroic challenge quite as properly as did anything in the experiences of the American Colonies; but when the challenge found fruition, it was a murderous shambles rather than a parliament of self-sufficient freemen. It was the volcanic eruption of a tortured ideal. It was the trading of Cut-Throats for Kings. It was, as Carlyle says: "The choking, sweltering, deadly and killing rule of no rule; the consecration of cupidity and braying of folly and dim stupidity and baseness, in most of the affairs of men; slop-shirts attainable three halfpence cheaper by the ruin of living bodies and immortal souls." Yet it was the usual progression of disease; the nearer it approached a crisis, the nearer it approached a cure.

Such a gory debacle—nauseating even to the most faithful of Republicans if he distinguished between liberty and license—served to solidify the monarchical enemies of France, surrounding her with horror and with bristling arms. The Court, the nobility and the clergy—largely emigrating to escape the wanton menace which cheerfully took life and property and called it blessed so long as it wore the new cockade—found willing sympathies in these neighboring capitols. Not only was just such willing intrigue always part

of the European system, but here was the added stimulus of fears lest the conflagration lighted by the French Commune might spread into a continental holocaust. Hostile gatherings were the open rule beyond all French borders. Preparations for counter-revolution that should snuff these torches of anarchy were made at Brussels, Worms, and Coblenz under the protection and inspiration of foreign Courts. They invited the reprisals of new Republican excesses to combat counter-revolution with counter-counter-revolution. Then came the 17th of January, 1793. On this red day, 721 members of the French Convention recorded their votes upon the fate that should mark the end of the sixteenth Louis—guilty of little, if anything, more than being an eighteenth century king—and a majority of fifty three decided that he should die upon the still unsatiated scaffold. On January 21, 1793, his royal head was laid upon the chopping block, and when Dr. Guillotine's great knife sped to its target with the tell-tale thud of fury, it was the signal that loosed external hurricanes. Indignant Europe flew to arms as with one accord, in response to French challenge in this and other directions. Thenceforth, the sinister Revolution had for its declared enemies England, Holland, Spain, the whole German Confederation, Naples, the Holy See and Russia, while almost simultaneously the Vendée, in Western France, arose in formidable revolt. France now faced 350,000 of the flower

of European soldiery, moving upon her frontiers in all directions. It was the climax in multiplying crises. It was the agonizing travail which soon should produce Napoleon Bonaparte.

All this searing turmoil across the sea had its inevitable and disturbing reflection within our own domain. While Americans universally remembered recent French aid in our own Revolution, and found a natural joy in the contemplation that another people—to whom we looked with peculiar affection—had dethroned monarchy and proposed the Republican recognition of “the rights of man,” yet they bitterly disagreed as to the nature and extent of the American obligation. As France split into parties of differing degrees of radicalism, so, sympathetically, split we. Faction raised its ugly head. Several different influences aggravated this breach. In the first place, lingering anti-British hates and prejudices could not throw off all memory of tyrannies so lately suppressed: and this ethnic factor, vicious then as always, encouraged particularly bitter suspicions of the motives of those who preserved a conservative and judicial view-point which sought primarily to consult domestic welfare. In the second place, the domestic alignment found these antagonisms commanded, upon the one hand, by Alexander Hamilton, now Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, who insisted from first to last upon an exclusively pro-American policy—invariably with his President’s ultimate

approval—and commanded, upon the other hand by Thomas Jefferson, now Washington's Secretary of State, who was recently returned from France imbued with such exaggerated notions of unlimited democracy that even his fidelity to the theory of the American Constitution was not above question among his political foes.¹ Their rivalry was not conducive to a composed state of public mind.² In the third place, the agents of this new France—as contemptuous of

¹ Washington himself took cognizance of this hostile interpretation of Jefferson's purposes. Replying in 1793 to a letter from Jefferson in which he protested that though he wished to amend, he did not wish to destroy the Constitution Washington gallantly said: "I did not require the evidence of the extracts which you enclosed me, to convince me of your attachment to the Constitution of the United States, or of your disposition to promote the general welfare of this country; but I regret, deeply regret, the difference of opinion that has arisen, and divided you and another principal officer of the government, and wish devoutly there could be an accommodation of them by mutual yieldings." This latter prayer referred to the persistent differences between Jefferson and Hamilton, particularly in respect to foreign relations.

² Washington's true estimate of Hamilton is suggested by the fact that when John Jay resigned as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Washington wanted to name Hamilton as his successor. A letter to Hamilton from Attorney-General Bradford pointed out "the immense importance of confiding that large trust to one who was not to be scared by popular clamor or warped by feeble-minded prejudices."—John C. Hamilton's *History of Republic*, Vol. VI, p. 253.

codes and proprieties as the intoxicated "government" from whence they came—visited America, brazenly paid court to a favorable public opinion which should flout its own Constitutional spokesmanship, and flung torches into an already ominous domestic conflagration. Indeed, it was their excesses which finally so shocked the public conscience that the nation very generally came to its senses and sustained President Washington when, as we shall see, he set the first great milestone along the trail of the tradition into which this volume proposes to inquire. Thus, ere the first Presidency had run its course, the United States found itself precipitated into the very vortex of foreign complexity and forced to make the first great national decision, in general terms, between Nationalism and Internationalism.

When Louis XVI was deposed by the "National Convention" in September, 1792, President Washington promptly informed American Minister Morris in Paris that the existence of the new administration was to be immediately recognized because every nation possesses the inherent right to settle its own internal structure to suit its own wish; that the United States would pay the debt still due at the time, and would furnish supplies requisitioned for French San Domingo; that the new administration should be formally assured of our friendly disposition to embrace whatever opportunities might promote the welfare of a sister Republic. In other words, so long as our con-

tacts involved no collateral clash with other powers and no untoward entanglements—so long as they solely concerned only our own relations with a regenerated and democratized France—we could and would sustain a posture of scrupulous helpfulness. But this was no blanket guaranty of blind alliance—no lengthened shadow of the old conventions of 1778. Dr. Aaron Bancroft, eminent historian, writing in 1850, describes President Washington's discriminating state of mind at this juncture as follows¹:

“Attached to Republican principles, the President fondly hoped that the struggle in France would terminate in a free government; but his partiality towards the new order of things in that country was not so great as to render him forgetful that the aid given to America had been afforded by a fallen King, or unmindful that he was the head of his own nation, whose independence and prosperity he ought to hold in higher estimation than the interest of a foreign people.”

That this was his attitude—reflecting a dedication to the nationalistic necessities of his home country ahead of any false altruism as related to the exigencies of others—events were soon to demonstrate. He was at Mt. Vernon on private business related to his vast estates when the slow traveling news reached these shores that France was in a state of declared war with nearly all the balance of Europe, and more particularly with

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 120.

England. Sensing the impending crisis, as related to our own affairs, he hastened back to Philadelphia at Hamilton's earnest instigation and, with typical fore-handedness, addressed confidential inquiries to the members of his Cabinet. This was on April 17, 1793. The letter—seeking to anticipate trouble—read as follows¹:

“The posture of affairs in Europe, particularly between France and Great Britain, places the United States in a delicate situation, and requires much consideration of the measures which will be proper for them to observe in the war between those powers. With a view to forming a general plan of conduct for the Executive, I have stated and enclosed sundry questions to be considered, preparatory to a meeting at my house tomorrow, where I shall expect to see you at 9 o'clock, and to receive the result of your reflections thereon.

“Question I. Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interferences of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain, etc.? Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not? What shall it contain?

“Question II. Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received?

“Question III. If received, shall it be absolutely, or with qualifications, and if with qualifications, of what kind?

“Question IV. Are the United States obliged

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 121.

by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France, as applying to the present situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended until the government of France shall be established?

"Question V. If they have the right, is it expedient to do either? And which?

"Question VI. If they have an option, would it be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaty still in operation?

"Question VII. If the treaties are to be considered as now in operation, is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defensive war only, or to a war either offensive or defensive?

"Question VIII. Does the war in which France is engaged appear to be offensive or defensive on her part? Or of a mixed and equivocal character?

"Question IX. If of a mixed and equivocal character, does the guarantee in any event apply to such a war?

"Question X. What is the effect of a guarantee, such as that to be found in the treaty of alliance between the United States and France?

"Question XI. Does any article in either of the treaties prevent ships of war, other than privateers, of the powers opposed to France, from coming into the ports of the United States, to act as convoys to their own merchantmen? Or does it lay any other restraints upon them more than would apply to the ships of war of France?

"Question XII. Should the future Regent of

France send a minister to the United States; ought he to be received?

“Question XIII. Is it necessary or advisable to call together the two Houses of Congress with a view to the present posture of European affairs? If it is, what should be the particular objects of such a call?”

It is obvious from the purport of this catechism that President Washington had a minute conception of the frictions, complexities and machinations waiting to spring, as from Pandora's box, out of this new situation—fraught, as it was, with dogmatic passions on both sides of the sea. It is obvious, too, that he was hoping and seeking by advance commitments to temper hostilities within his own official family—implacable hostilities captained by Hamilton and by Jefferson—hostilities which already had begotten incorrigible animosities. He knew too well that this was a tinder-issue well calculated to strike hottest fire between these two contentious counselors. He knew that General Henry Knox of Massachusetts, Secretary of War, invariably took Hamilton's part; that Attorney-General Edmund Randolph of Virginia uniformly aligned himself with Jefferson.¹ All

¹ Randolph succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State in the fall of 1793, subsequently resigning August 19, 1795. He was strongly suspected of questionable intimacies with the French Minister. His own statement was that he had been disgraced because of his attachment to France and to Liberty. By way of vindication, he asked for access

were powerful personalities. He had good reason to fear that this same stale-mate, in the present awkward affair, would communicate itself to the country where already the language of unbridled passion was making for dangerous breach. But his expedient failed to divert the usual collision.

When the Cabinet convened the following morning it was not a "meeting of minds." It was a clash of antagonisms—a preliminary skirmish in the contest of diverse opinions soon to engage the countryside. Hamilton came with firm conviction that necessity—and, at the same time, opportunity—here invited the separation of American destiny and European fates, perhaps once and for all. It might be said, in terms of modern idiom, that he came with a new dedication—"America First!"—upon his brave heart. Jefferson—Secretary of State and nominally responsible for the handling of foreign relations—came with a fanatical devotion to anything and everything wearing the guise of democracy, and to French experiments in particular. He came with a purpose to suspend affirmative American action—"watchful waiting," it would have been called in a subsequent century—if he could not adroitly

to certain confidential State Department files. Washington replied: "You are at full liberty to publish without reserve any or every private and confidential letter I ever wrote you; nay more, every word I ever uttered to you or in your presence, from whence you can derive any advantage in your vindication."

influence a more open partiality for his trans-oceanic idols. Such was the stage, and such the actors, on one of the most pregnant mornings in American history.

It is unnecessary to pursue President Washington's questionnaire seriatim. Summaries will suffice.¹ They suggest for themselves the vivid drama that was involved. Jefferson recommended to Washington that he should lodge responsibility for this prickly decision in an extra session of Congress—no doubt maneuvering for an opportunity to take this inflammable issue into domestic politics where so emotional a text would afford unlimited play to the Jacobin appeals which he knew so well how to foster and to capitalize.² Hamilton declared that the responsibility belonged

¹ Jefferson's grudging consent to the general doctrine of neutrality was sadly diluted by his objection to the specific program. He objected to Presidential action without Congressional approval on the theory—so far as his actual argument went—that it was an improper usurpation of executive powers. This Constitutional interpretation was wholly met and dissipated by Hamilton in his subsequent "Pacifcus" letters in which he enunciated the doctrine that has been the constant executive practice from that day to this. For the claims put forward in behalf of Jefferson's side of the neutrality question see Ford's *Writings of Jefferson*, Vol. V, p. 57, and Vol. VI, p. 232.

² This view seems sustained by unquestionable weight of authority as against Bancroft's statement that "the Cabinet was united in the opinion that it was inexpedient to call Congress together."—*Life of Washington*, p. 123.

with the executive, under the Constitution of which he had been admittedly the premier expounder, and he recommended a proclamation of strong, strict neutrality that should fix our status for all time as independent of European political fortunes. Jefferson wanted all our former Treaty obligations, running primarily to the former monarch under the conventions of 1778, to be acknowledged as of full continuing force and effect. Hamilton proposed to observe such particular Treaty detail as scrupulous honor required, but to refuse the prodigal favoritism which would stretch a "defensive" into an "offensive" alliance, and to take advantage of this fortuitous opportunity to discharge all possible legacies of the past and further effect complete American emancipation from entangling alien bonds. Hamilton admitted the right of a nation to change its form of government at its own will—quite as Washington had done in his initial instructions to Minister Morris—but denied its right automatically and arbitrarily to involve other nations in the consequences of those alterations. Jefferson had no intention of involving us in actual, physical war—he was too much of a confirmed pacifist for that: but he insisted that his pro-French policy could escape this casualty. Hamilton, however, pointed to war as the inevitable consequence of such gross partialities—war that would ruin this young and struggling Republic under such ill-omened circumstances. Only on the propriety of receiving

a Minister from the French Republic did the Cabinet apparently agree.

As usual, Secretary Knox sustained Hamilton. As usual, Attorney General Randolph supported Jefferson. It remained for the President to umpire the dispute. As usual, his mind ran parallel with that of his dynamic young Secretary of the Treasury—his main-reliance in peace and war—his faithful adjutant in the administration of almost every crisis which he met and mastered throughout his glorious career.¹ Neutrality, in all its implications, was ordered. The only concession—an empty one—to Jefferson's sensibilities was the omission of the word itself. The die was cast. Intelligent and essential Nationalism had triumphed. On April 22, 1793, this powerful tradition was formally inaugurated, and, with substantial authority, has blessed America from that day to this. It was the seventeenth year of the independence of the United States; and it is not an idle speculation to find herein the protective precedent—the cardinal philosophy—which made possible the decades of uninterrupted independence that have followed.

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¹ Even Perry Belmont in his partisan defense of Jefferson admits that when "Jefferson resigned from the cabinet," the policy of the government "had become more and more directed by the advice of Hamilton."—*National Isolation An Illusion*, p. 124.

By the President of the United States of America.

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas, it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain and the United Netherlands of the one part and France on the other, and the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers: I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct of aforesaid toward those powers respectively, and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.

And I do hereby also make known that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instructions to those officers to whom it belongs to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the

United States, violate the law of nations with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.

In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand.

(SEAL) Done at the city of Philadelphia, the 22nd day of April, 1793, and of the Independence of the United States of America the seventeenth.

By the President: Go. WASHINGTON
Th: Jefferson.

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Public opinion promptly divided and partook of the most extravagant and vociferous zeals in behalf of alternative prejudices. In his prior *Federalist Papers*¹ Hamilton had set down the axiom that faction would be "the most dangerous vice" that could attack the solidarity of the new American institution.² Faction now blazed—so ominously, at times, as to seemingly prophesy

¹ No. 10. See *If Hamilton Were Here Today*, by Vandenberg, p. 199.

² "By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."—Hamilton.

a consuming conflagration. Washington and Hamilton controlled what was the equivalent of the dominant political party of the day. They mustered powerful support—particularly after Hamilton gave to the country his impregnable defense of “neutrality” in his seven incisive “Pacificus” letters. On the other hand, the country was alive with French protagonists who made of every new French victory an occasion for provocative American fêtes; and Jefferson’s devoted constituents were tireless in their evangelism of malcontentment. Jefferson himself did not hesitate to call it an “English neutrality,” and sought to identify Hamilton with a “British party.” He did not hesitate even to encourage malignant calumnies upon the President from whom his Cabinet Commission read.¹ Madison declared it injurious to “the national honor by seeming to disregard the stipulated duties to France,” and said it would wound “the popular feelings by seeming indifference to the cause of liberty.”² Under the sobriquet of “Helvedius,” and at Jefferson’s inspiration, he undertook to “cut Hamilton to pieces in the face of the pub-

¹ “Washington was harboring in his own official family the cause of much of this abuse, for Jefferson did not scruple to attack his chief . . . sometimes through such low characters as Philip Freneau. This kind of disloyalty to one’s superiors is today regarded as extremely dishonorable, but in those days it was tolerated as fair play.” —Adams’ *The Foreign Policy of the United States*, p. 89.

² *The Greatest American*, by Vandenberg, p. 218.

lic." There were red hats and tri-color cockades galore in America. We were a mirror to the French Revolution's flow and ebb. We were a barometer registering its rise and fall. Barring the passion in which prejudices, pro and con, found expression, a judicial epitome of the country's reflex may be quoted from a contemporary analyst who wrote of the Neutrality Proclamation as follows¹: "The public approbation of this wise measure, for the preservation of the public tranquillity, was manifested in numerous addresses to the President, thanking him in warm terms for his attention to the interest of the citizens; many however were offended at the measure as they conceived that it implied a deficiency of respect and gratitude to the Republic of France to whom the United States were highly indebted for their independence." Effectually to meet this latter propaganda was the primary necessity which the President and his Proclamation faced; and to serve this need Hamilton once more took his vivid and invincible pen in hand. A complete clinical disclosure of realities resulted—as did also a perfect exposition of the doctrine of American "neutrality," and, therefore, of the great tradition which this study undertakes to trail.

As was the custom of those pamphleteering days, Alexander Hamilton wrote under nu-

¹ *Biographical Memoirs of General Washington*, by Thomas Condie, published in Brattleborough in 1814—p. 189.

merous different pseudonyms in the course of his varied career as a compelling publicist—a veritable sorcerer with words. He was “Phocion” in 1784–85 when he dared speak up for law and order against mistaken New York mobs which were pillaging ex-Tories—a brave challenge to incipient anarchy disclosing a repugnance that subsequently could not fail to revolt against the raw excesses of the French Revolution. He was “Americanus” in 1794, and “Horatius” in 1795, when pleading the self-sufficiencies of Nationalism. He was “Camillus,” in the closing crises of Washington’s administration, when he defended the Jay Treaty with England—the most powerful indictment ever flung against “government by weak and vague words; against the policy of drift, which possesses neither the courage to foresee results nor the energy to prepare for them; against those people arguing interminably to delay action, who grudge every sacrifice whether its object be peace or war, and who denounce with the same cantankerous hostility all preparation as aggressive and all concessions as cowardice.”¹ But never did he plead a more difficult or a more portentous cause, fraught with sterner consequences to the unfledged Republic, than when as “Pacificus” in 1793 he stood forward as the undaunted champion of singly-dedicated patriotism, faced these gathering storms of our first “hyphenated Americanism,” dissipated them with

¹ Frederick Scott Oliver’s *Alexander Hamilton*.

perfect logic, and contributed to history the first literature of a tradition that has been the perpetual genius of the international relations of the United States.¹ It is unfortunate that more copies of *The Letters of Pacificus* have not been preserved for latter-day illumination.² There would be a clearer understanding of initial Franco-American relations, a more intelligent appreciation of the great "neutrality" precedent of 1793, and a finer conception of the relationship which the Fathers and the Founders intended should exist between America and the world.

Knowing Hamilton's confessed appreciation of all the indispensable aid France gave the Colonies in their Revolution—an acknowledgment which he unstintingly volunteered in his Newbridge letter of 1780—it is easily understood that he embarked upon no congenial task when he dissected the legitimacies of gratitude and disclosed our lack of obligation to sustain the new French government against our erstwhile mutual foe. But knowing also the purity of his unselfish dedication to the experiment of New World Constitu-

¹ "Pacificus" has been the sobriquet of other writers. Noah Webster used it in 1815-27 writing against war. John Ryland used it in 1772 in "a modest plea for free communion." Joshua R. Giddings used it in 1842 in discussing the "rights and privileges of the several States in regard to slavery."

² Published originally in 1793, they were gathered in pamphlet form and reprinted by Samuel H. Smith, 118 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, in 1796.

tionalism, it is equally easy to realize that no fears of being misunderstood—no concession to the rampant and sedulously cultivated passions of that hour—could win him to the easy alternative of a silence which might have jeopardized the truth, and, with it, the honorable safety of the United States. In a series of seven brilliant letters he developed this thesis:

One. France, seeking vengeance upon England and eager to curtail her New World expansions, deliberately and confessedly consulted self-interest when she encouraged the American Revolution.

Two. France, consulting this self-interest and obviously dominated thereby, did not become our ally until after the Battle of Saratoga had created the presumption that England would be defeated, even without French aid.

Three. Therefore, America equally was entitled to consult self-interest when the situations were reversed.

Four. This self-interest, this intelligent Nationalism, dictated freedom from all untoward foreign entanglements and a strict neutrality as between quarreling European states; particularly when no correct interpretation of the Treaty of 1778 required American collusion in a French offensive war, and when pro-French partialities in official American policy would merely succeed in exposing America to ruin without any compensating advantage to France.

Upon this foundation Hamilton builded his great, authoritative homily—the first, baptismal exposition of the “Nationalism” to which the United States should be forever dedicated—the forerunner, almost in literal anticipatory paraphrase, of those deathless admonitions against foreign entanglements immortalized in Washington’s Farewell Address—the unanswerable validation of a mighty precedent which never could have survived as a perpetuated tradition except as its creation had been as virtuous as Hamilton’s proof thereof was clear.

It was not until the fourth of his seven letters that “*Pacificus*” attacked the critical question of that “obligation”—the crux of the issue as now viewed in perspective and against the background of the conclusions set down in the preceding chapter. His orderly mind first cleared away the lesser frictions ere it concentrated on the paramount concern. But once up to it, he drove at the target unequivocally—“this very favorite topic of gratitude to France”—and unsparingly and with unerring aim, he launched his bull’s-eye bolts—“since it is at this shrine we are continuously invited to sacrifice the true interests of our country.”

Not in derogation of French assistance to the Colonies—an assistance, let it be repeated, which he acknowledged without limit—but in candid, dialectic analysis of its genesis and its concurrent compensations, Hamilton marshalled his irresist-

ible philippic.¹ Facts marched in his battalions; logic was their commanding officer. Faith and justice—"virtues of a sacred and unequivocal nature with obligations that are definite and positive"—were set down as characteristics independent of "gratitude." The former he embraced; the latter he put in the witness box and cross-examined to discover its reality.

"The basis of gratitude," said he, "is a benefit received or intended, which there was no right to claim, and without the expectation of any reciprocal benefit. Between individuals, occasion is not unfrequently given to the exercise of gratitude. . . . But among nations they perhaps never occur. It may be affirmed as a general principle that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another is the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them. Indeed, the rule of morality is in this respect not exactly the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter,

¹ The essay says that it does not mean to disparage "the just pretensions of France upon our good will." It is freely admitted that the manner in which France afforded succor is "just cause for our esteem and friendship." But it is insisted that sentiments of appreciation are satisfied by a "cordial disposition of good and friendly offices which can be rendered without prejudice to our own solid and permanent interests."

in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national as compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government, while the consequences of the private actions of an individual for the most part terminate with himself or are circumscribed within a narrow compass. It is not meant here to advocate a policy absolutely selfish or interested in nations; but to show that a policy regulated by their own interest, as far as justice and good faith permit, is and ought to be their prevailing one; and that either to ascribe to them a different principle of action, or to deduce from the supposition of its arguments for a self-denying and self-sacrificing gratitude on the part of a nation, which may have received from another good offices, is to misconceive or mistake what usually are and ought to be the springs of national conduct."

Thus was the great doctrine of Nationalism made articulate—the doctrine that a policy regulated by intelligent self-interest, consonant with justice and good faith, is and ought to be the formula for American contact in world relations. Demonstration that the Neutrality Proclamation justified itself within this rule then became the immediate text to which "Pacifcus" addressed himself—proof that "gratitude" to France, as a paramount consideration, could be dismissed as

lacking the dominating altruism which could be the only quality to deserve it, and thus to deserve to veto the doctrine, the formula and the rule.

Hamilton painted the picture of eighteenth century relations between France and Britain—the former “the rival time immemorial” of the latter. The peace of 1763 determined that England should become the great colonial power of the world, and France was forced to abandon her dreams of trans-oceanic empire. From that bitter moment, the most constant of all French aspirations was “to find a favorable opportunity to destroy Great Britain and repair the breach which had been made in the national glory. The animosity of wounded pride conspired with calculations of the interest of the state to give a keen edge to that impatience and desire.” This, insisted Hamilton, motivated French enthusiasms toward the American Revolution and confessed why there was studious effort to mask French partialities until the Battle of Saratoga—long after the first Fourth of July—resolved these self-serving hesitations in favor of a cause which then gave reasonable evidence of self-contained success. “The American Revolution attracted early the attention of France, though with extreme circumspection. As far as countenance may be presumed to have been given prior to the epoch of the acknowledgment of our independence, . . . it was marked neither with liberality nor with vigor. They wore the appearance rather of

a desire to keep alive disturbances which would embarrass a rival power, than of a serious design to assist a revolution, or a serious expectation that it would be effected. . . . The victories of Saratoga established in the French government a confidence of our ability to accomplish our purpose, and as a consequence of it produced the Treaties of Alliance and Commerce. . . . It is impossible to see in this anything more than the conduct of a rival nation, embracing a most promising opportunity to repress the pride and diminish the dangerous power of its rival, by seconding a successful resistance to its authority, and by lopping off a valuable portion of its dominions. The dismemberment of this country from Great Britain was an obvious and a very important interest of France. It cannot be doubted that it was the determining motive and an adequate compensation for the assistance afforded us. . . . Aid and co-operation founded upon a great interest, pursued and obtained by the party affording them, is not a proper stock upon which to engraft that enthusiastic gratitude which is claimed from us by those who love France more than the United States."

Easy philosophers, untouched by the immediate consequences of their theories, may pretend to find in this a harsh determination. But a judicial inspection of authorities—a consultation of exhibits created by France itself—proves that it was as true as it may seem harsh. Truth

always must out-rank metaphysical "gratitude" in the tenets of a nation.

When France gave up Canada—however unwillingly—it was the French theory that the English Colonies would become so strong as to renounce their allegiance to the crown. Even England feared such a result. More than once it was proposed in parliament to re-cede Canada to France in order to check the growth of the American States. "There now!" said a French statesman when the Treaty of 1763 was signed; "We have arranged matters for an American rebellion in which England will lose her empire in the west!"¹ The terms of the Treaty of Paris were galling to French pride, and it was certain that French diplomacy would seek revenge whenever there was reason to suppose that France had her old enemy at a disadvantage.² There was a strong wish to humiliate England, and it was thought that the loss of her American Colonies would be a ruinous blow to her prosperity.³ Even so warm an advocate of France as James Breck

¹ Ridpath's *History of the United States*.

² Among numerous collateral influences which ought to be detailed but for which space is unavailable in this bird's-eye-view was the original French fear of an Anglo-American coalition hostile to France. "The notion that French possessions in the West Indies were menaced by a pending English-American coalition played an important part in bringing France into the War of Independence."—*French Policy and American Alliance*, by Corwin, p. 142.

³ *France in the American Revolution*, by Perkins, p. 21.

Perkins admits that "the defeat of the Seven Years' War left a consciousness of disgrace in every patriotic Frenchman, and a strong desire for revenge"¹; and that "Vergennes was no international philanthropist; he considered first the interests of France."² When Vergennes was urging Spain into the breach—another bit of mundane precaution—a long and impassioned secret paper put all stress upon the humiliation of England, "an enemy at once grasping, ambitious, unjust and perfidious." He added that this situation required France "to seize every possible opportunity to reduce the power and the greatness of England—it is a duty for us to do so—now is France's opportunity."³ In a similar document, he insisted that both France and Spain should follow the "impulse of their interests"; that they must avenge upon England the evils which for a century she had inflicted upon others; that at the proper moment, when she was exhausted with war, a decisive blow might reduce her to a secondary power. Even Beaumarchais "was fired with the zeal of a fanatic to avenge the shame that England had brought to France in the Treaty of Paris."⁴ Indeed, when the French Convention

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 327. "Vergennes' purpose was to break down the political and commercial connection between England and America."—Corwin's *French Policy and the American Alliance*, p. 368.

³ *The American Nation*, Vol. IX, p. 203—Van Tyne.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

sent its first Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, its address to us set down this perfectly frank indictment: "The support which the ancient French Court afforded the United States to recover their independence was only the fruit of a base speculation."

Undoubtedly a formidable argument can sustain the proposition that the French people, within sight of their own emancipation, looked with stirring sympathies—generous and unselfish—upon the brave adventure of the American Colonies.¹ But they lived under an absolute monarch whose government was law, and the motive of the government was the only motive of which official cognizance was subsequently due when another government, differentiated from

¹ Speaking in the United States Senate on January 22, 1925, Senator Bruce of Maryland said: "I repeat the conviction that the motives which induced France to participate in our struggle for independence were even to a greater extent generous than they were selfish. . . . If the motives by which France was actuated were purely selfish, it seems to me that the whole trend of our relations with her since the war of the American Revolution would have been quite different. . . . Anyone familiar with the history of France at that time cannot well doubt that what influenced most of the minds of the French people in forming an alliance with us was their love of liberty; that they were anxious to secure for themselves the same freedom that we were struggling to secure, and it may well be questioned whether she would have taken any part in our contest for independence at all had not that condition prevailed."

the sentiments of unofficial citizenship, came to assess historical realities. That motive, as Hamilton charged, found further disclosure in the actual chronology of the event. Effectual assistance was withheld until the presumption of success was assumed to be positive. There was no spontaneity of aid; there was a cool calculation upon it all. When Vergennes heard of the Declaration of Independence, he immediately emphasized his demands for French war on England. But when the tidings of the American defeat on Long Island arrived in Paris, he suggested to the King that there was "no hurry" and that "the time for giving the Americans aid depends upon their success."¹ In July, 1777, Vergennes again decided that the time was ripe; but again came sobering news—the occupation of Philadelphia by the British—and again a careful and significant precaution stayed the helping hand. American success, not American necessity, was the barometer of his enthusiasms. Finally the arrival in France of the news of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga proved to be the decisive influence to precipitate the open French-American Alliance.² The record is one of extreme circumspection and entirely bears out the conclusions

¹ Doniol, Vol. I, p. 611.

² "It will be found that Vergennes was quite ready to retreat from his program of alliance with America whenever English victory seemed seriously to impend."—*French Policy and the American Alliance*, by Corwin, p. 5.

that France—far from flaming with altruistic zeals—intended no untoward risks; but that an inviting opportunity, reasonably safe, to humble and cripple Britain was the goal of French quests. The late President Woodrow Wilson in his admirable *History of the United States* has said: "France conducted herself not as the ingenuous friend of the United States, but only as the enemy of England and, as first and always, a subtle strategist for her own interest and advantage." Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, has declared: "France joined with America, but she joined because it was to her interest to do so."¹ Nor can it be ignored that the French attitude toward the Colonies and their ultimate Republic during the decade immediately subsequent to Washington's first inauguration adds a climaxing corroboration to this verdict. The whole contemplation sustains Hamilton's thesis as he set out to blaze a new American trail—not only the trail of a tradition but also the trail over which a people might pass to their perpetuated salvation.

¹ Speech of January 22, 1925, in the Senate. The Senator quoted from a history of foreign affairs by Johnson which went so far as to say: "It would be difficult to conceive any policy more selfish, cold-blooded and cynical—the proposition in effect that France should play the part of Iago. We can perceive in it not one trace of sympathy for the American struggle for liberty and not a hint of a desire for the welfare of the Colonies."

Nor did "Pacificus" by any means stop short with a mere exposure of French motive and an assessment of those French compensations which, through British constrictions, concurrently balanced the revolutionary account. He inquired where "gratitude," if stressed at all, should be addressed: whether to the new Revolutionary France which had guillotined the King who had helped us, or to the British enemy which was the ally of this dead King's son and the defender of his aspirations. He quoted Franklin as authority for the statement that "there was no man in France more personally friendly to the cause of this country than Louis XVI."¹ Whether this was literally true or not, it certainly was the fact—as Hamilton urged—that it was Louis XVI to whom officially ran whatever debt, if any, could be construed to exist; and it was indeed an anomaly that these "preachers of gratitude" who formerly were shouting "Long live the King of France!" in salutation to the aristocratic head of an ancient monarchy² when he sustained them in 1778, should be "unashamed to brand Louis XVI as a tyrant, and Lafayette as a traitor" in

¹ This view is somewhat incomprehensible. It is denied by some authorities. The *History of North America*, by Veditz and James, p. 306, declares that "Louis XVI personally was not favorable to assisting the Americans and would break into a passion whenever he heard of help being thus furnished."

² *Ibid.*, p. 316.

1793. So literally was this true that when Lafayette's young son, escaping from France in 1795, sought sanctuary in America, Washington deemed it expedient for the sake of the boy and his mother, to make his reception and encouragement secret.¹ Hamilton insisted that even if, for the sake of the argument, "gratitude" be conceived to be due, still those who should think upon it judicially would acknowledge a duality of obligation—to the monarchy, upon the one hand—to the people of France, upon the other—and that "neutrality" was the only equitable rôle for us in a clash between the two. "Would not"—he asked—"a just estimate of the origin and progress of our relations to France, viewed with reference to the mere question of gratitude, lead us to this result—that we ought not to take part against the son and successor of a father, on whose sole will depended the assistance we received—that we ought not to take part with him against the nations whose blood and treasure had been in the hands of the father, the means of the assistance afforded us?"

More emphasis might well have been laid upon this point, and no doubt would have been except that slow media of communication put a comprehensive familiarity with the latest detail of European news beyond Hamilton's immediate consultation. If we inherited a debt of negotiable "gratitude," certainly it could not, by any stretch of the imagination, run to a French Commune

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. II, p. 165.

which sooner or later beheaded Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette,¹ forced Lafayette into wretched exile and imprisonment, condemned Rochambeau to the block,² killed Vioménil, who had been second to Rochambeau in American command, when defending the royal family in the Tuileries, and executed numerous other French veterans of the American campaign such as the Prince de Broglie,³ the Comte de Custine,⁴ the Duc de Lauzun and the Chevalier Duportail.⁵ This was not a type of prowess calculated to intrigue our enthusiasms or to invite reciprocal sympathy or to deserve our approbation—except as we went blood-crazy along with these wild “Republicans” across the sea.

This abrupt and horrifying change in the com-

¹ “Added to the pressure brought to bear upon the French policy was the attitude of Marie Antoinette.”—*Ibid.*, p. 311.

² “It is said that on the day appointed for his execution, the cart which transported prisoners was so full that there was no place for him, and before his turn came again, Robespierre had been sent to the block and the prisoners were liberated.”—Perkins’ *France in the American Revolution*, p. 376.

³ He was among the most distinguished in birth of the French noblemen who came to our aid; he was guillotined June 27, 1774.

⁴ He fought throughout the 1781 campaign and was among the first to be executed in the Reign of Terror.

⁵ He enlisted in the American service in 1777, and at Yorktown commanded the engineer corps; the Commune sentenced him to death, but he is said to have escaped.

plexion of France was one of the collateral reasons which Hamilton presented as justifying the new United States in deciding the issue on contemporary and independent merit rather than on the fiction of a misconceived and misdirected "gratitude." He listed various acts of French aggression upon neighboring European States and the repeated menace in various degrees of the French Convention. "Whatever partiality may be entertained for the general object of the French revolution," he wrote, "it is impossible for any well-informed or sober-minded man not to condemn the proceedings which have been stated, as repugnant to the general rights of nations, to the true principles of liberty, to the freedom of opinion of mankind." He charged that France was not blameless in the circumstances which preceded and precipitated the war in which we were committed to neutrality; that "if she received, she also gave causes of offense, and that the justice of the war on her side is not a little problematical." He faced "those who are disposed to justify indiscriminately everything in the conduct of France" with the unequivocal challenge that there could be "no doubt that France first declared and began the war against Austria, Prussia, Savoy, Holland, England and Spain"; and upon his demonstration of this premise he rested his invulnerable argument that our "defensive alliance" with France—the Treaty of 1778—could not be tortured into an "offensive alliance" requiring

of us that we fatefully desert neutrality and sustain such an "offensive war."¹

Further, he argued that "all contracts are to receive a reasonable construction," and that the fatal impossibility of effectual American aid to France—because "we are wholly destitute of naval forces and France with all the great maritime powers united against her, is unable to supply this deficiency"—added finality to our absolution from any constructive obligation. "There would be no proportion," he declared, "between the mischiefs and the perils to which the United States would expose themselves by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the nature of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that which it would be in their power actually to render her, by becoming a party. . . . Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation; and though in the performance of stipulations relating to war, good faith requires that the ordinary hazards of war should be fairly encountered, because they are directly contemplated by such stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards should be run. . . . If, as no sensible and candid man will deny, the extent of the present combination against France is in a degree to be ascribed to imprudences on her part,

¹ Hamilton argued that the Treaty of 1778 was not only solely defensive, but also that it applied solely to defenses of such colonies as France still held in America and American waters.

the exemption to the United States is still more manifest and complete. No country is bound to partake in hazards of the most critical kind, which may have been produced or promoted by the indiscretion or the intemperance of another. This is an obvious dictate of reason with which the common sense and the common practice of mankind coincide."¹

Thus did "Pacificus" build the technique of his case, scrupulously sustaining each successive conclusion with a wealth of argument and example. It was the parading proof that even if French precedent, rather than American interest, be consulted, the precedent was one of self-interest over everything else. Space forbids further extensive quotation. We can but deal in cameos. Hamilton did not neglect to remind his constituents that after the Colonies had won their war, the French attitude frequently became dubious. Such

¹ As early as the peace negotiations of 1782 when American Commissioners agreed to "Provisional Articles" without French consent, at a moment when French purposes had ceased to be clearly friendly, ultimate American autonomy was prophesied. These "Provisional Articles" were "intended to convey a warning that the United States reserved the right to make a separate peace, if a final peace should be obstructed by France for reasons not covered by the Treaty of Alliance. In other words, the Articles reclaimed for the United States the right to construe their treaty obligations which, when exercised in good faith, belongs to all sovereignties."—Corwin's *French Policy and the American Alliance*, p. 342.

of course, was the case—in certain efforts to fetter peace negotiations and prevent useful treaties with other powers—in efforts even to influence and control processes of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia—efforts, in a word, to render us substantially vassal to our erstwhile ally.

Numerous other controversial issues were met and vanquished. It was a perfect case. In it was the expression of a specific purpose, namely to illuminate the international trail for “the body of the American people” whose immediate peace was insidiously endangered by the hyphenated foes of Washington’s “neutrality.” But the lamps thus lighted were destined to glow down the longer trails of subsequent centuries which should profit from precedent and tradition in proportion as both should be intelligently preserved and embraced by posterity.

The whole contemplation, Hamilton asserted, “ought to serve as an instructive lesson to the people of this country. It ought to teach us not to over-rate foreign friendships—to be upon our guard against foreign attachments. The former will generally be found hollow and delusive; the latter will have a natural tendency to lead us aside from our own true interests, and to make us the dupes of foreign influence. They introduce a principle of action which, in its effects, if the expression be allowed, is anti-national. Foreign influence is truly the Grecian Horse to a Republic. We cannot be too careful to exclude its entrance.

Nor ought we to imagine that it can only make its approaches in the gross form of direct bribery. It is most dangerous when it comes under the patronage of our passions, under the auspices of national prejudice and partiality. . . . I trust the morals of this country are yet too good to leave much to apprehend on the score of bribery. Caresses, condescensions, flattery, in unison with our pre-posessions, are infinitely more to be feared."

Noble words! Upon another occasion the pure-hearted and single-purposed Hamilton had cried out that the paramount American aspiration must be the creation here of a citizenship that should be neither "Greek nor Trojan," but rather unequivocally dedicated to the exclusive destiny of an undivided and indivisible American unity of thought and loyalty. Here came the same simile—the same warning—the reminiscence of Troy's destruction—the shadow of "the Grecian Horse"! That the American people soon rallied to this great doctrine of intelligent "Nationalism," despite the "spirit of acrimony and invective" in which its designing politico-assailants flung upon it all the fetid anathema at their command, was a vindication of Hamilton's confidence in them as expressed in the seventh and last of these letters. "Too wise to have been misled by foreign or domestic machinations," he wrote, "the people of America adopted a Constitution which was necessary to their safety and to their happi-

ness. Too wise still to be ensnared by the same machinations, they will support the government they have established, and will take care of their own peace, in spite of the insidious efforts which are making to detach them from the one, and to disturb the other."

It was an epochal hour in the evolution of free governments. Washington's Proclamation was our second Declaration of Independence. Hamilton was its inspiration and its interpreter. Thirteen subsequent decades thus far are its happy beneficiaries. Thus did a puissant tradition take form. If there was courage enough and vision enough and discrimination enough and "100% Americanism" enough to abjure these foreign entanglements in 1793—when the Fathers and the Founders still were intimately close to France in our one and only foreign alliance and in recollections of indispensable French fraternity when we gained our own autonomy—it would seem that no subsequent situation could present great enough incentive to lure us from this tradition's sanctuary. "Esteem and friendship" for France? Yes. A "cordial disposition of good and friendly offices"? Yes. Martial partnership—contractual entanglement—prejudicial liaison? No—neither with France nor any other foreign power on earth. And the more positively we accept the preceding conclusions of Chapter One, the more strikingly monitory become the conclusions of Chapter Two.

PART III

Washington, Hamilton and Adams

Washington, Hamilton and Adams

THE new government of the United States, publicly and officially committed to essential and intelligent "Nationalism," faced even greater trials when complex and irritating events promptly put Washington's Proclamation, and its great doctrine, to the tests of application. "Neutrality" in theory and "neutrality" in practice are two different things; that which the laboratory abstractly sanctions, life often concretely rejects. Perilous as had been the experiences attendant upon Washington's pronouncement in 1793, even greater hazards pursued the scrupulous effort which the government immediately addressed to the enforcement of its decree, the preservation of its official impartialities, and the validation of the tradition thus instituted. Its novel and lofty purposes were beset by hostile circumventions at home and abroad. Domestic faction, cunningly fomented by native agitators and by alien agents, conspired to harass the Executive. Foreign challenge—all but racing to lethal crisis in the case of France, and ultimately in the case of England—multiplied the menace. The same unswerving devotion to a duty and an ideal, which had marked

the attitude of Washington and Hamilton in the initial neutrality decisions, now characterized their uncompromising efforts to render neutrality effectual. But vivid history wrote with speeding pen ere they mastered the trail and bulwarked the policy destined to live as a tradition. It was one of the Republic's greatest achievements,¹ and one of its greatest contributions to international law. Its novelty was part of its weakness; yet its novelty was the added and emphatic measure of its vast and critical importance.²

The rule is now universally recognized that every independent State has a right to remain at peace while other States are engaged in war.³

¹ "Probably next to our country's fame as being the place where Washington lived, there was no particular in which the Republic is so favorably known in Europe and throughout the civilized world as that of being the honest and consistent advocate of neutral rights at the time of the French Revolution."—Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 9.

² Speaking before the New York Historical Society in 1870, Charles Francis Adams declared that "the world owes the practical adoption of the principle of neutrality—the right of a nation to be neutral in time of war, if it so pleases—mainly to the long and painful struggles of the government of the United States. . . . It is on all hands conceded that in ancient times what is signified by the word neutrality did not exist, for there is no word known to express it. . . . The government of the United States, for the first time in history, laid down this principle."

³ "That great state paper which is now regarded by international law writers as the foundation of the law of

This is acknowledged to be an incontestable attribute of sovereignty. But it was far from "incontestable" in the last decade of the eighteenth century when young America dared to proclaim and defend it. Aggressions of both France and England had to be repulsed in its name—the very statement of this fact being the disproof of those astigmatized critics who had charged up our neutrality to pro-British predilections. That it finally did become "incontestable" is the tribute which history pays to the faithful purposes of Washington and Hamilton and to the devoted "Nationalism" which exclusively dominated their pure dedications.

In the midst of the convulsions which attended the promulgation of the Neutrality Proclamation in the spring of 1793, Citizen Genêt—twenty-seven years young—reached American shores with a commission as the Minister of Republican France. He came with a restless, provocative, communistic zeal which was destined, first, to spurn unbearably the government's pledged neutrality, then to trespass contemptuously upon the government's hospitality, and finally to defeat its own alien ends by the sheer effrontery with which it rushed headlong from one hysterical excess to another. So far as the American fever was concerned, the truth is that this progression was its

neutrality."—Warren's *Supreme Court in U. S. History*, Vol. I, p. 105.

salvation; that Genêt unmeditatedly cured it by homeopathy—" *similia par similibus*." No sooner was Genêt off ship in Charleston harbor and through with the extravagant welcome recklessly flung upon him than, ignoring the essential diplomatic etiquette which required the immediate submission of his credentials at the Capitol, he proceeded to fit out privateers against British trade in the West Indies, and to use this neutral port as the base for war upon a power with which we were at amity. Indeed, the very ship which brought him from France, while swinging up to Philadelphia, captured a British merchantman in Delaware Bay, inside the Capes and within three miles of land—blandly and derisively sailing into the Capitol with this prize within a week of the Proclamation which outlawed such piracy in American waters. The following day Genêt himself arrived in Philadelphia after a veritable triumphal tour well calculated to encourage his bumptious belief that the new United States was more French than American. He presented his credentials; was generously though circumspectly received; but immediately was faced with the necessity of acquiescing in the President's demand that the illegal prize should be released to the custody of the British Minister. His arrogance was not yet swollen with the poisons of which it was soon to partake. This was the first practical enforcement of American neutrality. The significance of the event—the moral grandeur of

the precedent—richly deserves the following apostrophe from the heart of a great commentator¹:

“Here was a newly organized and as yet hardly self-subsistent government of barely four millions of subjects, and those widely scattered over a vast and thinly populated territory, without a fortified sea-port or internal stronghold of any kind in its possession, without a ship or mounted gun in its navy, and without a soldier or a sailor that it could call its own, emphatically declaring to the first military power of Europe—at that time certainly more than six times its superior in population, and holding all Europe at bay by its martial prowess—that it must drop its prey, and make it over as a neutrality-offering to its hated enemy because United States neutral soil was inviolable, even to its best ally!”

Regarding such infractions of neutrality as this first episode involved, Washington's cabinet was a unit regarding the necessary strictures to be enforced. But upon the more serious question of prizes taken upon the high seas, by virtue of commissions issued by Genêt, and brought into American ports, the usual division persisted among the counsellors. Jefferson and Randolph held that the government was under no obligation to restore them; Hamilton and Knox contended that the maintenance of honest neutrality required their enforced restitution.²

¹ *American Neutrality*, by Bemis, p. 12.

² Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, p. 126.

But another immediate and more direct issue, involving the new French Minister, was raised when one of the prizes captured by one of the ships commissioned by him at Charleston, was brought into Philadelphia for sale. Here was a sharp precipitation of clashing motives and a clear call for augural disclosures, pro and con. Hamilton advised the President in writing that the prize should be restored and the two offending officers in charge arrested.¹ This course was pursued. In an extraordinary letter to the State Department—noting the arrest of these officers for a “crime which my mind cannot conceive, and which my pen almost refuses to state”—bellicose Genêt demanded “Presidential intervention” for the “immediate release” of these privateersmen “who have acquired the right of French citizens, if they have lost that of American citizens.” Needless to say, there was no “intervention.” Even Randolph, Attorney-General, had to rule that their trials should proceed. Washington deeply felt the insult to the nation which the incident involved in its implications, but pursued his unflurried yet inflexible course. The privateersmen were tried and acquitted—for lack of an unpartisan jury and an adequate law.²

¹ *Hamilton's Works*, Vol. IV, p. 394.

² Showing the intense partisanship prevailing—“it is said that the juryman who opposed acquittal, upon his final compliance, informed the Bench that he was induced to the verdict because he heard threats made out of doors

Washington seriously considered a special session of Congress to create new statutes that should strengthen the hands of the government in coping with such offenders. Ultimately he presented the contemplation in his annual message to the next regular session, the result of which was the Neutrality Code of June 5, 1794.¹

against anyone who should oppose the acquittal.”—Mass. *Mercury*, August 9, 1793.

¹ President Washington’s Message of December 3, 1793. “As soon as the war in Europe had embraced those powers with whom the United States have the most extensive relations there was reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might be interrupted and our disposition for peace drawn into question by the suspicions too often entertained by belligerent nations. It seemed, therefore, to be my duty to admonish our citizens of the consequences of a contraband trade and of hostile acts to any of the parties, and to obtain by a declaration of the existing legal status of the thing an easier admission of our right to the immunities belonging to our situation. Under this impression the proclamation . . . was issued. In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to adopt general rules which should conform to the treaties and assert the privileges of the United States. . . . It rests with the wisdom of Congress to correct, improve, or enforce this plan of procedure; and it will probably be found expedient to extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to many cases which, though dependent upon principles already recognized, demand some further provisions. Where individuals shall, within the United States, array themselves in hostility against any of the powers at war, or enter upon military expeditions or enterprises within the jurisdiction of

Details being not the function of this survey, high-spots must again suffice. Ebullient Genêt was quick to applaud enforcements of neutrality against putative British offenders in American ports—an impartiality of American stricture which perfectly denied those base imputations which had charged a pro-British incentive to Washington and Hamilton—but he was correspondingly slow himself to yield to the law of the land whose hospitality he violated.¹ On June 8, 1793, Governor Clinton of New York, acting under instructions from the President, seized another French privateer fitted out in violation of neutrality—the significant fact of the seizure being that it was done

the United States, or usurp and exercise judicial authority within the United States, or where the penalties on violations of the law of nations may have been indistinctly marked, or are inadequate—these offenses cannot receive too early and close an attention, and require prompt and decisive remedies.”

¹ Thus on June 25, 1793, Genêt wrote Jefferson applauding the apprehension of a British privateer off Georgia; and thus the British *Jane* was disarmed in Philadelphia at Genêt's request on July 9, 1793. *American State Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 159, 163. Thus, also, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, writing to Genêt from Paris, July 10, 1793, after berating him soundly for his disregard of American neutral dignity and rights, says: “We have never made an ineffectual demand on the American government, and we have always found there the most friendly disposition.”—Appendix to DeWitt's *Memoir of Jefferson*, p. 526. Also Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 29.

with a detachment of militia. America intended to keep peace even at the expense of force: "Nationalism" purposed a muscle in keeping with its ideals. This need for stern repressions sped swiftly to a climax. Genêt organized prize courts at the headquarters of French Consuls in America.¹ He even went to the ultimate extremes of gathering together in South Carolina certain malcontents from the old American army, giving them military commissions, and planning an armed attack on Spanish Louisiana, while a similar conquest of Florida was plotted under his auspices with Georgia as a base. The former thing was a "clear violation of the most elementary rights of sovereignty": the latter, a "frank violation of territorial rights."²

Then came *Little Sarah* to catapult the crisis. *Little Sarah* was a British merchantman, captured by French sea-hawks, brought into Philadelphia, re-conditioned with heavy armament, and ordered

¹ These French Consular Courts were reviewed in the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of "*Glass vs. Sloop Betsy*" —3 Dallas 6. The decision was emphatically adverse to the French imposition, and Hamilton again invoked the logic of "*Camillus*" to defend the findings in the New York *Advertiser* of September 23, 1795. "No decision of the Court ever did more to vindicate our international rights, to establish respect amongst other nations for the sovereignty of this country, and to keep the United States out of international complications."—Warren's *Supreme Court in U. S. History*, Vol. I, p. 117.

² Adams' *Foreign Policy*, pp. 86, 87.

by Genêt to new tasks of piracy as *La Petite Democrat*. Hamilton reported the case to the Cabinet, Washington being at Mt. Vernon. Genêt was requested to save the embarrassment of forcible restraints. This was July 14, 1793. He flew into a rage, violently abused the government, promised an answer of force to force, and threatened to appeal from the Executive to the people. It was the beginning of the end. The French Minister was the victim of his own lawless passions and of a mistaken assessment of the mass American fidelities which, when finally faced with the naked realities, rallied sturdily to articulate "Nationalism" and its courageous exponents. Jefferson reported an equivocal promise from Genêt that the erstwhile *Little Sarah*, now the *Little Democrat*—bearing an historical importance wholly out of proportion to the diminutives in its name—should merely drop down below Chester and there await Washington's final decision. Hamilton and Knox, in usual agreement, favored immediate restraints. But the Secretary of State professed confidence in his French friend, and, being indisposed, retired to his country home after committing the Cabinet to temporization. Washington returned to Philadelphia post-haste. Swiftly went this blunt note to the indulgent Premier—who sometimes might have been accused of gullibility if he had not been more frequently guilty of subtle calculations¹:

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. II, p. 130.

"What is to be done in the case of the *Little Sarah* now at Chester? Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the acts of this government at defiance with impunity? And threaten the Executive with an appeal to the people? What must the world think of such conduct? And of the United States in submitting to it? These are serious questions. Circumstances press for decision; and as you have had time to consider them—upon me they come unexpectedly—I wish to know your opinion upon them even before tomorrow, for the vessel may then be gone."

A Presidential summons scarcely could have been more peremptory. The temper of the Executive was obviously aroused. He knew that Hamilton and Knox had counseled immediate action, in the absence of the Executive, which would have demonstrated the administration to be at one in its determinations. Upon Jefferson fell the responsibility for humiliating and devitalizing delays. His answer to Washington's short, sharp interrogation renewed an expression of confidence in the intentions of the swash-buckler from abroad. But Washington's decision was made of sterner stuff. The Cabinet immediately decided to hold the armed vessels of all belligerents in port. Genêt was notified: but *La Petite Democrat* already was well on its dishonorable way. More: Genêt, fattening on his own sullen contempts, laid down an abusive barrage of vio-

lent and hysterical expletives upon the Cabinet and country. But he reckoned without his hosts. The former united August 16, 1793, in an emphatic demand upon France for Genêt's recall—a petition ranking among the ablest and boldest of all American State papers—and the latter, almost wholly without regard to prior malingerings, united in an eloquent, moving, monitory demonstration of renewed "Americanism," and of restored and intelligent fidelity to the Federalist spokesmen who were defending rational independence against all challengers.¹ Still Genêt, as insensible to propriety as to precaution, persisted in his imported treasons. President Washington's special message, December 5, 1793, to the Senate said: "The proceedings of the person

¹ The fame of this letter demanding Genêt's recall "is the property of the nation. How far the fame of it belongs to Jefferson, whose signature it bears, or whether it was Hamilton's work—as his son and biographer, Mr. John C. Hamilton, renders highly probable—I will not venture to affirm." Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 17. Also *American State Papers*, p. 167. Also Hamilton's *History of the Republic*, Vol. V, p. 333. Speaking of Jefferson's rôle in this correspondence, Charles Francis Adams, in his New York speech of December 13, 1870, says that "mortifying as it must have been to give up the policy which he had cherished, he showed no hesitation in his course. . . . Considering the sacrifice he had to make of all his cherished notions, nothing in the long and brilliant career of that gentleman seems to me more honorable than the way he acquitted himself upon that occasion."

whom they¹ have unfortunately appointed their Minister Plenipotentiary here have breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent him. Their tendency, on the contrary, has been to involve us in war abroad and discord and anarchy at home." Another message of January 20, 1794, said: "I now communicate to you that his² conduct has been unequivocally disapproved, and that the strongest assurances have been given that his recall should be expedited without delay."³ Only the belated word, in 1794, that France had acted affirmatively on the demand for his recall saved him from actual physical arrest when Washington, at the end of his great and dignified patience, prepared to demonstrate once and for all that the United States proposed to make of its "Nationalism" an indisputable and attained fact. The letter demanding Genêt's recall had said that "after independence and self-government, there was nothing America more sincerely wished than perpetual friendship with the French." But "independence and self-government" came first—eternally, implacably—and no other considerations were allowed priority of consultation. It was not an easy or a safe commitment—nor was it established with finality by the implications of Genêt's recall. But, at least, it was gloriously confirmed—as a principle

¹ The French National Assembly.

² Genêt's.

³ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, pp. 138, 142.

which should assume the dignity of a cardinal tradition—by these experiences of those assailants who lived, strove and conspired for its emasculation.

The unanimous re-election of President Washington had testified his continuing dominion of popular affections—an attachment, however, soon to convict itself of spasmodic inconstancy and fickle gratitudes—but the Congress enrolled an increasing sector of pro-French anti-Federalists. Responding officially to the President's fifth annual address, the House did not withhold an expression of "approbation and pleasure" for the "vigilance with which you have guarded against an interruption of peace by your proclamation": but neither did it withhold an inferential reservation when it observed that "the connection of the United States with Europe has evidently become extremely interesting," and suggested that "the communications which remain to be exhibited to us will no doubt assist in giving us a fuller view of the subject and in guiding our deliberations to such results as may comport with the rights and true interests of our country."¹ The Senate's official reply to the President was less contentious. It said²: "As the European powers with whom the United States have the most extensive relations were involved in war, in which we had taken no part, it seemed necessary that the

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

disposition of the nation for peace should be promulgated to the world, as well for the purpose of admonishing our citizens of the consequences of a contraband trade and of acts hostile to any of the belligerent parties as to obtain by a declaration of the existing legal status of things an easier admission of our right to the immunities of our situation. We, therefore, contemplate with pleasure the proclamation by you issued, and give it our hearty approbation. We deem it a measure well-timed and wise, manifesting a watchful solicitude for the welfare of the nation and calculated to promote it."

But these warm protestations frequently were to be more honored in breach than in observance. Frictions with England injected a further element of hazard, both domestic and foreign, requiring direct action abroad to save an honorable peace, and continued contest at home with those politico-fanatics who still rejected "Nationalism" as an exclusive American shibboleth. Neutrality was still in travail.

The Neutrality Laws of June 5, 1794—calculated to consolidate and stabilize the system to which Washington was committed—were fought by the entire force of the Jeffersonian party, and only passed the Senate by the tie-breaking vote of Vice-President Adams. But the fact remains that they were passed, and the world has since borne repeated testimony to their virtue, their honor and their sagacity—an apostrophe which

latter-day "Nationalism" would do well to emulate.¹ Never did the encyclopedic genius of Hamilton serve the American foundation in purer faith or to more vital end. Not only was he the originator, if not the draftsman, of the Proclamation, but also he was the author and framer of the Act of 1794—even as he was the irresistible advocate upon whose tongue and pen the validation of both had to lean.²

¹ John Ward, writing his *Rights and Duties of Belligerent and Neutral Powers* in 1801, said at page 166: "Of the great trading nations, America is almost the only one that has shown consistency of principle. The firmness and thorough understanding of the laws of nations, which during the French Revolution she has displayed, must forever rank her high in the scale of enlightened communities." Sir Robert Phillimore, in his *Commentary on International Law* says at page 282, Vol. III: "The conduct of the United States with respect to this matter has been, under the most trying circumstances, marked, not only by perfect consistency, but by preference for right and duty over interest and the expediency of the moment." A note on page 540 of Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* says: "The course pursued by Washington and his Cabinet, in sustaining neutrality and impartiality, has received the commendations of the masters of public law in all nations."

² "Beyond doubt, much the greatest share of praise, for the inauguration of this national policy, is due to Hamilton. . . . Neutral law, as embodied in the State papers of Washington and his Secretaries, and as enforced in the legislation and jurisprudence of his administration, furnishes as bright an example of exact and upright neutrality, based on scientific and impartial principles, as the

By this time, collateral events had been shifting the scenery upon the international stage. The recall of Genêt from Philadelphia at American request was balanced by the recall of Morris from Paris at French request. James Monroe of Virginia succeeded the latter—"pro-French, pro-Revolutionist, Jeffersonian Monroe."¹ It proved a desperately unfortunate designation because Monroe was more intent upon accommodating the desires of his Parisian hosts and their American sympathizers than the policies of the President and the Administration whose credentials he bore. Indeed, his ultimate recall was an acknowledgment of these dubious fidelities.² But he was not separated from his post until still another crisis had broken upon the "Nationalists" at the American helm, and had been met with another triumph for the undeviating principles which motivated them.

Persisting in the blindness which cost them the loss of the Colonies, the British had superciliously refused to negotiate essential treaties with

history of the world can produce."—Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 27.

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 107.

² "His correspondence with the enemies of Washington at home was more frequent and confidential than that with the President himself. Washington decided that although it was very desirable to have the American Minister acceptable to the nation to which he was sent, it was more important to have him loyal to the Administration which sent him."—*Ibid.*, p. 747.

either the old Confederation or the new Congress. More: when France and England came to renewed grips, it seemed to be the British assumption—perhaps born of guilty, reminiscent consciences—that the United States would incline to sustain its erstwhile ally in a new fraternity of war. Therefore, British eyes were hostile when they turned our way, and, accordingly, American prejudices rankled with re-opened sores. The impressment of American seamen in British ports, added to the common vexations of neutrals on the high seas, were scant tribute to a belief in the integrity of our proclaimed neutrality. In November, 1793, a British Order in Council swept a large number of our grain-laden ships into English ports and substantially threatened all of our French maritime trade. The mandate was so drastic that it bespoke the possible consequences of open hostilities—eagerly welcome to our pro-French, pro-war, anti-“Nationalist” party—desperately unwelcome to Washington and those of his single-purposed confrères who were in pursuit of a complete severance of the new United States from these continental vicissitudes. Under impulse of the former, retaliation leaped to American lips in the form of successive proposals graduating all the way from an embargo to a sequestration of all debts due British subjects as security for satisfaction of our prospective indemnities. But under impulse of the latter, fortuitously assisted by word from London that the offending Order had

been revoked as regarded America, and happily encouraged by reports of a belated British disposition to cultivate peace and amity with the United States, the Administration took another of those great, far-visioned steps which led to American emancipation. In a message to Congress, April 16, 1794, the President nominated John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as an Envoy Extraordinary to his Britannic Majesty and with a commission to seek compositions that should "vindicate our rights with firmness" yet "cultivate peace with sincerity." Said the President: "Peace ought to be pursued with unremitting zeal, before the last recourse, which has so often been the scourge of nations, and cannot fail to check the advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated. . . . A mission like this, while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for the friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to hostility."¹ His purpose was dual: first, to prevent, if honorably possible, another and stunting war with England; second, to forefend the inevitable domestic reaction which, under such embittering auspices, would rush into the arms of another French alliance from whence another escape might prove impossible. Both objects were at one with the dominating purpose to hold America aloof from foreign involvement whether of war or peace. Both

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 144.

consulted intelligent "Nationalism"—the rule of deliberative, rational self-interest. It was not the supinity of a coward. It was not a fear to fight. Rather it was a dread. Indeed, Congress had been specifically admonished to prepare the national defense—"If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it: if we desire to secure peace, . . . it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."¹ It was the sane pursuit of the primary welfare of the United States, which neither sought nor shunned a war with England, and neither wished nor wanted a permanent epilogue to the French liaison of prior years. It was another milestone down the trail of the tradition that Americanism—in the language of the street—asked nothing but the right and the privilege of "minding its own business." But, like the other prescient efforts in this profound consecration to which Washington and Hamilton gave their hearts and hopes, it succeeded only after cyclonic passions had hurled the thunders of unbridled anathema and the lightnings of white-hot wrath against the whole conception. American mobs were angry that the conciliatory gesture should be made; angrier that England—momentarily sobered into amiability and reason—should facilitate the mission; angriest that the "Jay Treaty," saving "Nationalism" and neutrality, should have

¹ Fifth Annual Address. *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 132.

snatched comparative tranquillity out of impending ruction.¹ The virus of condemnation spread until otherwise strong and sturdy patriots were temporarily inoculated and were swept into the feverish maelstrom. Obloquy and abuse were the universal lexicon; violent declamation, the universal practice. "No President since Washington could have stood the blast, and even he shook under it."² The President was attacked for his "mock pageantry of monarchy and apish mimicry of kings"; was taunted with being the facile tool of Hamilton; even impeachment was demanded. Jay was burned in effigy uncounted times. Hamilton himself was stoned. But these were not ordinary men to be daunted by peril or hindered by attack. The Treaty, resulting from Jay's pilgrimage, was not all that might have been desired; and, in addition, dumb British diplomacy further muddled the waters by a renewal of its offensive Order in Council while the Treaty exchanges were pending. But, all things considered, it was an honorable and useful composition, far better suited to the foundation of such an American edifice as Washington planned for his

¹ "The Jay Treaty is open to criticism in some of its details, and at best cannot be ranked among the triumphs of our democracy; but, as connected with a new system of international policy, its value cannot be exaggerated."—Charles Francis Adams, speaking in New York, December 13, 1870.

² *Ibid.*

people and their posterity than would have been the shifting sands of trans-oceanic entanglement. "In time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn," he wrote to Secretary of State Randolph, who had succeeded Jefferson not only in portfolio but also in dubious partiality to France; "but, in the meanwhile, the government in relation to France and England may be compared to a ship between Scylla and Charybdis. If the Treaty is ratified, the partisans of the French, or rather of war and confusion, will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly sentiments; if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences that may follow it as respects Great Britain. It is not to be inferred from hence, that I am, or shall be disposed to quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one straight course, and that is to seek the truth and pursue it steadily."¹ Neutrality and "Nationalism" were indeed sore beset; but "the one straight course"—then, as always, the only direction pursued by the trail of this tradition—was never altered. Hamilton, now a private citizen in New York City after voluntary resignation from the Treasury, again sat in the counsels of the President—unofficially, but unsurpassed in influence; and once more took his magnetic pen in hand to chart the truth where he who ran might

¹ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. II, p. 152.

read. The "Pacifcus" of yesterday was now "Camillus"—writing new gospels for the guidance of a distraught nation—adding new and powerful and brilliant chapters to his saga of a people. With merciless bayoneting logic which never served him better than in this critical complex, he dissected the Treaty's opposition, pinioned the hypocrisy which pilloried Washington alike for war preparedness and war prevention, riddled the bigamous affections of partisans who hyphenated their nationalism, and rallied discriminating fidelities to a renaissance of reason wherein first things should be first.¹ In the end, these sentinels of American security once more triumphed over the confusion of tongues. The Treaty was ratified by exactly the necessary two-thirds Senate vote. The British Order in Council was again withdrawn. Again the cherished policy which was paramount in Washington's and Hamilton's concerns was saved. Character and courage had survived another acid test.

Thus the President was able, in his seventh annual address on December 8, 1795, to felicitate Congress and the country upon "a tranquillity the more satisfactory because maintained at the

¹ "Camillus" wrote forty letters, occupying not less than one hundred newspaper columns. Thirty-two were written, and all were inspired, by Hamilton. The remaining eight were the contribution of Rufus King. *The Greatest American*, Vandenberg, p. 220.

expense of no duty.”¹ “Faithful to ourselves,” said he, “we have violated no obligation to others.” The Senate responded generously and did not neglect to confess that auspicious circumstances demanded that “we should unite our efforts in imitation of your enlightened, firm and persevering example to establish and preserve the peace, freedom and prosperity of our country.”² But the House, still uncured of the late partisan austerities, refused to sanction, in its reciprocal address to the President, a clause proposing that “the confidence of his fellow citizens in the Chief Magistrate remains undiminished”³; and contented itself instead with a somewhat grudging tribute to his “zealous and faithful services” and a confession of “affectionate attachment” to his “character”—without affirming an estimate of his standing with the electorate.⁴ Nor did the House stop at this cavil. For subsequent weeks it withheld appropriations necessary to the execution of the Jay Treaty, while it insolently de-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 175. Also said he upon this occasion: “If by prudence and moderation on every side the extinguishment of all the causes of external discord which have heretofore menaced our tranquillity, on terms compatible with our national rights and honor, shall be the happy result, how firm and how precious a foundation will have been laid for accelerating, maturing and establishing the prosperity of our country.”

² *Ibid.*, p. 179.

³ Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. I, p. 155.

⁴ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 180.

manded of the President all papers related thereto, renewed its violent speeches, and was rebuked for its pains by a dignified and powerful message which denied the Constitutional authority of the House to meddle in Treaty affairs. This argument, anticipated two years before by the letters of "Pacificus," in structure and almost in diction, leaves little room to doubt the source of its inspiration.

The tranquillity which Washington had welcomed was short-lived abroad as well as at home. No sooner did British frictions recede than French omens renewed their ertswile clouds. Misled by Monroe into expecting French-Americans to force a repudiation of the Jay Treaty and then of Washington, there was angry disappointment in the cabinets of the Directory when it was discovered that the Anglo-American crisis was composed. Monroe's rôle smelled strongly of duplicity in these relations—as he craftily shifted blames from himself to others—and he richly deserved the sarcastic animadversions which Washington addressed to his politico-philandering.¹ Succeeding him, Charles C. Pinckney was commissioned to the correction of his predecessor's errors. But

¹ Mr. Monroe's errors, however, were only in judgment, unduly biased by partisan feeling, which were all fully redeemed afterwards by his long and arduous services, carried up even to the highest position in the gift of the nation."—Charles Francis Adams' New York speech. *Ibid.*

the honors heaped by the French Directory upon Monroe, so long as he remained in Paris—equalled only by the refrigerated rebuffs studiously offered Pinckney—inevitably told the Directory's perverse decision to lean once more on the influence of internal American partialities, to again urge them into domestic eruption, and to revert to intrigue and affront in trans-oceanic contacts. Indeed, when the Directory finally noticed Pinckney at all, it was only with an ultimatum to quit France along with other foreigners!

In the hectic interim, Washington—declining a third election which not even his malignant detractors could have denied him—had been succeeded in the Presidency by John Adams, who disbelieved in foreign embroilment, but whose first duty it was to meet this new French indignity and this new threat to the policies of his predecessor.¹ In his message to the special Con-

¹ When John Adams was in London in 1782, he conversed with Richard Oswald, British Peace Commissioner, and reports the following conversation: "'You are afraid,' says Mr. Oswald, 'of being made the tools of the powers of Europe.' 'Indeed, I am,' says I. 'What powers?' said he. 'All of them,' said I. 'It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually maneuvering with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle.'"—*John Adams' Works*, Vol. III, p. 316.

gressional session of May 16, 1797, President Adams did not disguise the nature or extent of these untoward events. His was a brave soul; and his, a long, unbroken record of achievement in the face of obstacles. Referring to French aggressions upon both our honor and our commerce, he said: "Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision which shall convince France that we are not a degraded people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, and regardless of national honor, character and interest."¹ Yet, irascible old patriot that he was, he averred that one more and final attempt for "peace and friendship" with France was not "absolutely forbidden" by "the honor or the interest of the United States."² A noble patience—not an ordinary Adams characteristic—matched the courage and the determination with which young America went upon its appointed trail. Pursuant to this last pacific hope, another Commission was designated to seek justice and amity in Paris—"to dissipate umbrages, to remove prejudices, to rectify errors, and

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 225.

² *Ibid.*, p. 226. In this same message, President Adams paraphrased the foreign policy of his predecessors and continued "Nationalism's" thesis in the following words: "We ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and separate from it if we can."

adjust all differences by a treaty between the two powers"—¹ but succeeded only in suffering an aggravation of affronts, including even an intimation that we might be willing to pay tribute as to the pirates on the Barbary Coast.² The mission came to nought save as it confirmed American impressions that neutrality was about to fail in its last contact with the French, and that they the broken fraternity of other years threatened to set "Republicans" of the Old and the New World at each others' throats. President Adams' message of March 19, 1798, virtually put Congress upon notice to prepare for war. Indeed, it was followed four days later by a remarkable Proclamation designating a special day of fasting and of prayer.³ In it President Adams declared that "as the United States of America are at present placed in a hazardous and afflictive situation by the unfriendly disposition, conduct and demands of a foreign power, evinced by repeated refusals to receive our messengers of reconciliation and peace, by depredations on our commerce, and the

¹ President Adams' recitation of functions in his special Senate message of May 31, 1797. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

² "Think for a moment of John Marshall (one of the American Commissioners) who for over thirty years held up the judicial ermine free from the slightest breath of stain, invited to haggle with the emissaries of Talleyrand about the terms in cash upon which they might hope for the privilege of being courteously treated!"—Charles Francis Adams' New York speech. *Ibid.*

³ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 259.

infliction of injuries on very many of our fellow-citizens while engaged in their lawful business on the seas—under these considerations it has appeared to me that the duty of imploring the mercy and benediction of Heaven on our country demands at this time a special attention from its inhabitants." He prayed "that the American people may be united in those bonds of amity and mutual confidence and inspired with that vigor and fortitude by which they have in times past been so highly distinguished and by which they have obtained such valuable advantages"; and that "the blessings of peace, freedom and pure religion may be speedily extended to all the nations of the earth."

The publication of the historically famous "X, Y, Z Papers" re-cemented America. Their infamous proof of official French cupidity, their demonstration of fickle and sordid purpose toward America, disillusioned such of our remaining zealots as had clung to the Directory and deserted the Republic. X, Y and Z contributed to an algebraic atmosphere. They were "unknown quantities"—these three emissaries who spoke for France in these covert back-stairs blackmails. They were "unknown quantities" in that their identification was withheld; but there proved to be nothing uncertain about their insulting demands upon the American Commissioners and their direct proposal that bribes might open these barred and baffling doors. Each letter designated

a different agent in the conspiracy of itching palms. They worked singly and in pairs. The entire degrading contemplation was utterly reprehensible. Some attribute the origin of the famous aphorism—"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute"—to Pinckney's repulsion of these venal quests.¹ That, at least, was the spirit in which it was rejected, and of the American reaction when the notorious "X, Y, Z Papers" finally laid bare the complete disgrace which these minions of Talleyrand attempted to visit upon our plenipotentiaries.

America reluctantly prepared for war. New and surpassing French depredations, new decrees ravishing neutral rights, and finally the burning of an American ship by a French privateer steeled the American purpose. It was the paradox of a pacific purpose, expressed in martial terms. Washington, foreseeing the inevitable, wrote Hamilton—"I would go with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode as I should go to the tombs of my ancestors"²—and yet when President Adams besought him once more to stand forward as the generalissimo of unencumbered independence, he came from his retirement with brave dignity and girded on his glorious sword, stipulating only that Hamilton should

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 59, attributes the phrase to a toast at a public dinner given to Marshall at Philadelphia upon his return from France.

² Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. II, p. 199.

be second and active in command.¹ "It is reserved for intoxicated and lawless France—for purposes of providence far beyond the reach of human ken—to slaughter her own citizens, and to disturb the repose of all the world besides," he wrote the President in answer to this draft. "That they have been led to believe by their agents and partisans among us that we are a divided people, that the latter are opposed to their own government, and that the show of a small force would occasion a revolt, I have no doubt: and how far these men—grown desperate—will further attempt to deceive, and may succeed in keeping up the deception, is problematical. Without that, the folly of the Directory in such an attempt would, I conceive, be more conspicuous, if possible, than their wickedness. . . . Satisfied, therefore, that you have sincerely wished and endeavored to avert war, and exhausted to the last drop the cup of conciliation, we can, with pure hearts, appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause, and may confidently trust the final result to Providence."² Then, on the theory

¹ It is indicative of Washington's intimate reliance upon Hamilton that when Adams undertook upon his own responsibility to put General Knox ahead of Hamilton—because of his incontinent pique at the latter's absolute pre-eminence in national leadership—Washington flatly threatened to resign until Adams grudgingly amended his petulant course.—Vandenberg's *Greatest American*, p. 100.

² Bancroft's *Life of Washington*, Vol. II, p. 200–205. Inasmuch as Washington's attitude in this climax is highly

that "Heaven helps those who help themselves," the faithful, tireless, intrepid adjutant proceeded to organize for such a war as should once more

important because it accurately reflected the cumulative logic of the entire situation, it is worth while to contemplate excerpts from a letter to Lafayette written by Washington from Mt. Vernon on Christmas Day, 1798, as reported in the *Old South Leaflets*, No. 98, beginning at page 19: "You have expressed a wish, worthy of the benevolence of your heart, that I would exert all my endeavors to avert the calamitous effects of a rupture between our countries. Believe me, my dear friend, that no man can deprecate an event of this sort with more horror than I should, and that no one during the whole of my administration labored more incessantly and with more sincerity and zeal than I did to avoid this, and to render all justice—nay, favor—to France consistent with the neutrality, which had been proclaimed, sanctioned by Congress, approved by the State legislatures, and by the people at large in their town and county meetings. But neutrality was not the point at which France was aiming; for, whilst they were crying, Peace, Peace, and pretending that they did not wish us to be embroiled in their quarrel with Great Britain, they were pursuing measures in this country so repugnant to its sovereignty and so incompatible with every principle of neutrality as must inevitably have produced a war with the latter. And, when they found that the government here was resolved to adhere steadily to its plan of neutrality, their next step was to destroy the confidence of the people in it and to separate them from it, for which purpose their diplomatic agents were specially instructed, and, in the attempt, were aided by inimical characters among ourselves, not, as I observed before, because they loved France more than any other nation, but because it was an instrument to facilitate the destruction of their own government.

vindicate the realities of our independence and the integrity of our "Nationalism." "Real firmness is good for everything; strut is good for

. . . You add in another place that the Executive Directory are disposed to an accommodation of all differences. If they are sincere in this declaration, let them evidence it by actions; for words unaccompanied therewith will not be much regarded now. I would pledge myself that the government and people of the United States will meet them heart and hand at a fair negotiation, having no wish more ardent than to live in peace with all the world, provided they are suffered to remain undisturbed in their just rights. Of this, their patience, forbearance and repeated solicitations under accumulated injuries and insults are incontestable proofs. But it is not to be inferred from hence that they will suffer any nation under the sun, while they retain a proper sense of virtue and independence, to trample upon their rights with impunity, or to direct or influence the internal concerns of their country.

. . . That there are many among us who wish to see this country embroiled on the side of Great Britain, and others who are anxious that we should take part with France against her, admits of no doubt. But it is a fact on which you may entirely rely that the governing powers of the country and a large part of the people are truly Americans in principle, attached to the interest of it, and unwilling under any circumstances whatsoever to participate in the politics or contests of Europe—much less since they have found that France, having forsaken the ground first taken, is interfering in the internal concerns of all nations, neutral as well as belligerent, and setting the world in an uproar.

"After my Valedictory Address to the people of the United States, you would no doubt be somewhat surprised to hear that I had again consented to gird on the sword. But, having struggled eight or nine years against

nothing," Hamilton said in a letter to a friend anent these tasks.¹

The effect in Paris—now convalescing from its blood debauch—was electric. Talleyrand saw that he had over-shot his mark. The publication of the damning "X, Y, Z Papers" sobered France even as they had enflamed America. The enthusiasm for excesses by now was cooling. The prospect of adding America to the avowed enemies of France ceased to lure. The notion that we were hyphenated vassals to the vicissitudes of Europe waned. Talleyrand was quick to sense the crisis. President Adams' war messages to Congress had left one inferential opening through which pacific negotiations might be renewed. "I will never send another Minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful and independent nation," he wrote on June 21, 1798²; and six months later, as if to emphasize the forlorn hint, he repeated in his second annual address³ that "to send another Minister without more determinate assur-

the invasion of our rights by one power, and to establish our independence of it, I could not remain an unconcerned spectator of the attempt of another power to accomplish the same object, though in a different way, with less pretensions; indeed, without any at all."

¹ Vandenberg's *Greatest American*, p. 99.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 256.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

ances that he would be received would be an act of humiliation to which the United States ought not to submit." Talleyrand now complied with this indispensable condition precedent. In roundabout negotiations he passed these necessary assurances to Adams, and the President—to the profound disgust of his compatriots—dealt with him in kind, taking sole responsibility for his uncounseled action. New Commissioners, not happily chosen, repaired to France. They were "received by the First Consul with the respect due their character,"¹ this First Consul being none other than Napoleon Bonaparte, now rising like a new planet and already shining like Mars at perihelion.² Honorable negotiations proceeded in an honorable way. A Treaty resulted—a Treaty which vindicated America's independent "Nationalism" and neutrality—a Treaty which finally wiped away all implications of such an entangling "alliance" as was framed in the extremities of 1778³—a Treaty which vindicated

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

² In view of Talleyrand's relations with Napoleon and his opportunity for intimate study of all the great personalities of his day, his compliment takes on added authority when he says that the three greatest men of the age were Napoleon, Hamilton and Fox—and that if he had to choose between these three, he would name Hamilton.

³ To accomplish this latter purpose, the American Commissioners abandoned the spoliation claims of its private citizens for indemnities against the French plunder of their property upon the high seas.

the aspirations of George Washington, even as its negotiation was concurrent with his death.

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Far back in 1781 when the youthful Hamilton had written his six "Continentalist Papers"—apostrophizing the destiny of a nation yet unborn—he bespoke this augury: "Happy America if those to whom thou hast entrusted the guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy future repose, but miserable and undone if their negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banners on the ruins of thy tranquillity."

Happy indeed was America that these days of the foundation—these formulative years when the world's greatest adventure in self-government was building habits for the ages—should have fallen to the primary guardianship of two such colossal characters as Washington and Hamilton himself.¹ Their lofty influence, their powers of divination, their incorrigible courage, their incorruptible integrity, their singleness of devoted purpose, and their

¹ When Hamilton resigned, Washington wrote to him as follows: "In every relation which you have borne to me I have found that my confidence in your talents, exertions and integrity has been well placed. I the more freely tender this testimony of my approbation because I speak from opportunities of information which cannot deceive me and which furnish satisfactory proof of your title to public regard." *The Writings of George Washington*, Sparks, 1837; —*The Greatest American*, Vandenberg, p. 204.

perpetual mutuality of thought and action were the supreme reliance of our budding democracy. Nor were these elements ever more essential than in the establishment of this basic ritual of self-sufficient, self-preserving "Nationalism"—a tradition which has achieved for us those precise blessings envisioned by the original dedication of these two great souls.

In the uncertain days before the Constitution rescued the drifting and disintegrating Confederation from impending chaos, Hamilton had seen with his prophetic eye the possibilities of repeated European omens that should threaten to make our independence a vicarious sacrifice to European turmoil. "A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European World," he wrote in his *Federalist Papers*.¹ "If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are out of its reach. . . . Should a war be the result of this precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous."²

The insults and the depredations came. "Miraculous" it was indeed that our escape should have been effected—and by a policy which was

¹ No. 34.

² *Ibid.*, No. 41.

largely an innovation in the experiences of a world forever tramping to the beat of martial drums.¹ "Miraculous" it was that without sacrifice of honor or surrender of sovereign rights, intelligent "Nationalism" should have triumphed in the face of incalculable plagues which did their worst—within and without America—to break us on the wheel of alien entanglement. "Miraculous" that the syllogistic subtleties² of domestic hyphenates should have been as impotent to destroy us as were the intrigues of those imported agitators who were overwhelmed by the fidelities of those "whose principles were purely American."³ Small wonder, then, that when Washington and Hamilton collaborated in the immortal "Farewell Address"—a faithful paraphrase of the

¹ "The policy of the United States in 1793," says the late W. E. Hall, one of the most eminent of English publicists, "constitutes an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then incumbent on neutrals. But it represented by far the most advanced existing opinions as to what these obligations were; and in some points it even went further than authoritative custom has up to the present day advanced. In the main, however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the community of nations."—Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 47.

² The descriptive phrase used in *The Federalist Papers*, No. 22, to describe the propaganda of anti-Constitutional agitators.

³ Washington's phrase in his Lafayette letter.—*Old South Leaflets*, No. 98.

"Pacificus" letters, rightly cherished by posterity as a well-nigh sacred oracle—they put all emphasis at their command upon this policy and this tradition.¹

It ordinarily would be an act of supererogation to reprint the mighty benediction which these master-builders thus bequeathed to the beneficiaries of their wisdom and experience. Its potent phrases are widely known wherever decent familiarity with American philosophies prevails. Yet, against the background here disclosed, certain warnings glow with a special monitory brilliance which it would be crass negligence to ignore. Nor can these warnings be too indelible. Times have changed—and the world with them. Space has been annihilated—and distance all but overcome. Yet we have not outlived the essence of this mighty formula for the preservation of the realities of a total American independence. To the extent of re-impressing its vitalities, in this respect,

¹ The idea of a "Farewell Address" was suggested to Washington by Hamilton. Washington sketched the headings; Hamilton wrote the text. Gertrude Atherton quotes Hamilton's widow as saying that Hamilton's draft was accepted by Washington verbatim with the exception of one paragraph of five lines. Washington Irving says that Hamilton furnished three different drafts to Washington. Frederick Scott Oliver says that "what gives it universal value and places it permanently in the literature of the world, is the mind of Hamilton and not the character of Washington." See *The Greatest American*, Vandenberg, pp. 222-223.

upon an age which cannot too often consult the Fathers and the Founders, let us linger on a few of the patriarchal paragraphs in this "Farewell Address" of September 17, 1796.¹

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¹ James M. Beck, speaking to the Union League Club of Philadelphia, May 8, 1919, gave his version of the authorship of the "Farewell Address" as follows: "In September, 1796, the editor of a Philadelphia paper called the *National Advertiser* was asked to go to Sixth and Market Streets on a special mission. He entered the hall and was shown into the drawing room, and there, standing with his back to the fireplace, was, I think, the most Godlike man the world has ever known, 6 feet 2 in height, steel-gray eyes, prominent aquiline nose, firm set mouth, clad in black velvet, sword hanging by his side. When Mr. Claypole, the editor in question, entered, this man, who was none other than George Washington, said to him: 'Mr. Claypole, I have a manuscript here that I am very anxious you should publish in the *Advertiser*, and I want you to publish it exactly as I have written it.' Claypole said he would do it, and took it away. Washington for five years had labored over that manuscript, first in 1792, toward the end of his first administration; then he laid it aside when he agreed to accept a second term. In 1796 he took it up again and submitted it to the keenest jurist of his time (unless I except James Wilson), namely, James Madison, sometimes called the 'father of the Constitution.' He then discussed it with his Cabinet, including the very acute brain of Thomas Jefferson. When their opinions were given, he submitted the draft to that 'Admirable Crichton' of the period, Alexander Hamilton, and asked him to take all the suggestions that had been made and put the document into final shape. Hamilton did so, and when it was re-

"Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

"In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred

turned to Washington the latter again carefully revised it and then handed it to Claypole. Twice the printer's proofs were returned and twice Washington returned them with all the laborious care that marked that supremely great man, and finally, one September day, the noblest political testament in the history of the world was published—the Farewell Address."

or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur.

"Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, even-ommed, and bloody contests. The nation prompted by ill will and resentment sometimes impels to war the government contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject. At other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace, often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim.

"So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement of justification. It leads also to concessions to

the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by existing jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

“As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that

jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike for another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their interests.

“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

“Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

“Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy mate-

rial injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

“Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

“It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

“Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

“Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and inter-

est. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard."

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William Roscoe Thayer, in his *George Washington*, points out that the phrase "entangling alliances" does not appear in the Farewell Address at all. Literally, that is true: but spiritually, it

is a sophistry. How could the traditional challenge read more directly than in these incisive rhetorical questions? "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation"—meaning "our detached and distant situation"? "Why by interweaving our destiny with that of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?" There is no escaping the admonition: neither is there rational possibility of denying that these untoward continental elements have remained as constant through the years as has the profitable wisdom of the most persistent American quarantine against them. Pursuits of international justice? Yes—"the experiment is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature." Political connections—ties of international dependency? No—lest we be unable to "choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel."¹

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These chapters have inquired into the roots of a tradition. Admittedly they have ignored all the detail, however important, which deals with the specific perplexities that always have and always will attach to the correct and just interpretation of "neutrality" in relation to the traffic in ships

¹ "Washington's initiation and enforcement of American neutrality was perhaps the brightest laurel of his civic life."—Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 58.

at sea, to the definition of contraband, and to the limitations which belligerents are entitled to enforce upon neutrals whose trade trends indirectly toward enemy ports. In other words, we have pretended no dissections in the science of neutrality and in its devious jurisprudence. The purpose, rather, has been to sketch the general outlines of an American philosophy—and the only detail has been that essential to an appreciation of its honorable genesis. And this is what we see: first, independence won through the indispensable aid of France, which, however, in the very act of rendering that aid, set us a precedent for the consultation of self-interest; second, independence preserved through recognition that the precise partialities which sent France to our battle-lines, would, if perpetuated or reciprocated, make the United States a helpless pawn, enslaved to Europe's intriguing politics; third, independence bulwarked by courageous refusal to allow these intrigues, whether of French Republicans or British kings or of reflected native passions and perversities, to invade and regulate our destiny. It was, and is, the genius of our institutions—intelligent "Nationalism," a doctrine of physical and political and spiritual independence, a life-giving inheritance, a puissant tradition.

PART IV
Jefferson and Madison

Jefferson and Madison

AMERICAN independence of European influence and consequences by no means was permanently established with the comparative triumphs of Washington and Hamilton, and the lesser ones of John Adams. Indeed, with the ascendant of Thomas Jefferson it sunk to lowest ebb—not through lack of fervid and persistent protestations, but through want of a brave and vigorous diplomacy and of an impressive evidencing of unalterable American purpose.¹ Exigency was salved with expedient, and injury was countered with vain invention—eagerness to sustain neutrality being constant, but willingness to stand squarely on the issue being usually conspicuous by its absence. The trail of the tradition now zig-zagged fatefully and, at times, almost lost itself in a tortile maze of doubtful hesitations.

Jefferson was the political expression of that partisan sector opposed to the Federalism of which Washington had been the honorary and Hamil-

¹ Theodore Roosevelt once said: "I think the worship of Jefferson a discredit to my country, . . . as he was the most incompetent chief executive we ever had."—Rhodes' *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 397.

ton the active exponent. This of itself implied an antithetical body of aims and purposes—a reversal of general policies under which the organized institutions of the United States thus far had been nourished. Jefferson and Hamilton had clashed repeatedly, and to the former's frequent humiliation, in the cabinets of prior administrations.¹ Both as "Constitutionalists"² and "Nationalists," they were implacable foes—though Hamilton had swung the Federalist balance of power from Aaron Burr to Jefferson when the presidential elections of 1800 were deadlocked and thrown into the House of Representatives and the former sought by low but ambitious intrigue to rob the latter of a victory which the electorate obviously intended.³ They had nothing in common except an inherent love of country—and even

¹ "A very great leader, he united strength of intellect with an emotional idealism that made him the greatest apostle of the democratic spirit. . . . His political methods were too often subterranean. . . . His presence in the (Constitutional) Convention would probably have had as disastrous an effect as marked his membership in Washington's Cabinet."—Beck's *Constitution of U. S.*, pp. 119-120.

² The prime plank in Jefferson's platform was the first pronouncement of the doctrine of nullification—the rights of a State to decide for itself the constitutionality of the Acts of Congress.

³ Bryce correctly says in his *American Commonwealth*: "Hamilton's action—highly patriotic, for Jefferson was his bitter enemy—cost him his life at Burr's hands." It was undoubtedly this checkmate which sealed Burr's purpose

this usually came to expression in wholly different forms. Their followings were equally hostile in philosophies of government.¹

With Jefferson came two other Anti-Federalist Virginians to power—James Madison as Secretary of State, and James Monroe as constant counselor and frequent administration agent—both ultimately to occupy the White House.² Monroe was another to whom the name of Hamilton was anathema, and who, upon occasion, descended to cheap and unworthy defamation in efforts to subvert a reputation impervious to honorable assault. Both Monroe and Madison originally were opposed to the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793—the latter was the “Helvidius” who vainly attempted to match pens with “Pacifi-

ultimately to rid himself of Hamilton's opposition at any cost. *If Hamilton Were Here Today*, Vandenberg, p. 15.

¹ Jefferson wrote Monroe in 1800: “Nothing should be spared to eradicate the spirit of Marshallism”—which was a paraphrase of Hamiltonism. Marshall wrote Hamilton in 1801: “To Mr. Jefferson I have felt almost insuperable objections; he will sap the fundamental principles of government.”—*Ibid.*, p. 62. The Federalists, bereft of Hamilton's acute leadership, were far from blameless in this situation. Through sheer political perversity—plus a partiality which was probably as pro-English as that of their political adversaries had been pro-French—many of them opposed the war as impolitic and unjust.

² “The Anti-Federalists had been pro-French and unneutral.”—Warren's *Supreme Court in U. S. History*, Vol. I, p. 190.

cus"; and in Congress—the former in the Senate, the latter in the House—both fought the Neutrality Law of 1794.¹ Certainly the entire triumvirate had been rabidly pro-Revolution when the French communistic crisis threatened to translate its violent faction into American schism. But all three subsequently changed their views upon this score—fortunate America that stronger statesmen had prevailed in policies to be thus later validated, even by their critics!—and “all three, when they successively became Presidents, gave adherence to the neutral doctrines of Washington and, it may be added, carried them out in good faith.”² Good faith alone, however, was not enough to save us—and the great American tradition—from the humiliations which, under Jefferson, were the fruits of “the supine policy which characterized American diplomacy for the next six years.”³

This third President's inaugural address, delivered on March 4, 1801, was as beautiful a symphony of happy phrases and lofty ideals as could be delivered of human genius. The author of the Declaration of Independence knew no rival in the arts of delightful expression. He was a magician with words. But they were not always as meaningful as they were musical. Thus, in this inaugural, it must have made the erstwhile victims of his own partisan cabals smile sardon-

¹ Ann. Cong. 1793-95, pp. 67 and 757.

² Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 55.

³ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 117.

ically to hear him plead for a softening of austerities and a restoration of that "harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things"¹; even as the American press, unless forgetful of the caluminating Freneau and others whose journalistic barbs notoriously were poisoned by direct Jeffersonian inspiration, must have marveled reminiscently when, four years later, he complained that "the artillery of the press has been leveled against us, charged with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare."² A strange and constant anomaly, this third President. That he was a very great man, in the measure of his importance to America, it would be as absurd as it would be ungracious to deny. That he captured, then and ever since, the affectionate imaginations of millions of Americans is ample demonstration of rare capacities. Not even a superlative "Hamiltonian" could sensibly deny these credits, even if he would. If nothing else survived to commend him to the gratitudes of posterity, he would belong far forward in our Pantheon for his acquisition of the vast Louisiana Territory—a kingdom for a song—and for establishing free navigation on the Mississippi. Nor is this by any means the limit to his worthy labors.³ Yet it would be stupid to

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 310.

² *Ibid.*, p. 369.

³ "The American decimal system of coinage, the statute for religious freedom, the Declaration of Independence,

ignore his class consciousness. Even the late President Woodrow Wilson has said that "it was Jefferson's weakness to think it safe for the friends of the People to make a 'blank paper' of the Constitution, but the very gate of revolution for those who were not Democrats."¹ It would be less than candid to eulogize his consistency or his dependability; and it would be blind idolatry not to confess that he too often "kept the word of promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope." Too often his disposition was mercurial; too often his backbone was malleable.

On the one hand, he acted with righteous and resultful vigor—thanks to the glorious Decatur type of American seamanship and valor—in moving to rid American maritime commerce of Mediterranean menace, and to suspend the humiliating system of subsidies which the whole world, ourselves included, was paying to the pirates of Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli. The government, as President Jefferson declared, had determined "to owe to our own energies, and not to dishonorable condescensions, the protection of our right to navigate the ocean freely."² This fighting spirit—paradoxical as it sounds—was the safest guarantee of peace, the surest preservation of the American

the University of Virginia, and the Presidency of the Union are the immutable foundations of his fame."—Ridpath's *History of U. S.*, Vol. I, p. 377.

¹ Wilson's *History of the American People*, Vol. III, p. 183.

² Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 110.

tradition. That it was not pursued to a finality by Jefferson—not even in the case of the Barbary pirates—was unfortunate¹; but that it was displayed at all under Jeffersonian auspices is a refreshing recollection.

On the other hand, when this tradition came in conflict with European concerns, President Jefferson vacillated and extemporized. He wanted neutrality, but hesitated to command it. He surrendered to conditions, rather than surmounted them. He let Europe dictate the terms of ocean destiny and sought to save us from these mandates by shunning them.² He tried to cure foreign ills with domestic nostrums. He sought the wrong type of “neutrality” and in the wrong way. It was the “neutrality” of which Machiavelli—one of the most brilliant, versatile and subtle intellects of the Italian Renaissance—wrote in the sixteenth century when he advised the Magnificent Lorenzo de’ Medici “How a Prince Should Bear Himself So As To Acquire Reputation” and said: “Irresolute Princes, to escape immediate danger, commonly follow the

¹ “Unfortunately the matter was not followed up as Jefferson began to be economical about the navy at that time and little came of it in the matter of the principle involved.”—Adams’ *Foreign Policy*, p. 131.

² As long prior as May 23, 1793, he had written: “It is very necessary for us to keep clear of the European combustion, IF THEY WILL LET US.”—Harry Innes Papers, MSS.

neutral path, in most instances to their destruction. . . . Nor let it be supposed that any State can choose for itself a perfectly safe line of policy. On the contrary, it must reckon on every course which it may take being doubtful; for it happens in all human affairs that we never seek to escape from one mischief without falling into another." Escaping mischiefs, only to encounter greater ones, became the Jeffersonian ritual in these European affairs. Yet even adversities have their utility; and the moral exemplified by Jefferson's policies—up to the final breach which he bequeathed to his successor—was the demonstration that successful "Nationalism," in the terms of this tradition which we trail, must be a positive and not a negative quantity.¹

¹ To indicate how revolutionary was the philosophy behind Washington's and Hamilton's neutrality posture, it is illuminating to read Machiavelli further to this extent: "A Prince is esteemed who is a staunch friend and a thorough foe, that is to say, who without reserve openly declares for one against another, this being always a more advantageous course than to stand neutral. For supposing two of your powerful neighbors come to blows, it must either be that you have, or have not, reason to fear the one who comes off victorious. In either case it will always be well for you to declare yourself, and join in frankly with one side or the other. For should you fail to do so, you are certain, in the former of the cases put, to become the prey of the victor to the satisfaction and delight of the vanquished, and no reason or circumstance that you may plead will avail to shield or shelter you; for the victor dislikes doubtful friends, and such as will not help him at a

It was a positive enough quantity when he took his oath and delivered the first inaugural to which we already have referred. Not only did he acknowledge geographical isolation—"Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe, and too high-minded to endure the degradations of others"¹—but also he embraced and emphasized the political and diplomatic doctrine that our international objective should be "peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."² Thus, as a matter of fact, he probably was the first President to put the exact phrasing of this oft-quoted idiom—"entangling alliances"—into an official document. Nor do we intimate any suggestion that he was not now speaking from his heart.

It was still a positive enough quantity—in homily, at least—two years later when his third annual message of October 17, 1803³ again discussed the same physical and political facts in the same rugged and traditional tenor. "We have seen with sincere concern the flames of war lighted up again in Europe, and nations with which we have the most friendly and useful rela-

pinch; and the vanquished will have nothing to say to you, since you would not share his fortunes, sword in hand."

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 311.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

tions engaged in mutual destruction. While we regret the miseries in which we see others involved, let us bow with gratitude to that kind Providence which, inspiring with wisdom and moderation our late legislative councils while placed under the urgency of the greatest wrongs, guarded us from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest and left us only to look on and pity its ravages. In the course of this conflict let it be our endeavor, as it is our interest and desire, to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent nations by every act of justice and of innocent kindness; . . . to restrain our citizens from embarking individually in a war in which their country takes no part; . . . to merit the character of a just nation, and maintain that of an independent one, preferring every consequence to insult and habitual wrong. . . . Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe and from the political interests which entangle them together . . . it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise, indeed, were we to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the opportunity she has endowed us with of pursuing, at a distance from foreign contentions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness, of cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpirage of reason rather than of force."

It was a positive quantity—this self-sufficient

"Nationalism"—in the fourth annual message of November 8, 1804,¹ when satisfaction was proclaimed to attach to the fact that "the war which was lighted up in Europe . . . has not yet extended its flames to other nations; . . . that the irregularities on the ocean which generally harass the commerce of neutral nations, have . . . disturbed ours less than on former occasions": and that "we continue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to an honest neutrality."

It sounded like an extremely positive quantity when, by the time of the fifth annual message, December 3, 1805,² the flames of this foreign conflagration licked at our very shores and the President spoke out with righteous vehemence against multiplying grievances. America was charged flatly with "the obligation of providing an effectual and determined opposition to a doctrine so injurious to the rights of peaceable nations." "We ought still to hope that time and a more correct estimate of interest as well as character will produce the justice we are bound to expect," said Jefferson. "But should any nation deceive itself by false calculations, and disappoint that expectation, we must join in the unprofitable contest of trying which party can do the other the most harm. Some of these injuries . . . are of a nature to be met by force only, and all of them may lead to it. I cannot,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 371-373.

therefore, but recommend such preparations as circumstances call for."

But all of these positive quantities were largely dissipated, during this period ushering in the ultimate War of 1812, by the negative quantities embodied in the realities of the President's actions and those of his administration. Deeds always shout where words but whisper. We certainly abjured "entangling alliances": but in attempting to sustain our neutrality, we tried vainly to run away from challenge—instead of facing and overcoming it by the authority of right and justice—and, as the inevitable result, we "entangled" ourselves in the very maze from which we sought extrication. Self-sufficient "Nationalism" cannot be a squirming, writhing, twisting, fearful thing. It cannot be docile and submissive in its reception to infringements. As expressed in neutrality, it is a species of positive independence—and independence which compromises with its own rights, belies its name. The moment it yields, even by indirection, to duress or dictation, it ceases to be—in proportion as it yields. It can be pacific at all times except when its right to decide when it shall be pacific is invaded. Then it cannot dodge. President Jefferson's words were noble; his motives were sincere; but his method and strategy were pathetic. He permitted himself and his country to be ground between the upper millstone of England and the nether millstone of Napoleon, and finally drifted into war through

sorry efforts to stay out.¹ In Washington's fifth annual address² he had warned that "there is a rank due to the United States which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness." Such came uncomfortably close to being the fate recorded in this, the first of our "watchful waiting" eras.

When England and France broke the peace of Amiens in 1803 and once more flew to arms in the second and final act of the Napoleonic drama—ending at Waterloo and St. Helena and the Congress of Vienna—American merchantmen sailed into immense prosperity, not only in dealing with belligerents, but also in advantaging from the diversion of their ships. By the same token, they sailed into twilight zones of trouble from which their government did precious little to provide legitimate relief under the law of nations. The first difficulties arose over American effort to circumvent "the rule of 1756" under which neutral ships were excluded from substituting for a belligerent in carrying on the latter's colonial trade. American ships sought to evade the rule by intermediate call at American ports and a theoretical re-shipment of goods—the fiction being that this constituted a broken voyage, while the fact was that the voyage was continuous. Britain objected to this practice—as undoubtedly she had the right. It was not a neutral operation—providing

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 112.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 132.

France, as it did, with colonial trade connections which otherwise would have been totally suspended. American shippers indignantly and acquisitively protested; but British Prize Courts ruled against them, British seizures continued, and "from this time on, American policy was simply one of futile protest."¹

And now Britain, supreme on the sea since Trafalgar in 1805, and France, supreme on the land since Austerlitz and Jena in 1805 and 1806, entered upon their gigantic game of world chess in which America was the miserable pawn. They played against each other with ferocious decrees that were utterly contemptuous of international law and comity, while America humbly withdrew from the oceans and left them to this impudent and fatal duel. "The United States, which had a legitimate right of being the common carrier for the greater part of the civilized world, was suddenly made the victim of the angry passions of each party in turn. Either the whole field in which neutral rights were brought into dispute must be abandoned, or war must be waged in their defense against one party or the other, and perhaps against both."²

On April 6, 1806, Charles James Fox, now British Foreign Minister, declared a blockade to iso-

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 114.

² Charles Francis Adams' New York speech of 1870. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. III, pp. 262-292.

late all important channel ports serving Napoleon directly or indirectly. America suffered. Napoleon replied on November 21, 1806, with the "Berlin Decree" pretending a theoretical blockade of England. Again America suffered. One year later, November 11, 1807, the British retaliated with a blockade of every European port under Napoleon's dominion. America suffered. Enraged Napoleon countered with the "Milan Decree" of December 17, 1807, ordering seizure of all vessels that either stopped at a British port or allowed a British war-ship to search them, This was followed in four months by the "Bayonne Decree" which frankly seized and sequestered all vessels bearing the American flag coming into French ports. As a result, there was scarcely a sea-lane left in which an American ship could venture without sure and unrequited molestation. Our commerce fell off 80 percent—if not directly due to this presumptuous Anglo-French monopoly of the waters of the earth, then indirectly because of the self-abnegation which the American government practised in its futile and humiliating gestures of disapproval and protest. Nor was this our sole embarrassment. The wanton British impressment of American seamen—a species of insufferable maritime abduction repugnant to the most elemental pre-requisites of self-sufficient "Nationalism"—was now approaching its maximum offensive. Neither ships nor men could look to the American flag for protection.

If anything, the flag was a liability—since it seemed to invite the very aggressions which it lacked the will to repel. Faced with the alternatives of either uncompromisingly insisting upon our neutral rights or weakly submitting to these infractious mandates and invasions, President Jefferson attempted a middle course which pretended to address the former but succeeded only in arriving at the latter result. "The root of the evil was in the heart which failed to be true to the proposed object."¹

On April 19, 1806, pursuing the usual American formula in like situation, Jefferson commissioned Monroe, then resident Minister at London, and William Pinkney of Maryland "to settle all matters of difference" between the United States and Great Britain. This, it will be noted, was before the news of the first of the ravishing continental decrees could have reached America. But the same week, and without the impulse of this latter harassment, we took our first backward step. Jefferson prevailed upon a Congressional majority to agree with him that the best answer to British threats at sea would be a "dignified" American withdrawal from the sea! The very day before he commissioned Monroe and Pinkney to negotiate with Britain for an amicable and honorable acknowledgment of our neutral rights, Congress passed a "non-importation act" which should prevent American entry for cer-

¹ Adams' New York speech of 1870.

tain British manufactures—the theory being that this would club Britain into friendliness—the fact being that it simply started clubbing our own trans-oceanic commerce into negation. Long, unhappy and sterile were the London negotiations of these emissaries who lacked the impressive background of a positive, aggressive home policy which promised “to owe to its own energies the protection of the right to navigate the ocean freely.” This, upon occasion, had been Jefferson’s language in dealing with North African pirates. It was far from the language or the implications in the policy now launched toward Europe.

British impressment of American seamen now obtruded ominously. As early as May 3, 1806, the President had to recognize this aggression. His proclamation of May 3, 1806¹ described “murder” done “near the entrance of the harbor of New York” by the master of a British armed vessel—the victim being “a citizen of the United States”—and also the “trespasses, wrongs and unlawful interruptions and vexations” chargeable to two other British armed vessels. The proclamation demanded the apprehension of the master of the former ship, and the immediate and permanent departure “from the harbors and waters of the United States” of the latter. A stern, nationalistic stricture! But—humiliating anticlimax—“if the said vessels shall fail to depart or shall re-enter the harbors or waters aforesaid,”

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, p. 390.

what should happen? Vivid, monitory punishment? Oh, no. "I do in that case forbid all intercourse with them!" And dire penalties shall be visited upon any person "FROM OR WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES" who violates this prohibition. In other words, we proposed the defense of our sovereignty by attempting to pull it back out of harm's way and by the prosecution of any American citizen who failed to run for cover! Quite different, this, from the peremptory action which Washington and Hamilton demanded in the case of the *Little Sarah*! But quite reminiscent of the weakness of Jefferson, then Secretary of State, in that same significant emergency! Then, capping the climax, the President retreated even from his own timid premises, in his message of December 3, 1806,¹ when he recommended the suspension of the "non-importation act" in order to facilitate the labors of our London Commissioners by a demonstration of "candid disposition on our part." This "candid disposition" shortly was reciprocated by the British *Leopard's* wanton attack upon the United States frigate *Chesapeake* which was reduced to helplessness by gun-fire, all but stripped of American seamen who were impressed aboard the *Leopard*, and left to limp back into port as best she could. One might search modern history with a microscope and fail to find the ugly equal of this episode in the degree

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. I, p. 399.

of its contempt for the rights of neutrals and for the "Nationalism" of the United States. Yet one would fail equally to find a counterpart for the official humility with which it was received at Washington.

The attack on the *Chesapeake* occurred June 22, 1807. On the 2nd of July President Jefferson issued a proclamation which convicted the British of "constant insubordination to the laws, of violence to the persons, and of trespasses on the property of our citizens" and of failing to adjust any of these impositions—"no instance of punishment of past wrongs has taken place."¹ The grim assault on the *Chesapeake* was characterized as "transcending all" in "enormity." "Hospitality under such circumstances," said Jefferson, "ceases to be a duty, and a continuance of it with such uncontrolled abuses would tend only, by multiplying injuries and irritations, to bring on a rupture." Therefore, all armed British vessels were ordered from American harbors, never to return! And if they either failed to go or dared to return, the penalty—*mirabile dictu!*—should be the jailing of any AMERICAN having anything to say or do with them! Four months later, in his seventh annual message,² the President had to admit that his threat to punish Americans not only had failed to impress the British, but also that "the aggression thus begun has been continued . . . at length by putting to death one

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 410.

² *Ibid.*, p. 413.

of the persons whom they had forcibly taken from on board the *Chesapeake!*" It was vastly more than a "foreign alliance" Jefferson feared. Apparently the remotest shadow of a "foreign collision"—regardless of the price of escape—was the ghastly ghost that ordered his waking and sleeping dreams.

Nor was this the only running away that we attempted. "Instead of forcing the British to give up their practices, Jefferson forced American shippers to give up their business."¹ A series of laws known as the "Embargo" now was passed to further restrain American ships from venturing into trade. In a word, the aim practically was to prevent anyone from trading with America and to prevent America from trading with anyone else. To this extent it succeeded. What was left of American commerce was promptly ruined. Domestic criticism became bitter. Opponents reversed the spelling of the word and called it the "O-Grab-Me Act." Neutrality was not a benediction: it was a plague. Its distortion robbed it of all of advantage, all honor, and all elements of that authority which make it, in different form, persist as a noble American tradition. When the "Embargo" proved a failure, it was followed by still another experiment in parochial pacifism—the "Non-Intercourse Act." The following year even this was withdrawn—"an open confession of the failure of American foreign policy."² Yet President Jefferson, speak-

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 123.

ing to the Congress on March 17, 1808,¹ clung to his pathetic malconception. While blandly admitting that the competitive bans of Britain and France so dynamited the rights of nations that "these decrees and orders, taken together, want little of amounting to a declaration that every neutral vessel found on the high seas, whatsoever be her cargo and whatsoever foreign port be that of her departure or her destination, shall be deemed lawful prize"; still he found in this insufferable prostration nothing more moving than a vindication of "the expediency of retaining our vessels, our seamen, and property within our own harbors until the dangers to which they are exposed can be removed or lessened." It was the course of least resistance; also of least honor; also of least assurance against ultimate crisis so stark and so challenging that not even an opportunist could retreat farther or swallow more ignominy. By the President's own confession in one of the last of his state papers,² "no conduct on our part, however impartial and friendly"—he might have added "or however supine"—was sufficient "to insure from either belligerent a just respect for our rights"; and in his eighth and last annual message on November 8, 1808,³ he recorded the fact that "no steps have been taken for the purpose" of reparations anent the *Chesapeake*

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, p. 432.

² March 22, 1808; *Ibid.*, p. 434.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 440-441.

affair, yet—with strange perversity—that “we have the satisfaction to reflect that in return for privations . . . which our fellow-citizens have borne with patriotism . . . this experiment . . . has demonstrated to foreign nations the moderation and firmness which govern our councils”! A strange source of satisfaction! An even stranger exposition of firmness! Washington and Hamilton must have turned over in their graves!

Let a faithful summary of this situation be borrowed from Charles Francis Adams—than whom no publicist could have had better opportunities or sources of information.¹

“Jefferson’s love of peace prompted the entire withdrawal of the commerce of the country from the ocean, which was equivalent to a surrender, for the time, of the whole question at issue. To this he had been the more compelled by necessity created by his neglect of the maintenance and growth of a navy, without the protection of which neutral rights on the high seas were not in that day, perhaps are not at any time of war, likely to secure respect. Yet a secession from the ocean was practically a temporary suspension of the right to use it, and a surrender of the whole question at issue. The embargo which followed was a public confession of weakness. . . . The non-intercourse presently substituted was a still more pitiful expedient, of which the injury done was more to ourselves than to our opponents. . . .

¹ Quoting his New York speech of 1870.

It is not, then, to be wondered at that the various efforts at negotiation, and the exchanges of successive diplomatic envoys, which at times seemed on the eve of reconciliating differences, all successively failed."

In the midst of this disastrous and humiliating extremity in foreign relations and domestic consequences, the American government changed hands. Jefferson, declining to be considered for a third term, retired. James Madison, his Secretary of State, graduated to the Presidency, and James Monroe, in turn, shortly became Premier. It was a new administration upon the calendar: but it was merely a continuation of the same Virginia dynasty in fact. Despite the intervening electoral gesture, it was a "continuous," and not a "broken," voyage for the Ship of State—if we may be permitted a simile from prior American experiences with the "Rule of 1756." As Jefferson's diplomatic adjutant, Madison had attached his signature to every record in eight years of Jeffersonian flux, and was his spiritual, as well as his political, heir. The time had been when he was a follower of Hamilton—a "Constitutionalist" and a "Nationalist" of the Hamilton type; indeed, he has been called the "Father of the Constitution" and merits everlasting gratitude for the key-rôle he played in that period of the creation. He had been a collaborator with Hamilton in the authorship of fourteen of the eighty-five *Federalist Papers*. On the other hand, he had

joined Jefferson in his subsequent doctrines of nullification, had largely sustained him in his quarrels with Hamilton and Washington, and by now was distinctly the Jefferson type. Assessing his public services as a "series of contradictions, compromises, doubts and fears," ex-United States Senator Albert J. Beveridge has analyzed him as a man of "variable will and neutral character" inevitably sure to reflect some mightier leader who, for the time being, should dominate his imagination; yet Beveridge joins with posterity in testifying to Madison's superlative intellectual equipment, his long and faithful public service, his flashes of brilliance, his pure and exalted motives. "Loftier love of country no man had; and Americans love him who loves America."¹

It now remained for President Madison to liquidate the consequences of Jeffersonian folly. It was a perilous inheritance. For a time, continued vascillations dodged multiplying crises—the same old story—fears more powerful than faiths—straws, as for drowning men—pacific hopes rewarded only with new humiliations. Finally came war—war which might have been avoided by firmness in the right exercised a decade sooner

¹ "The weakness of Madison's presidential policy consisted in his well-nigh interminable diplomatic correspondence, backed up by retaliatory measures which were frequently modified and always harmful to American as well as English commerce."—Stanwood's *History of Presidential Elections*, p. 57.

—war which was a belated defense of a “Nationalism” now prone—war which was the travail, rather than the trail, of a tradition—war which brought doubtful issue in the letter of its victory, yet climaxed in the most epochal Treaty in all our State engagements.

President Madison’s first inaugural message March 4, 1809, re-addressed familiar apostrophes to our lack of “passions which trespass on the rights or the repose of other nations,” the true glory of the United States in “cultivating peace by observing justice, and entitling themselves to the respect of the nations at war by fulfilling their neutral obligations with the most scrupulous impartiality,” and our spirit of independence “too just to invade the rights of others, and too proud to surrender our own.” Then the plaintive and equally familiar note of significant despair over the treatment accorded us by these poaching European belligerents: “How long their arbitrary edicts will be continued in spite of the demonstrations that not even a pretext for them has been given by the United States, and of the fair and liberal attempt to induce a revocation of them, cannot be anticipated.”¹

Too proud to surrender our own rights! The modern paraphrase would be “too proud to fight!” Yet what a sterile pride—dependent upon “anticipations” of European magnanimity for its defense and validation! “If there be candor in the

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 452.

world," said Madison, "the truth of these assertions" the aforesaid apostrophes—"will not be questioned; posterity at least will do justice to them." But if there be full candor in this ultimate historical appraisal, truth also must acknowledge that we drifted into useless war by failure to distinguish between positive "Nationalism" and negative neutrality.

The President now embarked upon the last of our over-weaning expedients. He leaped to the embrace of every hopeful shadow; head-long, he pursued every mirage.¹ In a special message of May 23, 1809,² he announced the intention of Britain to abandon her offensive Orders in Council and to render satisfaction for that old *Chesapeake* affair; and declared that this concession to justice would be immediately urged upon France as the reason for paralleling leniencies. Concurrently, and without waiting to discover whether these engagements promised by Minister Erskine—his Majesty's new envoy at Washington—should materialize, he proclaimed a reciprocal suspension of the American embargo on British ships in American ports. But these engagements were promptly disavowed by George Canning, now the arrogant British Foreign Secretary; Erskine was recalled; and Madison had to follow

¹ "The President had no disposition and little capacity for war."—Ridpath's *History of the United States*, Vol. I, p. 392.

² *Ibid.*, p. 456.

with a second proclamation, ten weeks later, withdrawing the conclusions of his first. His message of November 29, 1809,¹ had to confess to Congress not only that he had been too gullible, but also that Erskine's successor—the notorious Francis James Jackson—had offended the Executive by his contempts, and had been dismissed. The situation became even worse than before.² France continued to ignore remonstrances—saving herself from the more intimate clashes with the United States only because hers was a distant land, rather than a sea, dominion—and England now added insult to injury. The President recommended nothing—except the platitude, by now frayed and tattered, that these situations should be met “in a spirit worthy the councils of a nation conscious both of its rectitude and of its rights, and careful as well of its honor as of its peace.”

Another cloudy year rolled by and Madison's next experiment was to play France against England. Napoleon, being under domestic pressure for a broader resumption of French commerce, his Foreign Minister Cadore announced a suspension of the “Berlin” and “Milan Decrees”—hoping to lure the British into similar latitudes. Madison promptly issued another of his vainly optimistic proclamations, November 2, 1810,³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

² *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, Vol. III, pp. 308-319.

³ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 467.

reciprocating with a suspension of America's anti-French embargo, and urged the British to proceed in kind. But the result of yet another inconclusive year had to be unhappily confessed in the President's third annual message, November 5, 1811,¹ when he told Congress that Britain required something more than his, Madison's, word regarding French intentions; that, far from withdrawing their Orders in Council, "the orders were, at a moment when least to have been expected, put into more rigorous execution"; and that even France, unfaithful to the expectations invited by Cadore, was again ravishing American commerce in a fashion so obnoxious as "to require at least corresponding restrictions." Says one commentator²: "This illustrates the essentially humiliating position of American diplomacy throughout this period. Britain and France, each fighting desperately for their lives in the face of a weakening morale at home, behaved like a pair of spoiled children, each promising to be good if the other would do so. Madison allowed himself to play the rôle of the distracted nurse who permits herself to get caught in such an argument, instead of letting each belligerent distinctly understand that he would discuss French relations with France and English relations with England, and would allow neither discussion to be in any way dependent on the other."

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

² Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 125.

But in this message of November 5, 1811, the flint of Madison's inherent patriot-courage once more struck sparks. He began to revert to the Washington-Hamilton type of self-sufficient vigor which once upon a time he had exemplified. He began to tire of interminable contumely. Acknowledging this condition to "have the character as well as the effect of war on our lawful commerce," he put Congress upon notice of the unfolding epilogue to all this mal-administration of a great tradition. Said he: "With this evidence of hostile inflexibility in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations."

The armor and the attitude materialized within six months—and with them the War of 1812. Broadly speaking, it was a war of desperation in defense of a flaccid neutrality—such a war as the aggressive defense of neutrality had saved under Washington and Hamilton and Adams—such a war as springs from the ashes of peace-pursuits that are too timid and too supine—a war of unnecessary inception under a different diplomacy—a war of debatable martial eventuality, despite new epics in American heroism—but a war of incalculably potent consequences, not the least of which was the demonstration that bad management of a good principle and weak stewardship of a

powerful tradition bring untoward exposure to the very frictions and entanglements which they too passionately seek to escape. Jefferson and Madison did not wish for peace an iota more than Washington and Hamilton. But the latter knew where concession should stop and firmness begin. It is not enough to enunciate a doctrine; it must be endowed with vitality. Adams suffered scarcely less ignominy at the hands of Talleyrand than did Madison at the hands of Canning. But he rebelled more abruptly and, once committed, moved with an incorrigible celerity that won a war without fighting it. It would be a vain compliment to credit Washington and Hamilton and Adams with perfect neutrality success. It was far from that. But theirs was the responsibility for inaugurating a new international doctrine in the name of a new nation. The background of their comparative achievements should have made the tasks of their successors relatively easier. Therefore, the comparative moral is the more pronounced. The War of 1812 might have been saved by a more self-reliant "Nationalism." But the opportunities for impressive diplomacy having been lost, the War of 1812 had to be—and it is to our ultimate credit that we entered upon it deliberately.

President Madison summarized the *casus belli* in his war message of June 1, 1812.¹ It was a powerful recitation of too patiently endured outrages.

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 483.

“Without going back beyond the renewal in 1803 of the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaid wrongs of inferior magnitude, the conduct of her government presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation. British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it. . . . Under the pretext of searching for British subjects, thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law and of their national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their brethren. . . . British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce. To the most insulting pretensions they have added the most lawless proceedings in our very harbors, and have wantonly spilt American blood within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction. . . . Under pretended blockade, without the presence of an adequate force and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered

in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. . . . It has become indeed sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation. She carries on a war against the lawful commerce of a friend that she may the better carry on a commerce with an enemy—a commerce polluted by the forgeries and perjuries which are for the most part the only passports by which it can succeed. . . . In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States, our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers—a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons without connecting their hostility with that influence and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government. . . . Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities

which have been heaped on our country, and such the crisis which its unexampled forbearance and conciliatory efforts have not been able to avert. . . . We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain. Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of events, avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contest or views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in an honorable re-establishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the government."

It is doubtful whether any recital of cumulative ills—inflicted upon an unoffending neutral—ever more righteously or unescapably licensed the arbitrament of war. Indeed, the composite summary of nine red years of vexations must have convinced even the most confirmed pacifist among our non-resistant forebears that their humiliations had long since ceased to be a virtue. Madison did not neglect to remind Congress that France, too, had failed to validate her equitable promises: but he "abstained from recommending definite measures" in her case because of continuing faith

in "unclosed discussions" with Paris. Plenty of angry Americans there were, by now, who demanded simultaneous war against both France and Britain. Congress rang with denunciations. But Madison and Monroe, satisfied to assume that French difficulties yet admitted of composition, held to the British target. At the last minute, Britain withdrew her obnoxious Orders in Council—an action confirming the suggestion that earlier American stamina might have purged the air and saved a conflict. But the news did not reach America until after Madison had spoken.¹ The war impulse was upon the land. On June 18, 1812, Congress acted, and the following day the President proclaimed the state of hostilities to the world.² Thus did the trail of our tradition detour from the peace which was its dedication and objective, into martial strife and the umpirage of arms.

We are not studying military history, except

¹ This time element played an unusual part upon more than one occasion. Thus, the great Battle of New Orleans in which General Andrew Jackson led his courageous middle-westerners to the great climaxing land victory of January 8, 1815, occurred more than two weeks after the Treaty of Ghent had been signed in Belgium. Some industrious and inquiring student can write a tremendously interesting book to show how the whole history of the world would have been changed if a few of our modern inventions in communication and transportation had been discovered a few hundred years earlier.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 497.

incidentally. Suffice it to say that historians seem violently to differ as to the relative advantages won at arms. Once upon a time both sides claimed victory. More recently it has not been unusual for both sides to admit defeat. There are controlling entries on both ledger balances. The American Navy be-jeweled its record with new glories.¹ On the other hand, the British sacked the city of Washington and burned the capitol.² One by-product of the war was the "Star Spangled Banner" written by Francis Scott Key while detained on a vessel of the British fleet during the bombardment of Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, September 13, 1814. Another, as expressed by

¹ "Great was the astonishment of the world when the American sailors, not waiting to be attacked, went forth without a tremor to smite the mistress of the seas. . . . The British newspapers burst forth raging and declared that the time-honored flag of England had been disgraced by a piece of striped bunting flying at the mast-heads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful of outlaws."—Ridpath's *History of the U. S.*, Vol. I, pp. 396–98.

² Madison made this raid the subject of a proclamation September 1, 1814, in which he said that "these proceedings and declared purposes, which exhibit a deliberate disregard of the principles of humanity and the rules of civilized warfare, and which must give to the existing war a character of extended devastation and barbarism at the very moment of negotiations for peace, leave no prospect of safety to anything within the reach of these predatory and incendiary operations but in manful and universal determination to chastise and expel the invader."—From Niles' *Weekly Register*, Vol. VII, p. 2.

Madison in his fifth annual message,¹ was that "the war has proved that our free government, like other free governments, though slow in its early movements, acquires in its progress a force proportioned to its freedom, and that the union of these States, the guardian of the freedom and safety of all and of each, is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to the test." But the eternally and everlastingly important product of the war was the Treaty which brought it to conclusion—not so much for any unusual advantages in the literal confessions of its text as in the moral and spiritual influence which the event seemingly has put upon the life of America and Britain in particular and of the world in general, dividing the ugly past from the enlightened present.

In 1813 the Czar of Russia offered mediation. "The high character of the Emperor Alexander being a satisfactory pledge for the sincerity and impartiality of the offer," as President Madison said to Congress on May 25,² the Czar's proposal immediately was accepted and American plenipotentiaries departed for the Russian capital. Not even yet had Madison learned not to take too much for granted in the duplicities of Europe. He assumed that Britain would respond to the Czar in kind. But he was mistaken. "The British cabinet, either mistaking our desire of peace for a dread of British power, or misled by other

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 525.

² *Ibid.*, p. 511.

fallacious calculations, has disappointed this reasonable calculation," he had to report to Congress seven months later.¹ "Under such circumstances, a nation proud of its rights and conscious of its strength has no choice but an exertion of the one in support of the other."

But the leaven was working. Internal England was weary after twenty years of war. Finally dependable word came through that peace negotiations would be agreeable. On January 6, 1814, the President thus formally notified Congress.² John Quincy Adams, James Bayard, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin and Jonathan Russell repaired to the little Belgian town of Ghent. There they joined issue with the British mission. It was an hour of far-flung portent.

There has been as much division of opinion as to who won the peace as there has been as to who won the war. But the measurements are of little moment—because the influence of the Treaty of Ghent has lain vastly more in its collateral results than in the letter of its text. Yet even an agreement on its inconclusive text was not reached without desperate hazard of dead-lock. On the one hand, Britain—though thus submitting to negotiations, while still pressing her anti-American ravages—obviously was in small degree impressed with the dignity, the importance or the power of her adversary, and her agents at Ghent reflected these contempts. On the other hand, the Amer-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 519.

² *Ibid.*, p. 526.

ican Commissioners, far from home and official instructions, took much latitude with them to Belgium: and the very extent of this liberty gave rise to profound disagreements between men of such positive and differing temperaments.¹ Between this gauntlet, the issue ran its course, with fluctuations of hope and fear in America, and with gradually progressive sanities in England.

The American envoys, of course, were bent upon validating the purposes which had drawn them reluctantly into this war: namely, a general acknowledgment of their maritime rights, permanent proscription of impressment, and an adequate definition of the term "blockade"—since this latter conundrum was one of the major sources of friction. That they were told if possible to get Canada, is likely to elicit modern smiles. The

¹ Charles Francis Adams, the son of one of the American Commissioners, has testified that an inspection of materials in his possession demonstrated that Gallatin was entitled to major credit for preventing a ruction among the American Commissioners. In his New York speech of 1870, heretofore referred to, he said: "These differences sometimes developed warmth in just proportion to the estimated importance of the interest affected. It is just here that the intervention of Mr. Gallatin appears to have been of the highest value. Calm in discussion, quick in mastering the points at issue, ready in resource, and adroit in giving shape to acceptable propositions, his influence upon the thread of the negotiation is apparent, not less in the intercourse with the other side than in reconciling the jarring interests of his own."

British envoys, on the other hand, dealing as with a defeated enemy, demanded the creation of an Indian barrier State between the United States and Canada, and the abandonment of territory at the source of the Mississippi and in Maine. Here were the antipodes. Small wonder modern historians have disagreed as to where actual martial victory lay, when these embassies themselves both acted as though dictating a conqueror's peace. Small wonder, too, that the negotiations lagged—while the embassies entrenched in their second positions, the British demanding territorial adjustment on the basis that each belligerent retain his winnings, the Americans demanding a restoration of territorial divisions as existent when hostilities commenced. President Madison substantially facilitated a breach in this stale-mate by submitting to Congress all the communications from Ghent “showing the conditions on which alone the British Government is willing to put an end to war.” The publication of this correspondence, revealing the King's imperialistic aims and his obvious unwillingness to deal in terms permitting a suspension of hostilities, induced the pressure—on both sides of the sea—necessary to results. Americans re-solidified for battle; Britons, tired of futile strife, pressed for conciliation. One by one the British envoys surrendered their demands. One by one the American envoys met them in a spirit of reciprocal comity. Indeed, the ultimate Treaty suggests more yielding—in mat-

ters of legitimate consideration—by the latter than the former. We did not procure a suspension of impressment, nor a blockade of definition, nor the abrogation of the "Rule of 1756," nor any of the guarantees for neutral commerce—the objectives for which we suffered nearly a decade of humiliations, and for which, in extremity, we took up arms. Even such moot points as North Atlantic fishing privileges and the navigation of the Mississippi were omitted in the interest of unreserved agreement. As viewed then, there could have been good reason for American protest that we failed at the peace table quite as thoroughly as we had failed in our prior exanimate efforts to escape trouble by running away from it—to keep out lightning by putting up our shutters.¹ But as viewed now—thanks to humane influences down the years—this Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve, 1814, was and is the greatest of all milestones along the calendars of Anglo-American friendships. More: no matter what specific credits may be allocated to our "winning" of this War of 1812, one spiritual advantage stands clear as day. This War nationalized America. While it was undoing, dubiously, the damage done

¹ "There never was a more absurd treaty than that of Ghent. Its only significance was that Great Britain and the United States, having been at war, agreed to be at peace. Not one of the distinctive issues to decide which the war had been undertaken, was settled or even mentioned."—Ridpath's *History of the U. S.*, Vol. I, p. 415.

by prior supine statecraft to that phase of "Nationalism" which has to do with our right to remain at peace while other nations war, it also was sweeping away our internal parochialisms and cementing together that other phase of "Nationalism" which observes the United States as a unit and defends it as such not only against domestic faction, but also against imported ethnic partialities such as had all but wrecked the great American experiment.

President Madison reported the Treaty of Ghent to Congress on February 18, 1815.¹ "I congratulate you and our constituents," said he, "upon an event which is highly honorable to the nation, and terminates with peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most brilliant successes. The late war, although reluctantly declared by Congress, had become a necessary resort to assert the rights and independence of the nation. It has been waged with a success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the legislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the valor of the military and naval forces of the country. Peace, at all times a blessing, is peculiarly welcome, therefore, at a period when the causes for the war have ceased to operate, when the Government has demonstrated the efficiency of its powers of defense, and when the nation can review its conduct without regret and without reproach." On

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 537.

February 18, 1815, the President officially proclaimed the exchange of ratifications.¹

Let Charles Francis Adams summarize subsequent history down to 1870, when he delivered in New York the famous address to which we have so often referred. "From the date of that Treaty down to this moment not a question has been raised, not a complaint made of the repetition of any such scenes on the ocean as were happening every day before. The barbarous practice of impressment has been voluntarily abandoned. The claim of a right to the services of a subject in spite of naturalization elsewhere has never since been pressed, and has very lately been explicitly surrendered; and, from being a fierce enemy to the extension of neutral rights, Great Britain has gradually been becoming our aptest scholar. Indeed, she has outrun her preceptor; for, in 1856, she gave her adhesion to the Declaration of Paris, which abandoned the piratical practice of privateering, and recognized the principle she had so long contested, of free ships, free goods. Nay, even more than that. In the late unhappy conflict between ourselves, it happened to be my particular duty to make many complaints of her alleged violations of neutrality, the favorite mode of replying to which was by appeals to our own construction of neutral doctrines. This being so, I think it may justly be claimed that the Treaty of Ghent was our greatest

¹ Niles' *Weekly Register*, Vol. VII, p. 397.

triumph, inasmuch as from that date has commenced the change of policy which has at last placed the most ruthless belligerent known to the world in the ranks of those who recognize the principle upon which Washington started, and which Mr. Wheaton has put into language I now ask leave to repeat as the burden of my song: 'The right of every independent state to remain at peace whilst other states are engaged in war, is an incontestable attribute of sovereignty.'"

Nothing since 1870 has changed the verdict. On the contrary, each succeeding year has strengthened these verities. The Treaty of Ghent declared that "there shall be a firm and universal peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons." Then, it was a hope. Now—and through one hundred and ten intervening years—it is a reality. We have had our differences—some of them serious differences—over boundaries—over mutual rights—over indemnities—the sort of friction which too often make for wars. But Emerson once correctly said that "the moral peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon race is, first, its commanding sense of right and wrong, second, the habit of friendship, the homage of man to man." These peculiarities have been emphasised by these two great Nations—neither sacrificing jot or tittle of their "Nationalism"—from that blessed hour

when the Treaty of Ghent proved such a benediction in disguise. Eighteen different times Britain and America have faced these major differences in the intervening years. And eighteen different times they have been settled by diplomacy or arbitration. A vast and pacific frontier divides our sovereignties—yet it is a frontier without a fort: and as for the frontier water-ways, they have been devoid of battle-ships ever since Charles Bagot, British Minister, and Richard Rush, Acting American Secretary of State, exchanged their diplomatic letters back in April, 1817.¹ We fought two wars together in a space of forty years; we have lived without a skirmish for nearly three

¹ President Monroe's first annual message of December 2, 1817: "I have the satisfaction to inform you that an arrangement which had been commenced by my predecessor with the British Government for the reduction of the naval force by Great Britain and the United States on the Lakes has been concluded, by which it is provided that neither party shall keep in service on Lake Champlain more than one vessel, on Lake Ontario more than one, and on Lake Erie and the upper lakes more than two, to be armed each with one cannon only, and that all the other armed vessels of both parties, of which an exact list is interchanged, shall be dismantled. It is also agreed that the force retained shall be restricted in its duty to the internal purpose of each party, and that the arrangement shall remain in force until six months shall have expired after notice given by one of the parties to the other of its desire that it should terminate."—*Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 581. This "notice" never has been given.

times forty years since the Treaty of Ghent was proclaimed. Said Sir Edwin Arnold: "Between these two majestic sisters of the Saxon blood, war is impossible; no cause of quarrel can ever be otherwise than out of proportion to the vaster causes of affection and accord. We have no longer to prove to each other or to the world that Englishmen and Americans are high-spirited and fearless; that Englishmen and Americans alike will do justice, and will have justice, and will put up with nothing but justice from each other and from the nations at large." And this harmony is the first hope of the world. "I believe the time has come," President Roosevelt once declared, "when we should say that under no circumstances shall there ever be a resort to war between the United States and the British Empire, and that no question can arise between them that cannot be settled in judicial fashion." It is a far, far cry from the desperate frictions which we have been detailing to this glorious conclusion—undoubtedly shared by a vast majority of citizens under both flags. None, we suspect, would have been more surprised than President Madison—with unfragrant memories still fresh in his nostrils—if he could have been told what the record of the years would unfold. Yet it is not the least compliment that can be paid to the prescient wisdom and purpose and statecraft of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton to say that this identical disclosure of time would have been

the eventuality dearest to their hearts and most directly in agreement with their fondest hopes and aspirations.

Thus does the trail of our tradition—after aggravating detour—resume the great highway. The intelligent, self-sufficient “Nationalism” which holds that international neutrality—devoid of foreign entanglement—is the only independent policy appropriate to the position and the destiny and the best welfare of the United States, takes from President Jefferson and President Madison the admonition that an honorably self-serving purpose is best preserved by unyielding defense of this prerogative. This same intelligent, self-sufficient “Nationalism” takes from the Anglo-American record, subsequent thereto, the proof that these primary consultations of self-interest—if born of honor and equity—can sustain steadfast peace between great nations without the necessity of super-parliaments and without the surrender of that inalienable right of self-determination which is the genius not only of “Nationalism” but of sovereignty and of independence.

PART V
The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine

THE tradition of intelligent "Nationalism"—the preservation of self-serving American independence against all avoidable extraneous entanglements—now trails into a new epoch of far-flung authority. Heretofore, the effort had been one of defense against untoward circumstance that should link America into Europe's over-seas vexations and deny us a right of self-determination when continental exigency beckoned us to partialities and strife. Now the effort became one of defense against European invasions that should meditate an extension of their system in the New World and thus more immediately expose us, as more intimate neighbors with less chance to avoid contagion and collision, to the vicissitudes which our traditional international policy purposed to abjure. The former thing was trade-marked "Neutrality." The latter was destined to ring down through the years as the "Monroe Doctrine"—perhaps the most powerful dictum, lacking the remotest literal validation either in domestic legislation or international contract, which ever dominated the welfare of a

hemisphere by the sheer puissance of proclamation. Both were essential defenses to the development of the independent foreign policy to which Washington and Hamilton committed their new country—the latter policy no less than the former, because if democracy should be generally subdued and shackled on the flanks of the Republic, the history of perpetual European imperialism and strife and intrigue inevitably would be communicated to these new continents which Republicans sought to dedicate to representative government and to self-sufficient peace. The latter policy was the lengthened shadow of the former. No less than Neutrality, the “Monroe Doctrine” was the practical evolution of that traditional “Nationalism” which sought the full fruition of the whole reality of independence—without mortgage or menace—for the United States. Though world geography and world philosophy are immensely changed in the century since this initial courageous dedication, though the need for it is infinitely less stressful in the detail of its Pan-American application, we are no less eager for these realities of independence in 1925 than were our forebears in 1823; we are no less dependent upon the traditional objectives which invited the energies and visions of the Founders; and we are no less undone—hapless barterers in birth-rights—if we neglect the admonitions of yesterday in charting the liberties of tomorrow.

The “Monroe Doctrine” was the articulation of

that aim which ultimately became the loose idiom "America for Americans." It was not new at the time of its formal pronouncement. As we shall see, it had been repeatedly anticipated by the great minds which cradled the initial hopes of federated American independence. But it remained, through fortuitous circumstances, for James Monroe—succeeding Madison in the Presidency—to give it an explicit expression which has changed the courses of history, and which has rescued his name from the comparative oblivion into which the lesser lights are prone to sink and all but disappear.¹

Mr. Monroe was not inherently a great statesman. On the contrary, there are numerous blemishes upon his record. Yet he had been an implacable patriot in the war of the Revolution. He had served numerous high responsibilities, some well, some indifferently. He had been less than wholly loyal to President Washington; but faithful to Jeffersonian dogma—and correspondingly hostile to Hamiltonism, including original Neutrality. He had been Madison's Premier—and, with him had swung squarely to the neutral code as "Nationalism's" essence. He had occupied the position, that of Secretary of State, which had come to be the stepping stone to Execu-

¹ "From beginning to end of his public life, one idea is consistently represented—'America is for Americans'—'Foreign intervention is never to be permitted.'"—Wilson's *Presidents of the U. S.*, p. 116.

tive promotion; and he brought to his inauguration on March 4, 1817, a cosmopolitan experience of great utility. From the hour of his first inaugural message—when he listed “our distance from Europe” and the “just, moderate and pacific policy of our government” as bulwarks of blessedness, and when he accepted the lesson of history, unequivocally declaring that “we must support our rights or lose our character, and with it, perhaps, our liberties”—he served “Nationalism” ably and well.

The New World for centuries had been the theatre of foreign explorative and colonizing enterprise. It had witnessed high adventure in which different nations, under different flags, pushed into the mystic West and cut the unfolding map into uncertain sectors. Eric the Red, Bjarni, Lief and Thorwald Ericson, and Karlsefue had pierced the North Atlantic five hundred years before Columbus “discovered” an America subsequently named for another and later mariner. No ethnic monopoly over these pilgrimages of disclosure rested on any one foreign strand—what with the names of Cabot, Vespuccius, Cortereal, Balboa, de Cordova, Cortez, De Soto, Ponce de Leon, Cartier, Raleigh, Davis, Drake, mingling on the record of hardy argonauts whose prows pointed the westward quest. Such diversity of allegiance invited diverse and clashing claims among squatter-sovereigns. The English were

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 576.

settling Jamestown in 1607 scarcely sooner than the French were settling Quebec in 1608; the Spanish, Leon in Central America, in 1610; the Dutch, New Amsterdam in 1614. It was the beginning of competition between Europe's Kings for a rich hemisphere destined to be wrenched away and given over almost universally to democracy, both north and south of the equator.¹ For two hundred subsequent years these aspirations of foreign monarchs—clashing with each other, but more particularly with the rising and expanding freedoms of North and South America—made one section or another the scene of convulsion. The United States, after ejecting George III, gradually acquired contiguous territory until it had practically consolidated itself from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and though little more than a third the area of "Latin-America," its expansion and authority already made it the head-stone in the corner. Its democracy and its "Nationalism" were contagious. Between 1809 and 1828, Ecua-

¹ "The American Republics number twenty-one. . . . With the exception of the United States, they are all, politically speaking, of 'Latin' origin, and constitute what is for that reason called 'Latin-America,' occupying the vast region formally ruled by Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese dominions, though greater in extent than the connected continental area of the United States, are comprised in what was for sixty-seven years the Empire, but is now the Republic of Brazil. The remaining nineteen countries were once colonies or provinces of Spain."—Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 365.

dor, Argentine, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay threw off foreign yokes and undertook their initial experiments in autonomy. It was the height of this era that President Monroe was privileged to serve—to serve with a policy which separated the New and the Old Worlds by definite proclamation—to serve with a philosophy which was rooted in self-interest yet bore the fruits of altruism—to serve with a doctrine that created all the Americas as an independent political entity, even an isolated entity, which should be self-owned, self-governed and self-willed in its various Republican divisions, and immune to imported imperialism.¹

The inception of this idea has always been a matter of conjecture—just as disputants have long quarreled over the actual authorship of the “Monroe Doctrine” itself. On the latter score, most authorities agree that John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, deserves the major fame.² On the

¹ “Had it not been for the Monroe Doctrine, it is safe to say that not one of the tropical Republics of South America could be in existence today.”—Haskins’ *Panama Canal*, p. 360.

² “It fell to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State under President Monroe, to be the master-spirit of administering and enforcing American neutrality during nearly all the trying period of South American contests.”—Bemis’ *American Neutrality*, p. 53. “The views of Adams prevailed.”—Moore’s *American Diplomacy*, p. 242. “The Monroe Doctrine embodies all the principles of American diplomacy which John Quincy Adams had been so carefully

former score, certain it is that as early as 1781 when Hamilton wrote *The Continentalist*, he had chronicled the basic aspiration, later to be immortalized by Monroe, when he urged that, after the final triumph of the Colonies, it should be the unfailing purpose of our public policy to prevent for all time any further European interference with the affairs of the North American Continent.¹ Certain it is that as "Publius" writing the *Federalist Papers* in 1787-88, Hamilton sustained this keynote when, in one of his typical flashes of foresight, he wrote: "We may hope ere long to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate."² And certain it is also that when Hamilton wrote into Washington's Farewell Address the suggestive observation that "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote, relation," he not only was anticipating Monroe's Doctrine, but also he was contributing almost the exact language which Monroe subsequently used.

building up for five years and it is to him that the real authorship of the Doctrine ought to be attributed."—Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 178. An argument to the contrary is attempted by W. A. MacCorkle in his *James Monroe, Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*. "John Quincy Adams was really the principal author of the 'Monroe Doctrine.'"—Wilson's *Presidents of the U. S.*, p. 125.

¹ Vandenberg's *Greatest American*, p. 286.

² *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Indeed, one brilliant essayist,¹ cognizant of these antecedents and likewise of Monroe's gutter tactics in seeking to blacken Hamilton's integrity, has picturesquely said: "The spectacle of Monroe, the defeated but undiscouraged assailant of Hamilton's private honor and public policy, roaring most nobly to all the ages out of the stolen skin of the 'Little Lion'² is possibly the crowning triumph of a great idea."

President Jefferson, despite his physical timidities, carried on in the same suggestive anticipation of the Doctrine soon to take formal shape, when in 1808 he declared: "We shall be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence, but unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same and the object of both must be to exclude European influence from this hemisphere." In other words, the past was beyond redemption, but the future belonged to the Americas.

In 1811, President Madison spoke in similar mandate when contemplating conditions in Florida. "The United States," said he, "could not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory in which they have, in different respects, so deep and so just a concern, pass

¹ Frederick Scott Oliver, writing his *Essay on American Union*.

² The Army's favorite and affectionate sobriquet for Hamilton.

from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power." Congress endorsed this declaration in words that cannot be misunderstood. If Spain lost Florida, the United States was going to get it. The New World was not a bargain counter for Old World traffics. Congress, with an eye to "the peculiar situation of Spain and her American provinces and the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States might have upon their security, tranquillity and commerce," authorized the President to occupy all or any part of the Floridas, "in the event of an attempt to occupy the same, or any part thereof, by any foreign government."¹ Meanwhile, this same administration was demonstrating—by sending five ships of food to relieve the suffering victims of the earthquake in Caracas in 1812—that America's concern for Pan-America was unselfish; that, despite our own heavy burdens in the War of 1812, we were eager to sustain a spiritual and material fraternity with these neighboring folk.² There never was a moment then or now—when the interest of the United States in the welfare of Central and South America contemplated the remotest element of conquest or aggrandizement. There never has been a time—then or now—when Pan-American relationships have not rested, so

¹ *Madison's Writings*, Vol. VIII, p. 131. *Adams' Foreign Policy*, p. 167. *Moore's American Diplomacy*, p. 259.

² C. L. Chandler's *Inter-American Acquaintances*, p. 72.

far as the United States is concerned, in an honorable reciprocity of mutual interest against whatever dangers and disasters threaten common concerns.

It remained, however, for Europe itself to provide the decisive impulse which moved the formulation of American antipathies to alien aspirations into a Doctrine and a program that should end forever trans-oceanic trespass. On September 26, 1815, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia signed at Paris a personal convention familiarly known as the "Holy Alliance." Its nominal address was to "lend one another, on every occasion and in every place, assistance, aid and support": but its actual objective, under crafty Austrian Chancellor Metternich, soon came to be a general contract for the suppression of democracy wherever it might threaten the divine right of Kings. The King of France soon associated himself with the enterprise and ultimately acted for this autocratic alliance in entering Spain to quell revolution and restore the Crown. Popular movements were forcibly suppressed in Piedmont and Naples. (The whole thing was a sort of "League to Sustain Royalty and to Crush Republics")—just such a purple enterprise as Metternich would eagerly stress in the hard administration of his ermine philosophy that Monarchs were the Vice-Regents of a God who intended mere people to be slaves. Finally these royal allies turned their eyes across

the Atlantic. They proposed to Great Britain that a royal congress should plan the termination of revolutionary governments in Spanish-America. This was in the summer of 1823. Britain, under Lord Castlereagh as Foreign Minister, had covertly favored the alliance: but Britain, under George Canning, his successor, took a different view. By now the Treaty of Ghent had composed Anglo-American differences and substituted an entente. Canning sensed a common Anglo-American interest in Spanish-America—particularly in its fast growing trade which, under the colonial system in vogue, would have reverted to the mother country, Spain, if these putative independencies were restored to Madrid's sovereignty—and subtly proposed to Richard Rush, the American Minister in London, a joint declaration of the United States and Britain against the intervention of the "Holy Alliance" in Spanish-American affairs. It was as tempting a bait as was ever shrewdly dangled before American statesmanship; but instead of luring us into an entanglement which might easily have ended our policy of continental independence and written finis to this tradition which we are trailing, it spurred the United States to its own independent decision and precipitated the great pronouncement which soon was to become the hall-mark of New World freedoms.

Great Britain had not yet recognized these new South American Republics which now saw the

shadow of Metternich across their uncertain paths. The United States had—but only after meticulous attention to the proprieties. In September, 1815, President Madison had issued a proclamation of neutrality forbidding citizens of the United States from “setting on foot any military enterprises within neutral territory in aid of hostilities against Spain.”¹ In December, 1819, President Monroe² urged that it was “of the highest importance to our national character, and indispensable to the morality of our citizens, that all violations of our neutrality should be prevented”—although he added that while a “virtuous public will confine themselves within the limit of a strict neutrality” yet “it is not in their power to behold a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case.” In his message of December, 1822, he was still “sustaining our neutral position and allowing to each party, while the war continues, equal rights,” although he had been immensely vexed with Spain’s refusal to ratify the Treaty for our acquisition of Florida unless the United States would promise never to recognize the revolting provinces—a tainted bargain which, needless to say, was promptly spurned. The President was cautious to observe every tenet of international law in respect to the continuing rights of these European nations; but he was as

¹ *American State Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 628.

careful not to give them undue encouragement as he was not to give them justified umbrage.

This perplexing question of recognition finally was resolved in 1822 in favor of these neighboring belligerents who, by dint of valorous achievement, had earned the acknowledgment.¹ In one victory after another, these liberators justified their right to our favor. All four of the old Vice-Royalties—Buenos Aires, Peru, Caracas and New Spain—were lost to the mother country. Spain, in the throes of revolution herself, was helpless. The army which Ferdinand VII had assembled at Cadiz to reconquer South America mutinied. Monroe and Adams decided to act. They asked for appropriations necessary for the institution of diplomatic relations. On June 19, 1822, the Minister from the new "Republic of Colombia" was officially received in Washington, and the recognition of the other Republics followed in quick succession.²

It was this group of new American democracies—breathing a liberalism that was anathema to Metternich and his welded sovereigns—which the "Holy Alliance" proposed to re-subjugate. It

¹ On December 6, 1817, Henry Clay announced in the House that he would move for a recognition of Buenos Aires and Chile. He took the former step finally in March, 1818, and was defeated. On February 9, 1821, Clay moved a general appropriation to cover embassies in all independent South American Republics. It was lost by seven votes.

² Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 173.

was to oppose this enslavement—for commercial rather than altruistic reasons—that Canning asked Rush to facilitate an Anglo-American liaison.¹ The suggestion was not without its allurements—particularly since Russia, a member of the Alliance, was broadcasting a claim to Oregon as well as Alaska and warning American fishermen to stay one hundred miles off-shore on pain of confiscation. American statesmanship might have been pardoned an inclination to accept a powerful associate in diplomacy and arms. This was, in fact, precisely what Jefferson and Madison, whom Monroe consulted, recommended, though Monroe warned both ex-Presidents that it meditated a breach in our traditional non-intercourse.² But

¹ One of the rarest compliments ever paid to American Neutrality fell from Canning's lips in his speech of April 16, 1823, in the British House of Commons, when he said: "If I wished for a guide in a system of neutrality, I should take that laid down by America, in the days of the Presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jefferson."—Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 30.

² The extent to which Jefferson's partisans attribute every good thing to him is magnificently demonstrated in Perry Belmont's *National Isolation an Illusion*, p. 4. "Characteristically American foreign policies originated or formulated by Jefferson were freedom of the seas, freedom from unjust commercial restrictions, the system of neutrality, the recognition of de facto governments, the doctrine of non-intervention, non-extradition of political refugees, and, above all, the message of President Monroe directly influenced by the former President and Secretary of State,

the powerful influence of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, fortunately prevailed. Happy that Providence put such a man in such a place at such an hour! Secretary Adams insisted that the time had come when the despotic philosophies of Old World Monarchies, organizing to sustain and extend their greeds, must be squarely set off from the liberal freedoms of New World Democracies—and without any doubtful implications. Canning's proffered partnership was rejected in an historic Adams despatch which frankly warned England that she was hopelessly a part of the "European community," and that her hesitation in recognizing the independence of these new Republics reflected a view-point insusceptible of assimilation with our own. Russia's belligerent threats were answered—and promptly cooled—by a flashing burst of patriot fervor which set the precedent for the formal challenge now soon to come from the heart of the new Americas to the thrones of Old Europe.¹ Everything was ready for the official, culminating pronouncement, born

whose advice had been sought and followed in establishing what we know as the Monroe Doctrine."

¹ From John Quincy Adams' despatch to Russia: "The United States of America could not see with indifference the forcible interposition of any European power other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain, or to establish monarchical governments in those countries, or to transfer any of the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American Hemisphere to any other European power."

of four decades of thought and inspiration and purpose, in behalf of adequate, honorable, honest, uncowardly "Nationalism"—though none of the actors in the drama sensed the vast eminence they should occupy upon the trail of a tradition and in the eyes of long-time posterity which has made the trail the course to guide their feet.

It was in his seventh annual message to the Congress, delivered on December 2, 1823, that President Monroe summarized the complete picture of trans-oceanic relations between the Old World and the New, and uttered those electric sentences which were to live as a time-honored "Doctrine" under his name. These sentiments and sentences were not set forward as the emphasized text of his observations; neither were they flung into a dramatic relief that should lend them unmistakable prominence. Instead, they flowed inconspicuously through the body of the address, with no evidence that their author intended or realized that they were to become new milestones along the trail of a regnant, paramount tradition. Indeed, it is entirely doubtful whether he himself—or those who listened upon that unsuspectedly historic day—realized at the time that a new addendum to the Declaration of Independence was being pronounced to the world and to posterity. Can it be questioned that their surprise would have been profound if some divination could have unrolled to them the picture of American Peace Commissioners, nearly one hun-

dred years later, insisting that the "Monroe Doctrine" must be preserved as the pre-requisite to any Treaty America could hope to ratify?

Speaking first of Russia's proposal "to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights of the two nations—America and Russia—on the northwest coast of this continent," President Monroe said:¹

"The government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussion to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that THE AMERICAN CONTINENTS, BY THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT CONDITION WHICH THEY HAVE ASSUMED AND MAINTAIN, ARE HENCEFORTH NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS SUBJECTS FOR FUTURE COLONIZATION BY ANY EUROPEAN POWERS."

The capitals are ours, not his. No such accent attached to the words in their initial setting. But a subsequent century, faithful to the tradition of intelligent "Nationalism," has written them upon the pages of history and upon the conscience of the world quite as formidably as have we.

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 778.

Textually unrelated to the foregoing paragraph, a further discussion of the same subject followed at the Message's conclusion. Speaking of Spain and Portugal, the President said¹:

"Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. **WE OWE IT, THEREFORE, TO CANDOR AND TO THE AMIC-**

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 787-788.

ABLE RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE POWERS TO DECLARE THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER ANY ATTEMPT ON THEIR PART TO EXTEND THEIR SYSTEM TO ANY PORTION OF THIS HEMISPHERE AS DANGEROUS TO OUR PEACE AND SAFETY. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles acknowledged, WE COULD NOT VIEW ANY INTERPOSITION FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPPRESSING THEM, OR CONTROLLING IN ANY OTHER MANNER THEIR DESTINY, BY ANY EUROPEAN POWER IN ANY OTHER LIGHT THAN AS THE MANIFESTATION OF AN UNFRIENDLY DISPOSITION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. . . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government 'de facto' as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of any power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE ALLIED POWERS SHOULD

EXTEND THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM TO ANY PORTION OF EITHER CONTINENT"—North or South America—"WITHOUT ENDANGERING OUR PEACE AND HAPPINESS; NOR CAN ANYONE BELIEVE THAT OUR SOUTHERN BRETHREN, IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES, WOULD ADOPT IT OF THEIR OWN ACCORD. IT IS EQUALLY IMPOSSIBLE, THEREFORE, THAT WE SHOULD BEHOLD SUCH INTERPOSITION IN ANY FORM WITH INDIFFERENCE. If we look at the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

Thus did America reiterate its tradition of separation from Europe: not "isolation"—for we were eager to sustain commercial relationships, and one of the greatest objectives of our statesmanship was such unhampered freedom of the seas as should make these contacts possible; not "isolation," but "separation"—"separation" that should divorce us absolutely from the political and governmental philosophies and vicissitudes and collisions of the European system. While the immediate purpose of the "Monroe Doctrine" was to keep Europe out of America, the commanding motive was the continuing desire to keep America out of Europe—out of its intrigues—out of its suspicions—out of its conspiracies—out of its

tyrannies—out of its debaucheries—out of its everlasting combats. The continuing impulse was the bulwarked determination that the United States should be free to decide its own destinies on the basis of its own legitimate and honorable self-interest, without let or hinderance; and the immediate objective was the emancipation of our neighbors into kindred autonomy, not alone to the end that their enjoyments of democracy should be untrammelled, but also, and particularly, to the end that we ourselves might live on a healthy hemisphere and be quarantined against intimate exposure to imported fevers. In other words, intelligent “Nationalism” was at work in the Doctrine exactly as it had been at work in “Neutrality.” The former became simply a lengthened and expanding paraphrase of the latter. It was simply the American Tradition carrying on.

The “Monroe Doctrine” was a brave announcement. The “Holy Alliance” was a tremendously powerful coalition, not to be lightly challenged. It was fighting for the life of monarchy and the prerogatives of regal privilege. The entire European system, not excepting England’s, was frankly and courageously indicted. If we put ourselves back into 1823, we may well imagine that such a declaration of expanding independence—1823 was the epilogue to 1776—could not have hoped or expected to avoid immediate reprisal. Yet such was its moral authority that it accomplished its whole purpose, from that day to this, with scarcely

an intervening friction. It is one of the miracles in the miracle-story of a miracle-land. It is one of the proudest and most useful of American achievements. It is an eternal sign-post on the trail of a tradition.

Space does not permit the detailed study of the Pan-Americanism—the moral leaguings of American nations—which has grown up, magnificently, on the tree of this seed of 1823, nor is it our function to detour from the specific domestic trail upon which we are embarked. But this much should be said. (Whether or not Central and South America desired a “Monroe Doctrine,” they have been profoundly its beneficiaries.¹ Whether they would have been self-sufficient without it is wholly a matter of conjecture. The intrepidity of their military leaders suggests that they would; the regal appetites of Europe suggest that they would not.) At any rate, the result has largely been that their democracy has shared the immunities of our own from foreign infraction. That they failed to sense the importance of the Doctrine at the time of its enunciation is probable—since its own authors could not have foreseen its puissance. That the growing importance and

¹ “It may not be too much to say that the South American States asked the United States to step forward and challenge the Holy Alliance in the name of the Americas.” Adams’ *Foreign Policy*, p. 176. W. C. Ford’s “J. Q. Adams and the Monroe Doctrine” in *American Historical Review*, VII, p. 696.

power of many of these great South American Republics has subsequently rendered irksome any erroneous suggestions of super-stewardship resident in Washington is logical—since the nations, cradled by the Doctrine, have long since put off swaddling clothes. Of course, any such misconception—the unfortunate and unintended assumption that these great powers are in effect but protectorates under the mandate of the United States—does violence to the realities of the “Monroe Doctrine” quite as much as it does to the pride and the honor of our neighbors and our friends. But that the spiritual purpose of the Doctrine gloriously lives and thrives, by common consent, is patent everywhere. “So far as the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ is held to guard the political system of this hemisphere against external subversion or attack, the American nations cordially accept it and look to the United States as its author and mainstay,” declares John Bassett Moore in his eminent work on *American Diplomacy*.¹ Upon the Doctrine, as upon a rock, the institution of Pan-Americanism has been erected—the mutual co-operation of North and South American democracies for common benefits, the most useful external political movement in which the United States engages. As long ago as December 7, 1824, General Simon Bolivar, then heading the Republic of Peru, suggested the holding of the first Pan-American Conference for “the establishment of

¹ Page 415.

certain fixed principles for securing the preservation of peace between the nations of America, and the concurrence of all those nations in defense of their own rights.”¹ While this initial Conference in Panama—in which delegates from the United States arrived too late to participate—was a failure, it has been followed, down the years, by other similar enterprises under the primary auspices of the United States that have created wholesome impulses of Pan-American friendliness and legitimate liaison—not “entanglements” but “understandings.” So far as Pan-America goes, the “Monroe Doctrine” has become the common concern of all. But a stream can rise no higher than its source, and the source of the Doctrine continues to be the United States. Nor is this fact ignored among our neighbors. Presiding as honorary president at the closing session of the Fourth International American Conference in 1910, Dr. Rodríguez Larreta, Argentine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, prophetically declared: “In this year the majority of our Republics complete a century of independent life. We can now say, with Washington, ‘America for humanity,’ because we are sovereign nations and the place we occupy in the world we owe to the strength of our own arms and our blood heroically shed. But let my last words

¹ At an earlier date, in 1815, General Bolívar, while in exile in Jamaica, wrote his famous prophecy declaring that the destiny of America to be independent was “irrevocably fixed.”

be to send a message of acknowledgment to the great nation which initiated these conferences, which preceded us in the struggle for independence, which afforded us the example of a fruitful people organized as a republican nation, which, on a day memorable in history, declared 'America for Americans,' and covered as with a shield our hard-won independence."

That "memorable day" was the 2nd of December, 1823, when the "Nationalism" of the United States spoke the lofty message of its independent heart and its sturdy soul. It now but remains, for the purpose of following this trail, to touch the high-spots of our own intervening history upon those occasions when the "Monroe Doctrine" has been re-asserted with honorable, just and uncompromising allegiance. It is not a chauvinistic record—as witness the promptness with which we acknowledged British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in 1829, despite the desires of Buenos Aires to dispossess a British occupation of sixty years. It is not the diary of a swash-buckler swaggering down the world's stage and pretending implications that ravish equity and the essentialities of international fair-dealing—as witness our non-interference in repeated episodes in which Europe has sternly demanded, short of actual territorial acquisition, Central and South American attention to legitimate engagements.¹ But it

¹ See Moore's *American Diplomacy*, pp. 417-418. In 1861, the United States, for example, admitted the right

is a consistent, unswerving record of fidelity to the principle of a limitation upon the extension of European power and influence on the American continents—a principle, as stated in an addendum which signatories to the Hague convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes unanimously accepted, under which the United States never has “departed from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state,” and never has “relinquished its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.”

Many Presidents have re-enunciated the “Monroe Doctrine”—indeed, few have not. It would be an act of supererogation to call the roll. Thus, for instance, President Polk in his message of December 2, 1845,¹ adopting the maxim in foreign affairs “to ask nothing that is not right and submit to nothing that is wrong,” declared that while existing rights of every European nation should be respected, it should be “distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our con-

of France, Spain and Great Britain to proceed jointly against Mexico for the collection of claims provided, as Secretary of State Seward declared on June 26, 1862, that the effort be not made the excuse “to raise up an anti-Republican or Anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there.”

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 2235.

sent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." There are innumerable kindred expositions. It will suffice to notice a few outstanding episodes which amply validate the Doctrine and its administration at America's hands.

No trial could have been more severe than that which, by design or circumstance, climaxed while the country was so engrossed in the death struggles of its own Civil War that it had to await the latter's conclusion ere it could pick up its tradition and proceed. Interminably annoying Mexico was the theatre of this episode—the only serious effort ever made, since the "Monroe Doctrine's" enunciation, actually to establish imported monarchy under the objections and the guns of the United States. Irresponsible government—the same sort of travesty with which modern generations have been unhappily familiar—had piled up an enormous liability to Europe for fiscal defaults, and to the United States for unpaid indemnities. On the former score, Spain notified us in 1858—and Great Britain in 1859—that she proposed to invade Mexico with a military expedition to force liquidation of debts and protection of citizens. President James Buchanan, in his second annual message of December 6, 1858,¹ noticed this anticipation and said that it "is a duty which we owe to ourselves to protect the integrity of Mexico's territory against the hostile

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, p. 3043.

interference of any other power"; and Secretary of State Cass, acknowledging these notifications which by then had included similar ultimatum from France, replied: "While we do not deny the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country, or endeavoring by force to control its destiny." In July, 1860, Britain, emulating the unsuccessful precedent of Canning, invited us to join the European powers in a program of control. Of course, it was declined. By now, President Buchanan wanted to proceed independently and aggressively. In his fourth annual message, December 3, 1860,¹ he proposed an American invasion supporting the government of Juarez against that of Miramon. "Thus," he argued, "European governments would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these governments to deprive our neighboring Republic of portions of her territory—a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the tradition and established policy of the American people."

But the Civil War now monopolized all our attentions and resources. On October 31, 1861,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3177.

Britain, Spain and France agreed to move on Mexico—though expressly declaring the absence of intention “to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of government.” Secretary of State Seward, under President Lincoln, had admitted the European right to make war on Mexico, provided this latter delimitation was scrupulously observed. France—later abandoned by her allies—suspicious of the intentions of Napoleon III, who now occupied the French throne—advanced on the City of Mexico; captured it in June, 1863; set up a dummy government; voted an Empire; sent for Maximilian, brother of the Emperor of Austria, and Napoleon’s nominee, and put him on a fateful throne. Under this Austrian Hapsburg, supported by French troops, Mexico embarked upon perhaps the weirdest of all its luckless governmental adventures. Beyond shadow of a doubt, the “Monroe Doctrine” had been contemptuously scorned and challenged. But, also beyond shadow of a doubt, the United States—in the bitter divisions and disasters of rebellion—was powerless to do more than “protest” and “deplore” and “regret” the happenings.

But by 1864, our own situation was clearing. Congress resolved that “it did not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins

of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power," and Secretary Seward began a series of sturdy inquiries which flatly informed the French Emperor that his Mexican pawn "could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared Republican institutions." The Civil War being ended, our government began the concentration of troops along the Rio Grande.¹ In 1865 Seward peremptorily demanded that France desist from armed intervention in Mexico. Though the "Monroe Doctrine" never was specifically mentioned in any of Seward's correspondence,² this was the spirit and the letter of the "Monroe Doctrine" returning unto its own.³ Napoleon III, conscious of

¹ That General Grant was a firm believer in the Monroe Doctrine was subsequently demonstrated upon several occasions. For instance, in his message to the Senate on May 31, 1870, after he became President, he said: "The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power."—*Messages of the Presidents*, p. 4015.

² Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 260.

³ "Seward was restrained by policy" from specifying the Doctrine, says Thomas in his *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 201. "The Doctrine was not popular in Europe. Seward was trying to maintain friendly relations with European states so as to prevent recognition of the Confederacy. One of his colleagues in the Cabinet,

failing Mexican fortunes, tried to save his face by "agreements" for French retirement. One after another expedient was attempted. All failed. Napoleon withdrew his troops. Hapless Maximilian was captured by Juarez troops, court-martialed and executed, as Emperor Iturbide, his only imperial predecessor had been before him in 1824. Undoubtedly home pressure on Napoleon III—both by taxpayers objecting to the futilities of this expensive Mexican adventure, and by citizens generally when Bismarck assumed ominous anti-French posture in Schleswig-Holstein—had much to do with the ignominious retreat which European monarchy thus beat, leaving its puppet, poor Maximilian, rather pathetically at the mercy of a Mexican firing squad. Yet it would be absurd to deny the primary importance of the "Monroe Doctrine" in the equation. So long as the United States was unable to put plain and unequivocal emphasis upon the spirit of the Doctrine, invasion had been withheld. As soon as the United States was in position to resume its traditional mandates—and obviously ready to do so, in the event of continued opposition—invasion was suspended. Despite every collateral influence, the dethroning of Maximilian—marking the last effort to emasculate American democracy—

Salmon P. Chase, wrote to a friend that it would have suited his temper and taste to appeal directly to the Monroe Doctrine," though not blaming Seward for his strategy.

stands as a paramount landmark along the trail of this tradition.

Perhaps the most famous of the occasions when the Doctrine was implacably sustained—and certainly one demanding both “Nationalistic” faith and “Nationalistic” courage—involved the long-time disagreement between Venezuela and Great Britain over the British Guiana boundary line. This dispute, in its antecedents, was some two centuries old and went back to the inability of Spain and the Netherlands to agree upon mutual limits to their Guiana settlements. The specific quarrel between Britain and Venezuela began to frame its issue as early as 1844 when Lord Aberdeen proposed a conventional line which Venezuela at the time refused. By 1876 Venezuela was ready voluntarily to accept the Aberdeen line: but Lord Granville now demanded substantially more of the Venezuelan territory. In the course of long negotiations, Venezuela—claiming this enlargement of British demands constituted a bald aggression upon her territorial rights—invoked American intercession under the “Monroe Doctrine,” and asked for arbitration. Great Britain demanded substantial Venezuelan territory beyond the Aberdeen line as the price of arbitration to settle the remaining title. The bargain was impossible. It specifically involved the sanctity of the “Monroe Doctrine” and when, after another long interval of sterile negotiations, the issue approached a climax in 1895, the adminis-

tration of President Grover Cleveland intervened. A categorical inquiry from Secretary of State Richard Olney demanded British answer to the request for unlimited arbitration. In the course of this inquiry Secretary Olney pointed out that, while the United States had no desire to relieve any of its South American neighbors of responsibility for their just obligations, yet that it continued to sustain the "object and purpose" that "no European power or combination of European powers should forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government"; and he insisted that because this dispute related to territory, it necessarily imported "political control to be lost by one party and gained by the other."¹ Lord Salisbury rejected the application of such a Doctrine to such a situation and declined to yield. Thus was a serious issue, under the Doctrine, squarely framed. Then came President Cleveland—sturdy, clear-headed, iron-hearted patriot that he was!—to re-enunciate the Doctrine in terms and in application which made it as vivid at the end as it had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Speaking to the Congress in his special message of December 17, 1895,² he took up the British government's effort to pretend America's tradition policy to be inapplicable "to the state of things in which we live at the present day," and said:

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 248.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIV, p. 6087.

“Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures. ✓ If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the governments of the Old World, and a subject for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their government.

. . . If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be ‘dangerous to our peace and safety,’ and it can make no difference whether the European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise.

“It is also suggested in the British reply that we should not seek to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the pending dispute because it does not embody any principle of international law which is ‘founded

on the general consent of nations,' and that 'no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before and which has not since been accepted by the government of any other country.'

"Practically, the principle for which we contend has peculiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something which we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned. . . . The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. . . . In the belief that the Doctrine for which we contend was clear and definite, that it was founded upon substantial considerations and involved our safety and welfare, that it was fully applicable to our present conditions and to the state of the world's progress, and that it was directly related to the pending controversy, but anxious to learn in a satisfactory and conclusive manner whether Great Britain sought under a claim of boundary to extend her possessions on this continent without right, or whether

she merely sought possession of territory fairly included within her lines of ownership, this government proposed a resort to arbitration as the proper means of settling the question, to the end that a vexatious boundary dispute between the two contestants might be determined and our exact standing and relation in respect to the controversy might be made clear. It will be seen from the correspondence submitted that this proposition has been declined by the British government upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far from satisfactory. . . . The course to be pursued by this government in view of the present condition does not appear to admit of serious doubt. Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great Britain to submit this dispute to impartial arbitration, and having been now finally apprized of her refusal to do so, nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly. . . . The dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its own justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. . . . When such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of

any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. . . . In making these recommendations, I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow."

Faithful sentinel upon the trail of this tradition! Aware that timid and supine "Nationalism" more than once had precipitated the very disaster from which it sought to run away, President Cleveland proposed the honorable alternative of a positive declaration of legitimate rights, and an unequivocal ultimatum thereupon which should discourage any notion that we were less than unswervingly earnest in our intentions. "I am firm in my conviction," declared this great soul, "that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness."

Magnificent apostrophe! If it shall have been some reader's lurking suspicion that a narrowly partisan critic has been assessing the character and contribution of some of the great men in this

story of yesterday—a critic refusing credits to any save those who were Hamilton's congenital successors in political faith and practice—let him be answered by this unreserved acknowledgment: Grover Cleveland was one of the greatest of all figures in the evolution of self-sufficient "Nationalism" and in the successful administration of "Nationalism's" aspirations.¹

The result of President Cleveland's message—immediately sustained by congressional action unanimously creating the American Boundary Commission—was ultimate composition and peace. Before the Commission faced the finalities of responsibility, the entire incident was closed by a Treaty of Arbitration, signed by Great Britain and Venezuela, but negotiated by Great Britain and the United States. Under it, and pursuant to accepted tenets of international law, the moot boundary was adjudicated. But the actual metes and bounds of an international line between two minor South American states was utterly secondary in importance to "the official adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by the Congress of the United States, and its explicit acceptance by the principal maritime power of Europe."²

¹ "Cleveland was as distinguished for forceful speech as for forceful action. His addresses are marked by clearness of thought and directness of expression which, with his courage and ability, have always appealed to the best sentiments of the people, and have formed and led a healthy public opinion."—Wilson's *Presidents of the U. S.*, p. 485.

² Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 251.

Venezuela again figured spectacularly in the Doctrine's evolution, this time in the considerations of the Roosevelt administration. President Theodore Roosevelt himself was one of the most intense of all statesmen devoted to intelligent "Nationalism." No patriot ever more perfectly understood its essence, more steadfastly sustained its creeds, more unswervingly defended its demands and implications, more courageously faced the responsibilities of its defense, or more effectually contributed to its glory. His passion was "Americanism" and so voluminous is the literature upon the subject which he has left that an anthology would require volumes and still fail to do it justice. With his general attitude we shall deal later. But his relations to another Venezuelan crisis were typical, not only of his red-blooded "Nationalism," but also of his inimitable personality.

In his annual message of December 3, 1901, President Roosevelt had re-defined the Doctrine in its traditional purport. "The Monroe Doctrine," said he, "is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil." But he also had taken pains to explain that this proscription had no bearing on collateral relationships. "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." When another Ven-

ezuelan crisis arose, immediately thereafter, the President scrupulously applied his own definition, both in its permissions and in its limitations. He denied through Secretary of State Hay the so-called "Drago Doctrine"¹ that "the public debt cannot give rise to armed intervention"; but he stood spectacularly firm against the prostitution of a legitimate European demand to an illegitimate and anti-Doctrinal assumption of permanent sovereignties. The strength of his position lay in these judicial discriminations which he was careful to preserve.² As he later explained in a speech at

¹ Contained in a note from the Argentine government, signed by Señor Luis M. Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations.

² Another example of President Roosevelt's discriminations—his realization that the "Monroe Doctrine" could not be a privilege without also being a responsibility—lay in his dealings with Santo Domingo, where he undertook to liquidate Dominican fiscal difficulties through an American administration of Dominican revenues. Those who profited from the Monroe Doctrine, he declared in a message of February 15, 1905, must accept the responsibilities attaching to the privilege. Since we could not consent that any European power should "seize and permanently occupy" the territory of an American Republic, he argued, even though that be the only ultimate method of collection, we must face the alternative of attending to such matters ourselves. "Either we must abandon our duty under our traditional policy towards the Dominion people, who aspire to a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other government to adopt its

Chicago, April 2, 1903,¹ "the concern of our government was, of course, not to interfere needlessly in any quarrel so far as it did not touch our interests or our honor, and not to take the attitude of protecting from coercion any power unless we were willing to espouse the quarrel of that power, but to keep an attitude of watchful vigilance, and see that there was no infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, no acquirement of territorial rights by a European power at the expense of a weak sister Republic—whether this acquisition might take the shape of an outright and avowed seizure of territory or of the exercise of control which would in effect be equivalent to such seizure." In other words, he did not propose to prevent the forced collection of a Venezuelan debt to Germany, but he did propose to prevent the Germanizing of Venezuela, contrary to the "Monroe Doctrine," through the pretext or process of such debt collection.

What actually happened was this. In December, 1901, the German Ambassador served notice upon Washington that his government intended to force debt collections from Venezuela—first by blockade, then by collecting duties if necessary. It was expressly stated, however, that no "occu-

own measures in order to safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves take seasonable and appropriate action."

¹ *Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 117-120.

pation or permanent acquisition of Venezuelan territory" was contemplated. Secretary Hay, responding, put all emphasis upon this latter guarantee and assumed to take it at its face value. A year later, Germany—joined by Britain and Italy—instituted the threatened blockade. Not satisfied with this duress, the joint fleets actually shelled Puerto Cabello on pretense of insult to the British flag on a British merchant vessel. Venezuela thereupon asked the United States to propose arbitration, suggesting that the President serve as umpire. President Roosevelt countered with a proposal for a mixed commission. Britain and Italy promptly acquiesced. But Germany refused. The Emperor seemed bent upon pursuing not only the legitimate purposes, to which we had assented, but also the subsequent illegitimate purposes to which we proposed to object. It was another tense moment in the history of this tradition. But it was served by typical Roosevelt vigor and daring. An unofficial American ultimatum—short, sharp and positive—was flung into the equation and the unyielding stamina of one man stayed calamity. In fact, there are few parallels to it by way of personal triumph in the unofficial behind-scenes chronicles of diplomacy. There need no longer be conjecture as to what happened in those historic conferences between President Roosevelt and Ambassador von Holleben, because the detail was set down by the President himself in a letter to William Roscoe Thayer,

written from Sagamore Hill, August 21, 1916, and published by Mr. Thayer in his *Life of John Hay* in 1915.¹ It is to be regretted that the entire letter cannot be reproduced here, but limitations of space forbid. It is the modest story of a courageous statesman, facing crisis with unblenched cheek and steel purpose—a story entitled to nourish the legitimate pride of every American citizen who loves his “Nationalism” and believes in its traditional destiny.

“Germany declined to agree to arbitrate the question at issue between her and Venezuela”—we are quoting Roosevelt; “and declined to say that she would not take possession of Venezuelan territory. . . . I assembled our battle-fleet, under Admiral Dewey, near Porto Rico, for ‘maneuvers,’ with instructions that the fleet should be kept in hand and in fighting trim, and should be ready to sail at an hour’s notice. . . . I saw the Ambassador and explained that in view of the presence of the German squadron on the Venezuelan coast, I could not permit longer delay in answering my request for an arbitration. . . . The Ambassador responded that his government could not agree to arbitrate, and that there was no intention to take ‘permanent possession’ of Venezuelan territory. I answered that Kiauchau”—referring to a Chinese invasion—“was not a ‘permanent’ possession of Germany—that I

¹ See Bishop’s *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, pp. 221-226.

understood that it was merely held by a 99 years' lease; and that I did not intend to have another Kiauchau, held by similar tenure, on the approach to the Isthmian Canal. The Ambassador repeated that his government would not agree to arbitrate. I then asked him to inform his government that if no notification for arbitration came within a certain specified number of days"—understood to have been ten days—"I should be obliged to order Dewey to take his fleet to the Venezuelan coast and see that the German forces did not take possession of any territory. He expressed very grave concern, and asked me if I realized the serious consequences that would follow such action; consequences so serious to both countries that he dreaded to give them a name. I answered that I had thoroughly counted the cost before I decided on the step, and asked him to look at the map, as a glance would show him that there was no spot in the world where Germany in the event of conflict with the United States would be at a greater disadvantage than in the Caribbean Sea. A few days later the Ambassador came to see me, talked pleasantly on several subjects, and rose to go. I asked him if he had any answer to make from his government to my request, and when he said no, I informed him that in such event it was useless to wait as long as I had intended, and that Dewey would be ordered to sail twenty-four hours in advance of the time I had set. He expressed deep apprehension, and

said that his government would not arbitrate. However, less than twenty-four hours before the time I had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Embassy had notified me that His Imperial Majesty, the German Emperor had directed him to request me to undertake the arbitration myself. I felt, and publicly expressed, great gratification at this outcome, and great appreciation of the course the German government had finally agreed to take. Later I received the consent of the German government to have the arbitration undertaken by The Hague Tribunal and not by me."

A powerful personification of the best and truest Americanism, faithful to the finest and purest of our national traditions, had once more vindicated the moral authority and the republican precepts of the New World. The same Germany which had, on second thought, decided that it was best for von Diederich not to quarrel with Dewey at Manila Bay, again concluded, on second thought, not to challenge Roosevelt and that same Dewey in the Caribbean and in the "Monroe Doctrine's" zone. The flag snapped straighter in the breeze. The shades of Washington and Hamilton must have approved!

"Germany had made the test," says David Y. Thomas in his *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine*,¹ "and had found that the Monroe Doctrine was a living reality. Indeed, with a Presi-

¹ P. 214.

dent ready to order warships to the scene of action, it now was decidedly more vital than in 1826, for then Adams, confronted with a politically hostile Senate, was virtually forced to say that it meant only that each nation should maintain the principle in application to its own territory and permit no European power to establish any colonies on its soil.

President Woodrow Wilson's administration, dealing with other vital "Nationalism" fundamentals which are reserved for subsequent discussion wrote the most recent chapter in the "Monroe Doctrine's" history—a chapter fraught with frictions, with threatened surrenders, but with ultimate world-wide acknowledgment—the first formal covenant ever thus recorded—that the Doctrine is a fixed and permanent tenet in the body of international law. Mr. Wilson's own conception of the Doctrine was ably submitted to Congress in the course of this third annual address, December 7, 1915.¹ Different from Cleveland, he undertook to prove a changing character and a certain mutability in this philosophy, though his conclusions were four-square with tradition. He differentiated between the early days "when the Government of the United States looked upon itself as in some sort the guardian of the Republics to the south of her as against any encroachments or efforts at political control from the other side of the water," and the modern dispen-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8102.

sation "when there is no claim of guardianship or thought of wards, but, instead, a full and honorable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, north and south." Nevertheless, said he, "our concern for the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and South America is not altered. We retain unabated the spirit that has inspired us throughout the whole life of our government and which was so frankly put into words by President Monroe. We still mean to make a common cause of national independence and of political liberty in America."

Secretary of State Robert Lansing amplified this interpretation in his opening address to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress on December 27, 1915, when he observed that within recent years the United States "found no occasion with the exception of the Venezuela boundary incident, to remind Europe that the Monroe Doctrine continues unaltered a national policy of this Republic"; suggested that the American Republics, meanwhile, had "attained maturity" on their own account; and intimated that commonality of ideals and aspirations had produced the "international policy of Pan-Americanism" as the ultimate expression of the continuing tradition of 1823.¹ Addressing this same body on January 6, 1916, President Wilson himself continued the amplification. His obvious and right-

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 268.

eous purpose was to disabuse South American prejudices and re-disclose the fact that the United States contemplated no untoward super-sovereignty over these Pan-American neighbors; but he did not neglect to say, unequivocally, that "the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority: it always has been maintained, and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility."

But when the entanglements of the secret cabinets at Versailles, wherein a quartette of paramount cartographers remade the map of the world in connection with the peace that concluded the World War, were disclosed to the American people—who had been kept, by a strict censorship, largely in ignorance of the progress of events at Paris—one of the immediate and most intensive scrutinies in vain searched the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations for some specific acknowledgment that the "Monroe Doctrine" had not been sacrificed to the Frankenstein of "internationalism." President Wilson now returned to America for his first homeland contacts and conferences in relation to his European labors and intents. He faced a determined force, in both public and private opinion, which demanded—among many other things to be inventoried later—that the "Monroe Doctrine" must be specifically acknowledged; that the implications of its sovereignty and its tradition must not be even inferentially abridged in favor of an organized

World Parliament. Returning to Paris the second time, he procured the following amendment to the League Covenant which became its Article XXI: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to effect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration, or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." This revision made the "Monroe Doctrine" international law for the first time, since all the signatories to the compact gave assent to it in a formal way.¹ But it did not end, it only began the American argument. For the first time, modern generations entered upon a serious study and discussion of the age-old Doctrine, and the final result was not only a better understanding of a tradition which had come to be largely legendary, but also a renewed allegiance to the philosophy of independence of which it was the vivid expression. The League's Covenant, by pretending to validate the "Monroe Doctrine," did not win American approval, in this or other of its sections: but it did precipitate an intensive American discussion—in forums that had heard nothing on the subject for many decades—which re-illuminated the subject and caused the Doctrine to live again as one of the unquenchable realities of American independence.

The triumphant objection to the Covenant's definition of the Doctrine was two-fold: first, it mis-named the Doctrine as being a "regional

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 403.

understanding," whereas it was and is a proscription addressed to all the world; second, it left the interpretation and the application of the Doctrine to the authority and the discretion of the League of Nations, whereas the very genius of the Doctrine—as President Wilson had himself declared in 1916—lay in its maintenance on the authority and the responsibility of the United States. In other words, a "Monroe Doctrine" (—warning Europe's political system out of the Americas—left to the discretion of Europe ceased ipso facto to be the "Monroe Doctrine" at all. That the intent of Europe was to close the Doctrine into the League's jurisdiction is indisputable. An official British explanation of the Covenant included, among other disclosures, the statement that "if a dispute arises, the League is there to settle it"; and Lord Robert Cecil said, in the *London Mail*, that the "League does not specifically recognize the American conception of that feature of American foreign policy."

Perhaps as tart yet illuminating a snap-shot of the American viewpoint as is available may be gleaned in a letter from United States Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Writing to the author of this book from Washington on May 30, 1919, he said in relation to this particular phase of the League problem:

"They have dealt with the 'Monroe Doctrine' in such a way as to make the situation worse than

it was under the first draft. They refer to it as a 'regional understanding.' It never has been anything but an American policy. Suppose that you own property which you wish to protect from hunting and shooting and you post it in the ordinary way: 'Hunting and Shooting on This Land is Forbidden under Penalty of Law.' Is that a regional understanding? The 'Monroe Doctrine' is like one of those signs. They have left it in such shape that the 'Monroe Doctrine' in the future is to be interpreted by the League of Nations—Great Britain in her summary stated that is so many words. To leave the 'Monroe Doctrine' to be interpreted by the League is worse than its abandonment. The 'Monroe Doctrine' must be accepted as declared, interpreted and applied by us."

To cure these palpable weaknesses in the defenses of a great American tradition, all but the most implacable of League enthusiasts soon began to acknowledge that the United States could not ratify so gross a perversion without collateral declaration. Then the policy of "ratification with reservations" began to be discussed.¹ This

¹ The author believes that the discussion of "reservations" was initiated, in the American press, by *The Grand Rapids Herald*; and that one of its first challenges upon this score is particularly pertinent to this study of the "Monroe Doctrine." When ex-President Taft spoke in Grand Rapids on June 3, 1919, under the auspices of the "League to Enforce Peace," campaigning for the

was not a new method for emphasizing American prerogatives in relation to the "Monroe Doctrine." Thus, for example, in 1899 our signature to the

Covenant, the author—in his capacity as Editor of *The Herald*—published an Open Letter to Judge Taft asking him whether certain essential American points were safe except as they were "reserved." Referring to the literature of the "League to Enforce Peace," as having said that the Covenant Amendments made the League "thoroughly American," Judge Taft was interrogated as follows in relation to the "Monroe Doctrine": "One amendment purports to preserve our traditional Monroe Doctrine. This amendment describes the Monroe Doctrine as 'a regional understanding to preserve peace.' Do you agree to that definition? When, since the birth of the doctrine, has it ever been thus shorn of its primary function to preserve independent Pan-American republican sovereignty? Having thus misdescribed the Monroe Doctrine, does not the Covenant then proceed to leave its interpretation entirely and exclusively in the jurisdiction of international councils, upon which we shall always be out-voted by Europe and Asia? When the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine thus becomes an alien prerogative, does not the Doctrine itself cease to exist in its vitals and its essence? Did not President Wilson himself say on January 6, 1916, in an address to the Pan-American Congress: 'The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority; it always has been, and always will be, maintained upon her own responsibility'? Is not this wholesomely American declaration — reminiscent of Grover Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt—flatly repudiated by the pending amended Covenant? Did not the British delegation in Paris issue an official explanation of this Treaty, saying among other things that 'Should any dispute as to the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine arise between

Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had been expressly delimited by the official declaration that it could not be construed as requiring the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon or interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude towards purely American questions." The Algeciras Convention, relative to Morocco, 1906, was approved only after the Senate had expressly announced that it was with-

American and European powers the League will settle it'? How can the 'League' (meaning Europe and Asia primarily) 'settle' the Monroe Doctrine and have any Doctrine left—since the essence of the Doctrine is its unassailable independence of Old World interference and dominion? Is there a greater French publicist than Stephane Lauzanne? Is he but demonstrating the possession of a 'pigmy mind' (one of your phrases, Mr. Taft) when he flatly says: 'It seems to me monumentally paradoxical and a trifle infantile to pretend that the Monroe Doctrine is not violated by the League Covenant'? Is it not a cold fact, Mr. Taft, that the Monroe Doctrine amendment—so far as realities are concerned—is little more than a piece of pretty camouflage? If without this amendment the League Covenant was not 'thoroughly American,' how can the situation have been changed by an amendment which amounts, in final analysis, to nothing but empty words?" Ex-President Taft was among those earnest and practical friends of the League who later joined in an effort to make the League acceptable to the United States through a series of "Reservations" dealing with this and other moot points.

out purpose "to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope." The Taft-Knox Treaties of amity in 1911 were expressly amended to exclude consideration of any question "involving the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine or other purely governmental policy." In the present instance, there were many different forms of "reservations"—dealing with a multiplicity of subjects—proposed in and out of the Senate. But on the subject of the "Monroe Doctrine" nothing more illuminating, more adequate, or more traditional in its faithful definitions was proposed than the so-called "Hughes Reservation" which pursued the following language:

"Fifth, that Article XXI of the Covenant classifies the Monroe Doctrine as having acquired the character of a customary convention applicable to the Western Hemisphere, and recognizes it as being in the interest of peace, with the meaning and effect that the United States may, without violation of any obligation or restraining covenant of the League, object to and prevent any attempt by European or non-American nations, whether by war, purchase, voluntary transfer or intrigue, to make new or additional territorial acquisitions, to acquire new or additional strategical footholds, to establish or further the establishment of monarchical or non-democratic governments, or to

secure new or additional political control in such Hemisphere."

It is doubtful whether any counsel of seers, though blessed with the spiritual presence of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Alexander Hamilton themselves, could put the complete scope, trend and tradition of the "Monroe Doctrine" into more certain and more complete phraseology than this. It is the twentieth century's interpretation of the early nineteenth century's nationalistic proclamation of American independence from foreign political entanglements; and it is faithful—in letter and in spirit—to its splendid model. Though we did not join the League, for this and other reasons that shall be later detailed, yet the League episode is to be credited with two achievements in relation to the "Monroe Doctrine": first, it caused the Doctrine to be written into the specific codes of international relations, no matter how inadequately; second, it caused a re-created domestic interest in and fidelity to this great American fundament, and a re-stated declaration of its purports which is a true, down-to-date acknowledgment of its real essence and authority.

Despite eruptive changes in Old World conditions, where "systems of government" in many places have seemed to cease to be so warningly different from our own as when the "Monroe Doctrine" originally was proclaimed, and, despite changed aspects in the New World, where Pan-

American Republics have themselves seemed to graduate into the category of wholly self-sufficient world powers, the Creed of 1823 is still a vitally essential philosophy from which democracy will depart at its peril. On the one hand, even where other spheres have cultivated democracy's demeanor, there is still beneath the veneer a "set of primary interests" so different from ours—ethnically, historically, geographically, politically, socially, economically, philosophically, metaphysically—that the Doctrine of separate destiny continues in full force and effect as a utilitarian memorial to James Monroe and John Quincy Adams following George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, and as perpetual insurance that the United States and her neighbors, whatever their internal turmoils, shall not be diverted by external lure or pressure from their own particular and exclusive trail of their own democracy's tradition. On the other hand, even where these neighbors have blossomed into a proud and capable maturity under the priceless autonomies which the Doctrine of separate destiny has permitted and preserved, there is still a necessary reliance upon the unshifting and unshifted bases of this greatness. No institution, though it rises majestically and magnificently with the years and salutes the very heavens with its towering superstructure, can ignore the foundations, deep down in the earth, which are the indispensable guarantors of its stability. No tree lives longer than its

roots. We cannot forget—except as we criminally gamble with our inheritance—either the First or the Second Declaration of American Independence.

PART VI

**John Quincy Adams to Ulysses S.
Grant**

John Quincy Adams to Ulysses S. Grant

HAVING pursued the "Monroe Doctrine's" paralleling tradition and inspiration down the years, from its inception in 1823 to its renaissance in 1919—from its birth in protest against one foreign League, to its reiteration in restraints against another—we return to "Nationalism's" main trail; and sequence requires that we go back and pick up the route with Monroe's successor, John Quincy Adams, the Doctrine's actual architect and so consistent an advocate of the separationist theory of international relations that as early as 1793 he had been writing, under the sobriquet of "Marcellus," in support of Washington's and Hamilton's sturdy refusal to prostitute American independence to alien partialities or partnerships. Among the great names that have been associated with the Presidency, perhaps none is less intimately known and less often mentioned than that of this second Adams. He is most frequently identified as the President who left the White House to resume a seat in the House of Representatives and who died in the old hall

of the House upon a spot marked in the Capitol floor and invariably pointed out by Capitol guides. Yet John Quincy Adams served innumerable high responsibilities, always faithfully, expertly and well; he was a brilliant scholar, a skilled statesman, and a devotedly loyal "Nationalist." He deserves highly of fame, and belongs on a particularly lofty pedestal in the memories of those to whom the tradition of "Nationalism" is an adequately appreciated inheritance.

But from this second Adams, down to very recent years, foreign relations—though always important, and though repeatedly chaptered with vital considerations—were not a paramount concern with us and occupied but a comparatively small corner of the public eye. On the one hand, the European menace ceased to obtrude with imminent regularity; Europe, though still resentful of our contagious experiments in democracy, seemed reasonably resigned to our divorce without alimony. On the other hand, our internal problems—leaping toward the awful cataclysm of gigantic fratricide—began to engross our major attentions. We continued to gather in contiguous territory wherever it offered on bargain counters or battle fields until, in 1867, Seward's purchase of Alaska seemed to complete the acquisition of the last available bit of continental North America. But our interest in Europe constantly waned in proportion as the European shadow receded and our own magnified. This very lack

either of interest or contact naturally confirmed the tradition of separate destiny during these years—by sheer omission of challenge to the contrary. This does not mean that an infinity of delicate foreign interpretations and decisions was not recorded in this span—so complex a calendar, indeed, that it were folly, within the confines at our disposal, even to pretend an inventory. But it does mean that this essay is committed to one specific quest—the trail of a general tradition—and that this tradition of independence from and avoidance of European political entanglement, this tradition of utter “Nationalistic” self-determination in matters involving the character or destiny of American government, was so consistently supported, that it is only necessary to touch flying milestones as we count the intervening decades that have brought this unbroken trail down to the present hour. And lest irresistible diversions shall beckon us unduly to linger amid the romance and the color that jewel the history which flanks this trail, we shall choose largely to cling to Presidential utterances as the best authority for the interpretation of this long and honorable interval. It is as if our effort were the compilation of a road map—a “Blue Book,” if you please—to mark the shortest but the surest route between two points—yesterday and now.

Naturally President Adams, the second, subscribed to all of these traditional policies. He had supported Washington and Hamilton; he had

been the author of Monroe's pronouncement. Therefore, it is but the normal expectation to find him, in his message of December 26, 1825,¹ reiterating the admonitions of the "Farewell Address" and its subsequent Doctrine for "the emancipation of both the American continents." Four months later² he fervently amplified his discussion, directly proclaimed the latter to be the logical outgrowth of the former, and urged a Pan-American co-operation that should bring all these Western Republics into concert and harmony for the preservation of the benefits of our geographical "detachment" and our political differentiation from Europe whose "set of primary principles" still had "none or a remote relation" to our own. His difficulties with a Congress—hopelessly embroiled when the electoral deadlock had forced the presidential election into the House where Adams was unjustly accused of a "deal" with his subsequent Secretary of State, Henry Clay, to win the election—obstructed his Pan-American efforts; but he has left a clear record of his own philosophies.

Sturdy General Andrew Jackson—popular idol born of many a hard stressed battle on fields both of war and of politics—succeeded Adams in the Presidency. Whatever else he may have been, Jackson was a loyal "Nationalist" when either the solidarity of Union at home or respect for it

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. II, p. 885.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 903-904.

abroad fell into question.¹ His fidelities were implacable—and they well served one typical foreign crisis which required the positive articulations of courage to preserve the realities of honorable American independence. It all grew out of the old claims against France for “unlawful seizures, captures, sequestrations, confiscations, or destruction of vessels, cargoes or other property” during the European turmoils of the first decade of the nineteenth century. European nations found no difficulty in settling their claims against France, but the claims of the United States were treated with supercilious silence. The justice and legality of these claims were to a very general extent admitted; but the sterile years had multiplied without the slightest display of serious purpose to render settlement. President Jackson undertook to bring these evasions to a head. It would be well if the whole honorable detail of his procedure might be scheduled. But we must content ourselves with summaries. As the result of friendly but firm negotiation, a treaty was signed in Paris on July 4, 1831—once more, the significant date!—in which France obligated herself to pay \$5,000,000 upon stated and certain terms. But if the prior refusal to consent to a contract had been contemptuous of the United States, the subsequent refusal to honor the con-

¹ “The memory of that great and good man is revered by his countrymen next to that of Washington.”—Lossing’s *Eminent Americans*, p. 246.

tract when once solemnly made, added insult to injury. "Old Hickory" was not to be thus spurned. Despite his martial spirit, he wanted peace—particularly with France—"a disposition," as he declared, "founded on the most grateful and honorable recollections associated with our struggle for independence."¹ But more than peace, he wanted national honor preserved against foreign reproach—"The idea of acquiescing in the refusal to execute the treaty will not, I am confident," he declared, "be for a moment entertained by any branch of this government, and further negotiation upon the subject is equally out of the question." This followed such a persistent French refusal to make the necessary appropriations—even going to the extent of refusing a United States government draft—that Jackson was well entitled to suspect that the French posture reflected design rather than exigency. "Our institutions are essentially pacific," said Jackson to Congress. "Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our government as they are the interest of our people. But these objects are not to be permanently secured by surrendering the rights of our citizens or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or set aside. . . . It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt execution of the treaty, and in

¹ Sixth Annual Message, December 1, 1834. *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. III, pp. 1319-1326.

case it be refused or longer delayed take redress into their own hands. After the delay on the part of France of a quarter of a century in acknowledging these claims by treaty, it is not to be tolerated that another quarter of a century is to be wasted in negotiating about the payment. The laws of nations provide a remedy for such occasions. It is a well-settled principle of the international code that where one nation owes another a liquidated debt which it refuses or neglects to pay the aggrieved party may seize on the property belonging to the other, its citizens or subjects, sufficient to pay the debt without giving just cause of war. This remedy has been repeatedly resorted to, and recently by France herself toward Portugal, under circumstances less unquestionable. . . . If an appropriation shall not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, it may justly be concluded that the government of France has finally determined to disregard its own solemn undertaking and refuse to pay an acknowledged debt. In that event every day's delay on our part will be a stain upon our national honor, as well as a denial of justice to our injured citizens. Prompt measures, when the refusal of France shall be complete, will not only be most honorable and just, but will have the best effect upon our national character. . . . I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property. . . . Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and

power are too well known to expect anything from her fears. . . . She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist on their rights."

France pounced upon this declaration as a new and additional pretext for discussions which avoided consideration of the debt itself. She pretended violent umbrage—recalled her Minister from Washington and offered passports to ours in Paris—and announced, in fervid accents of injury, that President Jackson would have to "explain himself" satisfactorily. But she was dealing with an American Executive to whom not even the word "fear" or the word "cowardice" were known. Far from permitting himself either to be side-tracked from the main issue or thundered into humility, Jackson took the issue once more to Congress on December 7, 1835. He denied any alien right to censor the official communications, required by the Constitution, between internal branches of the American government—even as he denied that the communication itself was entitled to any insulting interpretations, if honestly read in the light of our rejected drafts and the accepted international code for the ultimate collection of international debts. But he particularly denied the French effort to invade his field of his own relations with his own Congress. "The principle involved in the new aspect which has been given to the controversy," said he, "is so vitally import-

ant to the independent administration of the government that it can neither be surrendered compromised without national degradation. I hope it is unnecessary for me to say that such a sacrifice will not be made through any agency of mine. The honor of my country shall never be stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth and the performance of duty; nor can I give any explanation of my official acts except such as is due to integrity and justice and consistent with the principles on which our institutions are founded. This determination will, I am confident, be approved by my constituents. I have, indeed, studied their character to but little purpose if the sum of 25,000,000 francs will have the weight of a feather in the estimation of what appertains to their national independence, and if, unhappily, a different impression should at any time obtain in any quarter, they will, I am sure, rally round the government of their choice with alacrity and unanimity, and silence the degrading imputation."

A more sterling Americanism—true to the purest traditional ideals to which the nation is dedicated—never fell from a statesman's lips. If France thought to domineer over this back-countryman from Tennessee, she was doubly confounded. The same British regiments which he defeated at New Orleans were afterwards victorious at Waterloo. Therein lay a parable which the French Court might have scanned with profit.

The ultimate eventuality may be told in a word. Great Britain intervened with friendly admonitions to her Channel neighbor. Her earnest recommendation was that France should settle—and settle quickly. And that, France did. Bespeaking the fact that Jackson, though a man of war, was devoted primarily to peace, is his public expression of gratitude to Britain for her timely mediation. “Universal respect and the consciousness of meriting it are with governments as with men the just rewards of those who faithfully exert their power to preserve peace, restore harmony, and perpetuate good will.”¹ In this beneficent climax, even as in the scorching episodes which preceded it, President Jackson was defending the finest purposes of this “Nationalistic” tradition of American independence. Though Alexander Hamilton, the master craftsman in creating the structure of this independence, would have violently differed from Jackson’s fiscal views and much of his internal political philosophy, yet he would have stood with him, back to back, in his glorious courage against external menace. Jackson was defending the Republic against a species of foreign “invasion” utterly insidious. He was keeping clear this trail of a tradition.²

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 1435.

² Jackson’s domestic “Nationalism” is vividly apostrophized in an anecdote well worthy to live forever. It is typically related of him that after Harvard had conferred its coveted degree of Doctor of Laws upon him, as he was

Martin Van Buren succeeded Jackson in the White House as the latter's personal and political choice.¹ Van Buren had been one of Jackson's most faithful lieutenants and, though perhaps more moderate and more inclined to revert to the philosophies of Jefferson whom he had zealously followed in his youth, he carried on in the Jackson trends.² His inaugural address³ declared that "we have no disposition, and we disclaim all right, to meddle in disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries, regarding them in their actual state as social communities, and preserving a strict neutrality in all their controversies." His purposes were put to severe test during a rebellion in Canada which won generous border sympathies across the line in the United States. These sympathies expressed themselves in

concluding his speech, an irreverent auditor shouted out. "You must give 'em a little Latin, Doctor." No whit abashed, the grizzled old Hickory solemnly doffed his hat, stepped forward to the front of the platform and uttered these words, fraught with meaning for all: "E Pluribus Unum, my friends, sine qua non!"

¹ "A Democratic national convention, consisting of several hundred office-holders, bowing submissively to the will of 'King Andrew,' unanimously nominated Van Buren."—Forman's *Our Republic*, p. 289.

² His inheritance of Jeffersonian antipathies is suggested by James Grant Wilson in his *Presidents of the United States*, p. 178, when he says: "Van Buren was easily startled by the red rag of 'Hamiltonian Federalism.'"

³ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 1537.

direct aid to the rebels—even “a hostile invasion actually was made by citizens of the United States in conjunction with Canadians and others, and accompanied by a forcible seizure of the property of our citizens and an application thereof to the prosecution of military operations against the authorities and the people of Canada.”¹ Invoking the principles “cherished and sacredly respected by those great and good men who first declared and finally established the independence of our own country,” Van Buren issued proclamations of neutrality² and scrupulously enforced these policies which were designed to hold us aloof from foreign collision. Conversely, when bands of Canadian invaders entered northern Maine—or that area which was still in dispute as to the international boundary—he insisted, calmly but firmly, that New Brunswick as well as Maine must consult a rule of reason, and he pushed amicable Anglo-American negotiations for such settlements as should sustain our just rights yet which should avoid the exercise of the summary powers with which Congress clothed him.

William Henry Harrison, “the Cincinnatus of the West,” who was called from his Ohio farm by an electorate which refused Van Buren a second term, survived his inauguration but thirty days. Yet he lived long enough to sustain traditions in his inaugural address.³ “Long the defender of

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. IV, p. 1703.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1698–1699.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 1847.

my country's rights in the field," said he, "I trust that my fellow-citizens will not see in my earnest desire to preserve peace with foreign powers any indication that their rights will ever be sacrificed or the honor of the nation tarnished by any omission on the part of their chief magistrate unworthy of their former glory."

The political partnership of "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" having been dissolved by death, the latter assumed the former's responsibilities.¹ "In regard to foreign nations," Tyler declared, when taking up his unexpected labors,² "the groundwork of my policy will be justice on our part to all, submitting to injustice from none; while I shall sedulously cultivate the relations of peace and amity with one and all, it will be my most imperative duty to see that the honor of the country will sustain no blemish." He clashed with Mexico over the annexation of Texas and laid the groundwork for the war which he bequeathed to his successor; but he was scrupulously careful to assure posterity that this Texas episode stayed well within the character which he ascribed to his prospective foreign policy. In repeated messages he reiterated how Texas had won her independence

¹ This slogan was used by the Whigs in the campaign of 1840. Their opponents frequently called it the "Hard Cider and Log Cabin" campaign in disparagement of General Harrison's humble birth and station.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 1890.

at the culminating battle of San Jacinto; how her status as an autonomous Republic was recognized by Great Britain, France, Belgium and the United States; how a free Texas plebescite returned an overwhelming majority in favor of annexation to the United States—a “course adopted by her without the employment of any sinister measures on the part of this government.”¹ How this “boon,” if rejected, would have resulted in a Texas quest “for the friendship of others” whom we could not countenance on our flank; and how “while all the world regarded Texas as an independent power,” it was impossible that we alone should share the vain Mexican persistence in looking upon her “as a revolting province.”² He protested to Mexico against the further prosecution of her fruitless war against Texas, and insisted that if it continued “it could not be looked upon with indifference by our own citizens inhabiting adjoining states,” and that “our neutrality would be violated in spite of all efforts on the part of the government to prevent it.”

But war with Mexico came with the next administration—that of James K. Polk, the first so-called political “dark horse” to reach the White House.³ Like Tyler, Polk was careful to engrave

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 2162.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2177.

³ Polk was a compromise between Van Buren and Cass in Democratic national convention at Baltimore in 1844.

a clean bill of American health on the record of that always debated conflict.¹ In his first

¹ That the preponderance of historical criticism puts a dubious construction on America's part in this conflict is suggested by the most cursory inquiry. "The war with the United States was a pre-concerted and pre-determined affair on the part of the ruling classes of the nations involved."—*The Mexican People*, by Gutierrez de Lava and Edgcumb-Pinchon, p. 139. "Nothing is either more true or more extensively known than that Texas was wrested from Mexico and her independence established through the instrumentality of the United States."—*Mexican War Review* by William Jay, Chap. III, p. 22. "It is said that war was forced on Mexico for slave territory; this is not true as Texas had been asked to join the Union a year before war broke out and accepted ten months before."—*The U. S. and Mexico*, by Rives, p. 656. "Our recognition of Texas was not only founded on just reasons, but was concurred in by the leading powers of Europe: Mexico deliberately launched the attack so long threatened and in every way possible forced us to take a stand."—*War with Mexico*, by Justin H. Smith, p. 311. "So far as war can be the just means of settling any differences between nations, the war of '46 was just."—*American History*, David-Seville-Muzzey, p. 250. "Polk began the war, thinking Mexico would yield at the show of force."—*History of the U. S.*, by Bassett, p. 450. "The war was really a case of a strong nation's bullying a weak one."—*History of U. S.*, by Adams and Trent, p. 296. "However unrighteous the causes of the Mexican war, it was carried on successfully by land and sea."—*New American History*, by Hart, p. 346. "The payment of \$15,000,000 to Mexico may be regarded as a sop to an uneasy conscience."—*Development of U. S.*, by Farrand, p. 300. "No occasion for war arose until it was furnished by boundary troubles due to that

annual message, December 2, 1845,¹ he paid particular attention to the attitude of other powers toward the Texas situation. His words bear particularly upon our primary concerns in this essay. "We may rejoice that the tranquil and pervading influence of the American principle of self-government was sufficient to defeat the purposes of British and French interference and that the almost unanimous voice of the people of Texas has given to that interference a peaceful and effective rebuke. From this example, European governments may learn how vain diplomatic arts and intrigues must ever prove upon this continent against the system of self-government which seems natural to our soil, and which will ever resist foreign interference." In his second annual message, he declared again

peculiar craving for territory which at this moment possessed the minds of the slave-holders."—*How the U. S. Became a Nation*, by Fiske, p. 152. "Nearly all American historians agree with General Grant who in his personal memoirs called the Mexican war 'a war of conquest against a weaker power.'"—*History of U. S.*, by Thwaites and Kendall, p. 298. "If the American administration had desired peace, it is likely that reasonable forbearance would have brought a settlement, but it was war and California which Polk wanted."—*Growth of American Nation*, by Judson, p. 288. "There are certain points of likeness between the war by the United States against Mexico and that of Great Britain against the Boer Republic—in both cases there can be little doubt that it was the stronger power which complacently contemplated war."—*Mexico*, by Chesterton, p. 172.

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 2237.

that war with Mexico "was neither desired nor provoked by the United States" and that "the wrongs we have suffered from Mexico almost ever since she became an independent power, and the patient endurance with which we have borne them, are without a parallel in the history of modern civilized nations."¹ Speaking of these prior wrongs—and emphasizing the error in expecting to escape a crisis by running away from it—he declared that "had the United States at that time adopted compulsory measures and taken redress into their own hands, all our difficulties with Mexico would probably have been long since adjusted and the existing war would have been averted."² He was indicting the "watchful waiting" of earlier decades. But, in the immediate instance, he insisted upon multiplied occasions that "though the United States were the aggrieved nation, Mexico commenced the war, and we were compelled in self-defense to repel the invader and vindicate the national honor and interests by prosecuting it with vigor until we could obtain a just and honorable peace." On July 6, 1848, laying the subsequent peace before Congress,³ he said: "The war in which our country was reluctantly involved, in the necessary vindication of the national rights and honor, has been thus terminated. . . . The extensive and valuable territories ceded by Mexico to the United States

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. V, p. 2323.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2326.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2437.

constitute indemnity for the past, and the brilliant and signal successes of our arms will be a guaranty of security for the future, by convincing all nations that our rights must be respected. . . . The great results which have developed and been brought to light by this war will be of immeasurable importance in the future progress of our country. They will tend powerfully to preserve us from foreign collisions, and enable us to pursue uninterruptedly our cherished policy of 'peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none.' "

By the terms of the peace, the United States acquired what are now the states of Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and California and the disputed areas of Texas.¹ Polk was something more than "land hungry" in these acquisitions. He was endeavoring to consolidate a compact and complete nation from sea to sea in order to minimize, on the one hand, the possible competition of foreign powers for these unattached areas, and, to forefend, on the other hand, the necessity of American objection thereto. In these respects he

¹ "Lord Aberdeen, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1844, proposed that if Mexico would acknowledge the independence of Texas, the British would oppose annexation by the United States. . . . The British peril was exaggerated by both Mexico and the United States. It seems as though Mexico depended too much on English diplomatic aid and the United States feared unduly the possibility of British interference."—Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 192. E. D. Adams' *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, p. 168.

was constructively serving the American tradition.¹

Polk's administration was signalized by another and different phase of articulating "Nationalism" and American independence. In the earliest days of the Republic we had fought the ravishment of the American flag by the hateful processes of impressment—a species of maritime abduction which left American seamen at the cruel mercy of thinly veneered piracy. We had fought it by force: we had continued to fight it by diplomacy. The accepted American doctrine upon this score was never better pronounced than by the leonine Webster who, as Secretary of State under the first Harrison and Tyler, had said: "In every regularly documented American merchant vessel the crew who navigate it will find their protection in the flag which is over them." This, too, is now a precious part of our tradition. But it remained for James Buchanan, serving as President Polk's Premier, to first announce the doctrine of "expatriation" in its fullest extent—the doctrine that naturalization in the United States not only clothes the citizens with a new allegiance but also absolves him from

¹ "Polk suspected that Great Britain harbored such designs, basing his suspicions partly on rumor and partly upon the fact that the British on the Pacific coast were acting in a mysterious manner. . . . The interests of Great Britain were opposed to the expansion of the great American Republic, and it was her policy to keep California out of the hands of the Americans by any means short of actual warfare."—Forman's *Our Republic*, p. 332.

the obligation of the old—the doctrine that an alien when once accepted into American citizenship is in full and complete possession of all the inalienable rights and endowments which this term implies.¹ It was one thing to declare that the flag, visually evident, protected the American seaman on the decks of an American ship: but it was a vastly broader thing to insist that the flag, only constructively evident, protected the American citizen—even the adopted citizen—wherever he might lawfully be. Thrilling volumes could be written upon the evolution of this brave text—a text wholly at war with the habitual Old World theory of “indefeasible allegiance,” which is to say “once a subject, always a subject.”² We can but sketch. Buchanan refused to differentiate between the rights of the natural and the naturalized American citizen. Said he: “We can recognize no difference between the one and the other, nor can we permit this to be done by any foreign government, without protesting and remonstrating against it in the strongest terms. The subjects of other countries who from choice have abandoned their native land, and, accepting the invitation which our laws present, have emigrated to the United States and become American citizens, are entitled to the very

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 276.

² In his fifth annual message of December 1, 1873, President Grant referred to this foreign practice as “the feudal doctrine of perpetual allegiance.”—*Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 4194.

same rights and privileges as if they had been born in the country. To treat them in a different manner would be a violation of our plighted faith as well as our solemn duty." Not only was this premise in clash with general Old World custom to pretend a permanent sovereignty over any original subject, but it was far from having unanimous support at home where many authorities—and many Premiers—inclined to the advocated notion that American naturalization could not protect its recipient against municipal jurisdiction in his original and native land. But if Buchanan had not persisted, the United States—destined to assimilate so many millions of aliens in its melting pot—would have ultimately become little more than a polyglot boarding house, the precise eventuality against which all modern American enlightenment and all self-preservative "Nationalism" has sternly gone on guard in the immigration bans of modern days. And it remained for Buchanan, as President, to force the issue which, as Secretary of State a decade previous, he had dared to frame. In February, 1859, Christian Ernst, who had emigrated from Hanover as a boy of eight and who had become a naturalized American citizen, obtained a passport for a visit to the scenes of his birth and, arriving in Hanover, was promptly arrested and forced into the army. Buchanan immediately and courageously faced the challenge. His Attorney-General—in an opinion which John Bassett Moore says was significantly written on

the Fourth of July¹—sustained the President's theory that it was the "natural right of every free person, who owes no debts and is not guilty of crime, to leave the country of his birth in good faith and for an honest purpose," and to choose for himself the allegiance under which he shall live. President Buchanan demanded Ernst's release. "The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized," said he, "his allegiance to his native country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad and impassable line separates him from his native country. . . . Should he return to his native country, he returns as an American citizen, and in no other character." The result was the "full pardon" of Ernst on August 20, 1859, and his "dismissal" from military service—although the Hanoverian government warned us that we either must change our views regarding expatriation or effect treaty engagements thereon to prevent a repetition of conflict between the "indefeasible allegiance" proclaimed by Old World crowns and the "inalienable independence" proclaimed by New World democracy. Buchanan was unimpressed by this admonition. A year later in his annual message of December 3, 1860,² he re-asserted that "our government is bound to protect the rights of our naturalized citizens everywhere to the same extent as though they had drawn their first breath in this country." It has

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 281.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 3172.

been a rather familiar habit to think of President Buchanan as a weak and vacillating executive—because of the timidities he displayed in compromising and temporizing with domestic secession. But he was quite the contrary in his “Nationalism” when foreign policy was the stake. His bold stand for expatriation has borne blessed fruits. The issue re-flamed during the Fenian agitation of 1866 when American citizens, natives of Ireland, were arrested in British jurisdiction for acts committed in furtherance of the Fenian movement. The cases of two such citizens, Warren and Costello by name, particularly excited American public opinion which belligerently expressed itself in hot demands for their release from British imprisonment. The House of Representatives voted a resolution demanding that President Johnson obtain the release of Warren and Costello and “their return to our flag.” They were returned. President Johnson said, in his second annual message of December 3, 1866¹: “This government has claimed for all persons not convicted or accused or suspected of crime an absolute political right of self-expatriation and a choice of new national allegiance. . . . The present seems to be a favorable time for an assertion by Congress of the principle so long maintained by the Executive department that naturalization by one state fully exempts the native-born subject of any other state from the performance of military service

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, p. 3656.

under any foreign government, so long as he does not voluntarily renounce its rights and benefits." A year later,¹ he asked Congress "to declare the national will unmistakably upon this important question."

The principle involved has been the subject of much domestic legislation. It never has been wholly accepted by foreign nations. With some—notably Britain—effectual treaties have validated the precedent for all time. With others little or no treaty progress on the question has been made. But as an American precept, it is forever a part of our traditional independence of foreign mortgage. "Our statutes do not allow this government to admit any distinction between the treatment of native and naturalized Americans abroad," declared President McKinley in his annual message of December 5, 1899.¹ "Foreign entanglements" shall no more be the rôle assigned our citizens in their individual capacities than in their composite character as the independent—wholly independent—United States of America.

Returning once more to pick up the chronological thread of this panoramic picture of a tradition's trail across the years, we find General Zachary Taylor, hero of the Mexican War, affectionately known as "Old Rough and Ready," inducted into power. He was elected on a platform which proclaimed Washington's administra-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. IX, p. 3779.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, p. 6356.

tion as its model. His administration was cut short by his death sixteen months after inauguration.¹ He faithfully defended our own neutral obligations to others, by stopping the out-fitting of German warships in New York harbor at the time of the Schleswig-Holstein war between Germany and Denmark; and equally he insisted upon the respect of our neutral rights by others. It is interesting and prophetic in this connection to find him² urging encouragement for "the authorities of the Sandwich Islands in their efforts to improve and elevate the moral and political condition of the inhabitants," and expressing the desire that "the Islands may maintain their independence, and that other nations should concur with us in this sentiment." He added: "We could in no event be indifferent to their passing under the dominion of any other power."

Taylor was followed by his Vice-President, Milard Fillmore—little known to modern generations, yet a statesman whom John Quincy Adams had called "one of the ablest, most faithful and fairest-minded men with whom he had ever served in public life." Fillmore's foreign policy, laid down in his first annual message,³ was "to maintain a

¹ "As President, he had purity, patriotism and discretion to guide him, and had he lived long enough, it would have been found that the soldier was equally fitted to be head of a government."—Wilson's *Presidents of the U. S.*, p. 243.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VI, p. 2555.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2614.

strict neutrality in foreign wars, to cultivate friendly relations, to reciprocate every noble and generous act, and to perform punctually and scrupulously every treaty obligation." Pursuant to this traditional doctrine, he publicly deplored the ill-fated expedition which set out from New Orleans, August 12, 1851, to participate in a Cuban insurrection against Spain, and warned his citizenship that such hostile and unneutral sorties could not be tolerated.¹ At the same time he warned Spain that search of vessels under the American flag, on suspicion of such participations, equally was unthinkable. In 1852 he declined an invitation from France and England to join in a tripartite convention disclaiming all intent forever to possess Cuba. But, though refusing this joint exposition, he subscribed his own belief that American annexation was forever impossible. Speaking generally of the proper American posture toward other lands, he declared that "'Friendly relations with all, but entangling alliances with none' has long been a maxim with us" and should persist as our "true mission."² These aspirations, however, were nearly wrecked upon the shoals of sentiment upon one colorful occasion.

It was during the administration of President Fillmore that internal American partialities toward a foreign cause blazed into more dangerous

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, VI, p. 2653.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2652.

flame than perhaps at any time other than when the French Revolution was communicating its virus to the American blood. The republican aspirations of Hungarian patriots, struggling for emancipation from Austrian autocracy, intrigued all the generous sympathies of the American people and inspired tremendous manifestations of feeling which ran hot and high. This Hungarian Revolution was personified in Louis Kossuth, born of a noble family but early dedicated to a passion for democracy, who became the benevolent dictator to whom the peasantry of his land entrusted the direction of their crusade. In June, 1849, President Zachary Taylor, during his brief incumbency cut short by death, had appointed "a special and confidential agent of the United States to Hungary" to inquire into the exact status of this revolutionary cause. "I have scrupulously avoided any interference in the wars and contentions which have recently distracted Europe," he said in his first annual message, December 4, 1849¹; but with the prospect of Hungarian victory, "I thought it my duty," he continued, "in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, who deeply sympathized with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared, upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations." But Taylor's hopes were vain and his prevision futile. Before

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VI, p. 2550.

his agent reached his destination, Russia had intervened in behalf of Austria; the revolution had been crushed; and Kossuth, with many of his republican associates, had taken refuge in Turkey. The American Congress, dangerously forgetful of untoward implications, voted by joint resolution March 3, 1851, that the United States should put a public vessel at the disposal of these exiles in the event they wished to emigrate to this country. President Fillmore despatched the U.S.S. *Mississippi* upon this strange errand—more creditable to the hearts than to the heads of its authors. Kossuth accepted this hospitality from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar: but there he left the *Mississippi* and detoured to London for conferences with other Hungarian exiles. From London he came to New York on his own responsibility, arriving December 14, 1851, and straightway entered upon an unreserved appeal for Hungarian revolutionary aid—speaking directly to vast American audiences which responded with wild enthusiasm. It was as if another "Citizen Genet" had come to disturb the tranquillity of our domestic concerns and our foreign contacts. Stalking boldly to the White House, Kossuth petitioned for American intervention in behalf of the Hungarian rebellion—an appeal which President Fillmore repelled with firm dignity. But Congress was less continent. He was received by both Senate and House and officially banqueted. A startling and desperate departure from traditional non-participation in Eu-

ropean affairs was speeding to hazardous denouement, when into the breach stepped Henry Clay—now a patriarchal patriot of seventy-four. He flatly refused to countenance the prevailing agitation. He refused to be swept from his moorings by these gales of mercurial passion. Finally granting Kossuth the interview which he had repeatedly sought in vain, Clay—enfeebled in body but not in mind—sturdily indicted the entire propaganda. “For the sake of my country,” said he, addressing the Hungarian agitator, “you must allow me to protest against the policy you propose to her.”¹ He emphasized not only “the grave and momentous question of the right of one nation to assume the executive power among nations, for the enforcement of international law,” but also the physical impossibility of any effectual American liaison with Hungary against Austria and Russia. He stressed the menace of American departure from its “ancient policy of amity and non-intervention” and insisted that by adhering to that policy the United States had “done more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect.” And then he triumphantly concluded in these immortal words: “Far better is it for ourselves, for Hungary, and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to our wise pacific system and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our lamp burning brightly on this Western shore, as a light to all nations, than to hazard its

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, pp. 204-205.

utter extinction, amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe." The blessed doctrine of "Nationalism"—its unanswerable appeal to intelligent, unhyphenated Americanism—never was put in more powerful phrase. Thirty years before, Clay had been impatient in his zeals for the hasty American recognition of experimental democracies south of our own equator. But the seasoned statesmanship of his maturer years bore richest fruits of emancipatory wisdom when he stood against the Kossuth contagion. Once upon a time, in a moment when one of his partisans had chided him for adherence to principle instead of party, he had coined the famous epigram, "I would rather be right than be President." That he was eternally right in combating Kossuth—despite the great republican virtues of this justly beloved Hungarian patriot—will be the well-nigh unanimous verdict of the years. He was one more sentinel upon the trail of a tradition. The Kossuth sensation waned and almost as suddenly as it had arisen. He departed from Washington without having effected a reversal in our historic policies and "the sudden collapse of Kossuth enthusiasm in high places, after his departure from the Capitol, would have been inexplicable if the open opponents of his policy of intervention had found any one to meet them on that ground."¹ It is interesting to note, parenthetically, in passing, that Secretary of State Hughes, in the administration of President

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 205.

Coolidge, in 1925, permitted the temporary entry into the United States of another high Hungarian revolutionaire, Count Karolyi, only under the explicit injunction that he should not discuss political questions during his exercise of our national hospitality.

President Franklin Pierce had his share of experiences with the axiom that "neutrality" sometimes requires a show of belligerence in order to make its pacific aspirations effectual. In his inaugural address¹ he declared that "the rights, security and repose of this Confederacy reject the idea of interference or colonization on this side of the ocean by any foreign power beyond present jurisdiction as utterly inadmissible." The Crimean War between Great Britain and Russia brought Pierce abruptly face to face with the need to practice this faith in a new direction. He tells it in his own words in his third annual message of December 31, 1855.² "It is the traditional and settled policy of the United States to maintain impartial neutrality during the wars which from time to time occur among the great powers of the world. Performing all the duties of neutrality toward the respective belligerent states, we may reasonably expect them not to interfere with our lawful enjoyment of its benefits. . . . The undeniable rights of neutrality, individual and national, the United States will under no circumstances sur-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VI, p. 2730.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2864.

render. . . . The British Parliament passed an act for the enlistment of foreigners in the military service of Great Britain. Nothing on the face of the act indicated that the British Government proposed to attempt recruitment in the United States. It was a matter of surprise, therefore, to find subsequently that the engagement of persons within the United States to enlist in the service of Great Britain was going on extensively, with little or no disguise. . . . It became known, by the admission of the British Government itself, that the attempt to draw recruits from this country originated with it, or at least had its approval and sanction. . . . It is difficult to understand how it should have been supposed that troops could be raised here by Great Britain without violation of the municipal law. . . . Recruiting rendezvous were opened in our principal cities and depots for the reception of recruits established on our frontier, and the whole business conducted under the supervision and by the regular co-operation of British officers. The complicity of those officers in an undertaking which could only be accomplished by defying our laws, throwing suspicion over our attitude of neutrality, and disregarding our territorial rights is conclusively proved. These considerations, and the fact that the cause of complaint was not a mere casual occurrence, but a deliberate design, entered upon with full knowledge of our laws and national policy and conducted by responsible public functionaries, impelled me to

present the case to the British Government, in order to secure not only a cessation of the wrong, but its reparation." Such was the situation—a bold violation of our neutrality well calculated to embroil us in difficulties with Russia with which Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy had to deal. And they dealt with it in a wholesome fashion well designed to sustain our traditions. Such British agents as could be apprehended within the United States for violation of our domestic neutrality laws were arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced. But these legal proceedings could not reach the roots of mischief in Canada and over-seas. That responsibility lay with England. Pierce tired of indecisive delays. On May 29, 1856, he notified Congress that he had dismissed the British Minister at Washington,¹ following proclamations the previous day,² revoking the credentials of British Consuls in New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati. The challenge had the desired effect. The difficulty was amicably composed. The American recruiting of British soldiers for the Crimean War ended in a general acknowledgment of America's traditional rights.

James Buchanan, whom already we have met on the international firing line of a prior administration, now climaxed a long public career by one term in the White House. Domestic affairs so monopolized his era, the country now edging its

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VI, p. 2908.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2925.

way into the ante-room of Rebellion, that little or no consequence ever has attached to Buchanan's foreign policy—despite the fact that it was under him that important treaties were consummated with Japan, and the additional fact—important for our particular purposes—that he met several delicate international episodes with a vigor worthy the traditions of his high station and his citizenship.

Another positive evidencing that the United States proposed to brook no dilution of its righteous and complete independence came under President Buchanan through the liquidation of an imbroglio—of minor immediate moment, but of major ultimate implication—with Paraguay, inherited from the administration of President Pierce. In 1853, the Navy Department sent the *Water Witch* to survey the tributaries of the Paraguay, the Parana, and the Plate—important South American Rivers. Brazil and Argentine readily gave their formal consent. After perhaps eighteen months of exploration, the *Water Witch* ran aground where the Parana forms the common boundary between Argentine and Paraguay. It was under the guns of the Paraguayan fort of Itapiru. When the American naval vessel had been hauled off, it suddenly became evident that Itapiru was preparing for action. Lieutenant Jeffers, commanding the *Water Witch*, also cleared for action—anticipating no trouble, but preferring to be ready for untoward eventualities. He stood

up the river through the only navigable channel which lay close to the fort. Hailed in Spanish which he did not understand, Jeffers immediately thereafter was saluted with a shot from Itapiru which demolished the wheel, cut away the ropes and mortally wounded the helmsman of the *Water Witch*. Jeffers directed a general return fire in an engagement which lasted several minutes, but without determinate consequences on either side. The incident was reported to Washington. Immediate inquiries were instituted. President Buchanan in his first annual message of December 8, 1857,¹ told Congress that the attack had been unjustifiable—typical of Paraguayan methods toward our citizens—"insulting and arbitrary"—and recommended a demand for "satisfaction." He added significantly: "This will the more probably be granted if the Executive shall have authority to use other means in the event of a refusal." A year later² the President reported that he was awaiting the efforts of a special Commissioner to seek amicable settlement, "if this be practicable." But again he disclosed the power he intended to use if no lesser recourse produced results. Said he: "Should our Commissioner prove unsuccessful after a sincere and earnest effort to accomplish the object of his mission, then no alternative will remain but the employment of force to obtain "just satisfaction" from Paraguay. In

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, p. 2980.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3050.

view of this contingency, the Secretary of the Navy, under my direction, has fitted out and despatched a naval force to rendezvous near Buenos Ayres which, it is believed, will prove sufficient for the occasion." That the mere gesture "proved sufficient" was immediately evidenced by its effect. Paraguay submitted formal and profound apologies, indemnified the family of the seaman killed at the wheel, and ratified a treaty of commerce and amity conceding "to the merchant flag of the citizens of the United States" the free navigation of its rivers. It was a salutary lesson—not in the arbitrary overlordship of an overbearing Pan-American neighbor, but in the inculcation of that wholesome international respect which is prerequisite to the preservation of an independent nation's rights. These are sporadic episodes which we are chronicling: yet they are the kaleidoscopic picture of an ultimate composite tradition.

Our traditional policy of neutrality was conserved by Buchanan in the Chinese difficulties of 1857 when Britain and France instituted a blockade after hostilities in the Canton River. The American Minister was directed to "occupy a neutral position"; at the same time, "to co-operate cordially with the British and French Ministers in all peaceful measures to secure by treaty those just concessions to foreign commerce which the nations of the world have a right to demand." Incidentally, Buchanan dropped a hint—in his second annual message of December 6, 1858

—of another now forgotten episode in the defense of the dignity of America's independent rights, when he observed that he did not believe American grievances were sufficiently aggravating to warrant American war on the Chinese Empire, and added: "I was the more inclined to this opinion because of the severe chastisement which had but recently been inflicted upon the Chinese by our squadron in the capture and destruction of the Barrier forts to avenge an alleged insult to our flag." One year later he was able to report to Congress that "the wisdom of the course pursued by this Government toward China has been vindicated by the event." The "course" was "neutrality"—preceded by a monitory spanking. The "event" was a treaty of peace, amity and commerce.¹

Abraham Lincoln followed Buchanan in the Presidency. Under him the gathering storms of Civil War broke in one of the epochal internecine tempests of all time. That Lincoln and his never-to-be-forgotten service met and conquered a Rebellion is self-explanation why he wrote no emphatic chapters in our foreign relations. His God-sent genius was concentrated upon home problems which had to be safely solved or there would have been no subsequent United States—proud in its strength, powerful in its unity—to perpetuate the traditions born of its birth, founda-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VII, pp. 2977, 3037, 3089, 3173.

tion and early maturity. His foreign contacts necessarily confined themselves to the adroit and sleepless efforts of Secretary of State Seward to prevent European partialities toward the Southern Confederacy. After the President had declared a blockade of Southern ports, immediately after the rupture, Great Britain—much interested in trade with these ports—recognized the Confederate States as belligerents and proclaimed herself a neutral nation. Her example was followed by most of the important nations of Europe. "In the North," says one competent historian,¹ "the action of England was resented as an evidence of unfriendliness to the United States, for it gave to Confederate cruisers the status of privateers, while it was the policy and desire of Lincoln that they should be regarded as pirates." This only intensified the efforts of Lincoln and his advisers to prevent any more pronounced continental favoritism for the Union's foes. While the story is one of frictions—some of which will appear, in their final liquidation, in subsequent administrations—the effort was, in the main, successful. Lincoln's philosophical attitude toward it all was suggested in his second annual message² when he said: "We have left to every nation the exclusive conduct and management of its own affairs. Our struggle has been, of course, contemplated by foreign nations with reference less to its own merits than to its

¹ Forman's *Our Republic*, p. 451.

² *Messages to the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, p. 3327.

supposed and often exaggerated effects and consequences resulting to those nations themselves. Nevertheless, complaint on the part of this government, even if it were just, would certainly be unwise."

But even though Lincoln's sainted Presidency was unmarked by any of the positive international expressions which particularly sustain the thesis upon which we are engaged, the tradition of self-sufficient "Nationalism" must pause at the tomb of his martyrdom with the profoundest of its acknowledgments. Behind all "Nationalism," dealing with external problems, there must be, as we have said, a solidified and undiluted "Nationalism" at home and in its internal implications. Without the latter, the former ceases to be: and though the former is the particular tradition which we are trailing, it would be unpardonable omission to neglect America's debt to Abraham Lincoln for his indispensable contribution upon the latter score. In a broad sense, he was one of our greatest "Nationalists"; and in this sense, and in his blessed name, the traditions which have made us what we are call modern generations to fidelity to them that "government for the people, of the people, and by the people, shall not perish from the earth."

After Lincoln, came the ill-starred Andrew Johnson. In reviewing America's relations with the Old World, President Johnson subscribed himself to a particularly vivid paragraph in his first

annual message, December 4, 1865,¹ when he said: "We should regard it as a great calamity to ourselves, to the cause of good government, and to the peace of the world, should any European power challenge the American people, as it were, to the defense of republicanism against foreign interference. We cannot foresee and are unwilling to consider what opportunities might present themselves, what combinations might offer to protect ourselves against designs inimical to our form of government. The United States desire to act in the future as they have ever acted heretofore; they never will be driven from that course but by the aggression of European powers, and we rely on the wisdom and justice of those powers to respect the system of non-interference which has so long been sanctioned by time, and which by its good results has approved itself to both continents." That he cherished America's traditional attitudes is indicated, in this same connection, by his prayerful thanksgiving that our position and capacities "make us singularly independent of the varying policy of foreign powers and protect us against every temptation to 'entangling alliances.'" But that he sensed a changing world was shown by his observations three years later² when he described "the duty which rests upon us of adapting our legislative action to the new circumstances of a decline of European monarchical power and influence

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, p. 3566.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3887.

and the increase of American republican ideas, interests and sympathies."

Ulysses S. Grant—passing from superb achievement upon victorious battle-fields to the highest civil honors with which a grateful Republic could acknowledge its debt—emphatically sustained the American tradition in his presidential administration. Indeed, one of the best "neutrality" summaries—its rights and, as well, its duties—ever compiled was presented by him to Congress in his message of June 13, 1870,¹ when he was standing aloof from Spanish difficulties in Cuba. "In determining the course to be adopted," said he, "the liberal and peaceful principles adopted by the Father of his Country and the eminent statesmen of his day, and followed by succeeding Chief Magistrates and the men of their day, may furnish a safe guide to those of us now charged with the direction and control of the public safety. . . . Washington inaugurated the policy of neutrality and of absolute abstinence from all foreign entangling alliances, which resulted, in 1794, in the first municipal enactment for the observance of neutrality. . . . The American policy of neutrality, important before, became doubly so from the fact that it became applicable to the new Republics as well as to the mother country. . . . It then developed upon us to determine the great international question at what time and under what circumstances to recognize a new power as

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4019-21.

entitled to a place among the family of nations. . . . Mr. Monroe concisely expressed the rule. . . . The strict adherence to this rule of public policy has been one of the highest honors of American statesmanship. . . . It has given to this Government a position of prominence and of influence which it should not abdicate." Grant called the entire roll of American precedents and brought the philosophies of the American foundation pointedly down to date. The "tradition" was as personable with him as with the Fathers who laid down the record to which he turned for guidance. On August 22, 1870, he issued a proclamation of neutrality in the war between France and the North German Confederation¹; and he later reported² in his second annual message to the Congress that he had declined an invitation to serve jointly with European powers "in the interests of peace." "Answer was made," said he, "that the established policy and the true interests of the United States forbade them to interfere in European questions jointly with European powers. I ascertained that the government of North Germany was not then disposed to listen to such representations from any power. . . . I declined to take a step which could only result in injury to our own true interests without advancing the object for which our intervention was invoked. Should the time come when the action of the United States

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. VIII, p. 4040.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4051.

can hasten the return of peace by a single hour, that action will be heartily taken."

Grant was an "expansionist," however, rather than an "isolationist." He was eager for the annexation of the Republic of San Domingo—pursuant to the feelings of "unanimity of the people" of this neighboring island. But he rested his ambitions on the same solid ground heretofore indicated. He feared their alternative affiliation elsewhere. "I believe," said he, "that we should not permit any independent government within the limits of North America to pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a European power." His effort, he declared, was "to maintain the 'Monroe Doctrine.'"¹ Congress refused to consent to his program, however, in this particular.

Throughout Grant's term, the Cuban insurrection was constantly obtruding. But though the President refused to be moved from his neutral bulwarks, he was prompt to resent, with traditional resolution, any invasion of our rights under this policy.² Indeed, his administration was chaptered with one of the most trenchant demonstra-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4083.

² "I would deal with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each other. I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding equal respect for our own. If others depart from this rule, in their dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent," said President Grant. Wilson's *Lives of the Presidents*, p. 382.

tions of our purpose to sustain without cavil that maritime element of absolute independence embraced within the rule that our ships shall be exempt from visitation and search on the high seas in time of peace. So long as the piratical practice of indiscriminate "search and seizure" existed, "freedom of the seas" could be but a myth. America had led in the proscription of such semi-barbarous trespass and had written it into reciprocal acknowledgments with the British government as early as 1858. But on October 31, 1873, the *Virginus*—flying the Stars and Stripes, and sailing under American registry—was apprehended on the high seas off the coast of Cuba by a Spanish man-of-war; diverted into the harbor of Santiago; and submitted to gross indignity. On the pretext that the *Virginus* was engaged in carrying arms and ammunition to Cuban insurgents, the entire crew was court-martialed and ordered to summary penalties. Fifty-three of her officers, crew and passengers—Americans, British and Cubans—were shot: the balance imprisoned. There was no justification in international law, by the remotest stretch of the imagination, for this violation of American rights. Washington acted with that promptness and vigor which are the usual concomitants of peace with honor. The government, under President Grant, demanded the restoration of the vessel, the surrender of the captives, a salute to the flag, indemnities for the families of the slain, and the immediate punishment of the offend-

ing Spanish officials. When it was demonstrated that the registry of the *Virginus* was fraudulent the demand for a salute to the flag was withdrawn.¹ But in every other detail Spain was held to rigid accountability—not alone because she was guilty of violating the American colors which she had no means or reason to know were improperly flown by the *Virginus*, but also and particularly because of her flagrant disregard of international law and of the specific treaties existing between Spain and the United States. It was by such purposeful demonstrations as these that the world was won to healthy respect for the independent rights which America was prepared to maintain against all trespass.

Grant's administration also saw the pacific termination of the historic friction generically known as the "Alabama Claims." It will be remembered that when young America initiated the policy of neutrality and non-intervention, it charged itself with "neutral" duties just as earnestly as it demanded respect for its "neutral" rights. In other words, it proposed to deserve equity by doing equity. The charges of Chief Justice Jay and Judge Wilson to the grand juries of their respective districts, in May, 1793, immediately after Washington's initial proclamation,

¹ "If her papers proved irregular," said Grant in his message, January 5, 1874, "the offense was one against the laws of the United States, justiciable only in their tribunals."
—*Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 4211.

bore directly upon our own "neutral" responsibility to belligerents,¹ and the government caused them to be published and circulated abroad as an exposition of our serious purpose to be neutral in fact as well as theory, and as an earnest of our good faith. For the depredations of French privateers, operating in 1793 from American bases in violation of our neutrality and in spite of our vigilance, the United States paid damages of \$143,428.11 to the subjects of Great Britain. "The amount was relatively small, but its payment, on consideration of international obligation and good faith, established a principle incalculably important, and, like the seed received into good ground, brought forth a hundredfold and even more."² In other words, this tradition of ours was born of honor and righteousness and scrupulous justice—demanding nothing in the name of independence which, under kindred circumstances, we were not prepared to yield to others. The severest test of this principle of neutral liability, as applied by us against others, grew out of the Civil War. During the Rebellion, the Queen of England issued a proclamation of neutrality on May 13, 1861, granting belligerent rights to both combatants and forbidding her subjects to take part with either. In violation of this latter prohibition, John Laird, British ship-builder, built the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, the *Georgia*, the *Shenandoah* and other vessels for the Confederacy. The

¹ Wharton's *State Trials*, p. 49.

² Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 50.

Alabama became the most famous of these pirates. Laird knew her mission—"the savage and unmanly mission which she afterwards so successfully fulfilled by special qualities of speed, to run after unarmed merchantmen, and to run away from fighting vessels of her own calibre."¹ Laird built her; manned her with a crew recruited and pensioned on Confederate account; shielded her by false pretensions that she was being fitted for the Spanish government; got her away on the assertion that she was to take a trial spin for the pleasure of a party of invited guests, including his own family. Despite the protests of the American Ministry, she put to sea, and in the course of a spectacular free-bootery was credited with having destroyed 58 vessels belonging to the Northern States and property estimated at \$6,550,000. "Had John Laird fired at every passing American vessel with cannon planted in his shipyard at Birkenhead, and brought it to, and then robbed and burned it, would it have been any more a crime than what he actually did?"² This was, in effect, the question which the government of the United States insisted upon having answered. Charles Francis Adams, representing this government in London at the time, had quietly but firmly said to Earl Russell, at the time "*Laird's Ironclads*" were being permitted to leave England upon their nefarious errands: "It would be super-

¹ Bemis' *American Neutrality*, p. 145.

² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

fluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war." And "war" it would have been if Washington had not been engrossed in the heaviest and gloomiest of its own martial crises. We had demonstrated our own meticulous good faith—despite the unprecedented pressure of domestic exigency—in the so-called "Trent" affair, when we released J. M. Mason and John Slidel, Confederate emissaries en route to Europe who had been captured November 8, 1861, by a Union man-of-war: released them at Boston because they had been taken off a British mail steamer—the "Trent"—and because Earl Russell charged it up as "an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law." In this "Trent" affair, Lincoln's Secretary of State—Mr. Seward—had acted promptly, assuring the British Minister that he was happy to defend and maintain "an old, honored, and cherished American cause." But Earl Russell was not so eager for international amenities when the shoe was on the other foot. The government of the United States insisted that the "Alabama Claims" should be arbitrated. Russell refused. But the point was implacably pressed. It was vital to the American tradition. If we were to "give" neutrality, we must "get" it—or the unilateral policy would be suicide. On May 8, 1871, an epochal treaty was signed in Washington under the American inspiration of Hamilton Fish, Grant's Secretary of State. It declared that a neutral government was bound

to use "due diligence" in the performance of its duties. It sent the "Alabama Claims" to Geneva for liquidation. It resulted in an arbitral award which found Great Britain culpable for allowing "Laird's Ironclads" to spawn in British yards and ports. It assessed damages of \$15,500,000 in gold in satisfaction of all American claims. Great Britain paid. As President Grant said in his fourth annual message December 2, 1872,¹ this decision "happily disposed of a long-standing difference between the two governments and . . . leaves these two governments without a shadow upon the friendly relations which it is my sincere hope may forever remain equally unclouded. Pacific but implacable American insistence thus produced one more powerful precedent to bulwark the traditional foreign policy which the United States had been the first to give the world, and which, by kindly but painful lessons, it was undertaking to teach to its neighbors. The "Trent" affair visualized our respect for the rights of others the "Alabama Claims" visualized the respect which we insist others shall show the traditional rights that are our own.

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. IX, p. 4139.

PART VII

From Hayes to Woodrow Wilson

From Hayes to Woodrow Wilson

CONTINUING the trail down through the Presidencies which have marked the epochs of our national development—continuing at a speed which unfortunately denies examination of all the landmarks that might profitably be consulted—we arrive at the centennial year of 1876.

The administration of President Rutherford B. Hayes was as comparatively uneventful in its foreign relations as it was perturbed by the domestic frenzies incidental to the intense faction engendered by the famous Hayes-Tilden electoral contest. But he himself was no less placid in the face of the latter than he was in the calms of the former situation. He believed in American separation from perennial European turmoil and evidenced it—upon the only necessary occasion—by neutrality in the war between Russia and Turkey. "An attitude of just and impartial neutrality has been preserved," he reported to Congress on December 3, 1877, "and I am gratified to say, as a result, that in the midst of their hostilities both the Russian and the Turkish governments have

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 4418.

shown an earnest disposition to adhere to the obligations of all treaties with the United States and to give due regard to the rights of American citizens." But Hayes did not hesitate, in 1877, when occasion warranted to make the usual and traditionally sturdy stand in defense of our own sovereignty and sanctity when the Mexican border flamed with spasmodic outrage. He took aggressive and successful action to defend American rights against Mexican marauders. He declined to confuse "non-intervention" in foreign affairs with "non-resistance" to foreign challenge—a distinction highly essential to the vitalities of this tradition which we continue to pursue. He proposed to stop border raids even at the price of following these alien despoilers back into their own lair. He ordered troops to the border and repeatedly sent them across the line after some invasion of American territory had resulted in loss of life and property. Mexico raised the inevitable voice of protest. Young Diaz was just entering upon the long career which was to make him the virtual dictator of a Republic. To an unusual degree he subsequently succeeded in the domestic disciplines which were pre-requisite to American abstention from obtruded restraints. But he had an excellent manual in the official despatch of Secretary of State William M. Evarts, who replied to contemporary Mexican protests in the following language, exactly faithful to American tradition:

¹ *Foreign Relations of the U. S.*, pp. 572-574 (abridged).

“The first duty of a government is to protect life and property. For this, governments are instituted, and governments neglecting or failing to perform it are worse than useless. Protection in fact to American lives and property is the sole point upon which the United States is tenacious. So far, the authorities of Mexico, military and civil, in the vicinity of the border appear not only to take no steps effectively to check the raids or punish the raiders, but demur and object to steps taken by the United States. The pretense that the United States are plotting or executing invasions for conquests in Mexico is fallacious and absurd. No American force ever goes over the Rio Grande except in pursuit of ‘invaders’ who have already ‘invaded’ the soil of the United States and are escaping with their booty. The United States have not sought the unpleasant duty forced upon them, of pursuing offenders who, under ordinary usages of municipal and international law ought to be pursued and arrested or punished by Mexico. Whenever Mexico will assume and efficiently exercise that responsibility, the United States will be glad to be relieved from it.”

President James A. Garfield served his high responsibilities but a few short weeks. He was inaugurated March 4, 1881. He was assassinated July 2, and died on the 19th of September. He was cut down in the prime of a masterful career, chaptered with repeated demonstrations of heroic patriotism. He had followed his country's flag, in

war and peace, with singular and striking fidelity. While he had no time to create an official record in the Presidency, his beautiful apostrophe—in his one inaugural address¹—to “the fervent love of liberty, the intelligent courage, and the sum of common sense with which our fathers made the great experiment of self-government,” leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his traditional faiths. His Vice-President Chester A. Arthur, inheriting an always difficult position, served with quiet distinction through to the completion of a pacific term.

Then came the terms of Grover Cleveland, divided by the Harrison régime. Cleveland’s relationship to this tradition which monopolizes our present study already has been emphasized in the most famous of all his foreign contacts—the Venezuelan incident. That he was a powerful and scrupulous “Nationalist” cannot be gain-said; indeed, he frequently delimited this designation to the extent of being an “isolationist.” One of his first acts was to disavow the action of an American naval commander in saluting “the revolted Brazilian Admiral”—in the Brazilian eruption of the 80’s—this being, he declared, a violation of “our fixed policy of impartial neutrality.”² On the other hand, in the same address, he reported that he had demanded—and received—Honduras’ disa-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. X, p. 4596.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 5867.

vowal of the firing upon an American mail steamer by her military authorities which had sought to stop the ship to take off a passenger in transit. Meanwhile, again in the same address, he pointed to incidental Samoan collision with Britain and Germany as illustrating "the impolicy of entangling alliances with foreign powers." And, lastly, he chronicled the collection of reparations from Turkey for destruction wrought by a Turkish mob upon the school buildings of Anatolia College, established by citizens of the United States at Marsovan. In every detail of these traditional essentialities President Cleveland was meticulously alert. He refused to take advantage of the plight of the native Queen of Hawaii—insisting¹ that a "candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States." He refused to recognize the belligerency of Cuban insurgents—though resolutions favoring this action passed both branches of Congress—and twice proclaimed our neutrality. Honesty and courage of thought were his cardinal principles and faithful "Nationalism" was his constant dedication. If he erred, it was never dereliction in seeking to maintain the great Tradition which threads this hasty inventory.

President Benjamin Harrison was similarly sturdy and similarly faithful. His generic ideas may be gleaned from his inaugural address, March

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5892.

4, 1889.¹ "We have happily maintained a policy of avoiding all interference with European affairs. We have been only interested spectators of their contentions in diplomacy and war, ready to use our friendly offices to promote peace, but never obtruding our advice and never attempting unfairly to coin the distresses of other powers into commercial advantage to ourselves. . . . We shall neither fail to respect the flag of any friendly nation or the just rights of its citizens, nor to exact the like treatment for our own. Calmness, justice and consideration should characterize our diplomacy." But President Harrison did not mis-define these attributes in the lexicon of his executive activities. "Calmness" did not become timidity; "justice" did not disintegrate into self-abnegation; nor did "consideration" make the suicidal error of drifting into the patience that lacks virtue. Among repeated evidences of his discriminations a few exhibits will suffice.

In Harrison's administration, with James G. Blaine serving as Secretary of State, repeated emergencies required repeated exercise of vigorous decisions to sustain traditional independence in all its implications. Thus jurisdiction and privileges in Samoa involved us with both Britain and Germany. Our Samoan Treaty of 1878 had given us naval rights in the harbor of Pago Pago: but during the first Cleveland administration we deadlocked with these two other powers in a long series

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XII, p. 5445.

of native frictions which a tripartite conference, arranged by Blaine's predecessor, had failed to liquidate. In January, 1889, only the sudden and fortuitous appearance of a hurricane—which destroyed every vessel in the harbor but one—prevented an open clash between American and German warships after armed Germans had seized the American flag in Apia. Another conference was undertaken, this time in Berlin, to resolve the difficulties. But Bismarck offensively and irascibly insisted upon German predominance in the settlement. Blaine tersely cabled the American negotiators: "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is not the measure of American rights." Britain supported the American view. A three-power protectorate resulted. This stood until 1899, when Britain withdrew and the United States received Tutuila free of encumbrance. Thus we entered the far Pacific. A tradition of mere physical "isolation" would thus have been broken. But the real American tradition—not "isolation" but unimpaired "independence"—lost nothing as between Blaine and Bismarck.

The "plumed knight"¹ was equally discriminating when a New Orleans mob, in 1891, lynched 22 Italians in reprisal for the Mafia's murder of the Chief of Police. The Italian Minister at Washington abruptly threatened to leave unless immediate reparation was provided. A dual issue

¹ The descriptive phrase applied by Ingersoll to Blaine when nominating him for President.

resulted: on the one hand, the proprieties of diplomacy; on the other, the American responsibility for law and order. On the latter score, Congress did not hesitate to appropriate \$25,000 for the families of the victims of mob passion. But on the former score, Blaine promptly repudiated all possibility that this act of grace should take on the appearance of concession to duress. Replying to the irate Italian Minister, he said: "I do not recognize the right of any government to tell the United States what to do. We have never received orders from any foreign power and we shall not begin now." The Minister left and the American Minister at Rome was reciprocally withdrawn ere the ultimate composition cleared the record.

At the same time, Harrison and Blaine found themselves involved with Chile. In October, 1891, a vicious assault was made in Valparaiso on American sailors from the U. S. S. "Baltimore," resulting in the death of one and the injury of eighteen. The President promptly demanded redress and in his annual message referred to the incident with emphatic stress.¹ The Chilean Minis-

¹ That President Harrison's words (*Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIII, p. 5620) were well within proprieties is indicated by consultation of their text. "On the 16th of October an event occurred in Valparaiso so serious and tragic in its circumstances and results as to very justly excite the indignation of our people and to call for prompt and decided action on the part of this government. A con-

ter resented his words and charged them with a lack both of exactness and of sincerity. But promptly he was hoist by his own petard. Neither verity nor purpose were absent, he immediately discovered, when Harrison and Blaine conserved the traditional rights and dignity of the United States in contact with foreign problems. "Nationalism" spoke with ominous and decisive calm. An ultimatum demanded that the Chilean Minister's offensive epithets be officially withdrawn; that an apology be offered; and that adequate indemnity be paid for the outrage upon the "Balti-

siderable number of the sailors of the United States steamship *Baltimore*, then in the harbor at Valparaiso, being upon shore leave and unarmed, were assaulted by armed men nearly simultaneously in different localities in the city. One petty officer was killed outright and seven or eight seamen were seriously wounded, one of whom has since died. So savage and brutal was the assault that several of our sailors received more than two, and one as many as eighteen, stab wounds. An investigation of the affair was promptly made by a board of officers of the *Baltimore*, and their report shows that these assaults were unprovoked, that our men were conducting themselves in a peaceful and orderly manner, and that some of the police of the city took part in the assault and used their weapons with fatal effect, while a few others, with well-disposed citizens, endeavored to protect our men. Thirty-six of our sailors were arrested, and some of them while being taken to prison were cruelly beaten and maltreated. The fact that they were all discharged, no criminal charge being lodged against any of them, shows very clearly that they were innocent of any breach of the peace. So far as I have yet been able to

more's" blue-jackets. "I am of the opinion that the demands made of Chile," said Harrison,¹ "by this government should be adhered to and enforced. If the dignity as well as the prestige and influence of the United States are not to be wholly sacrificed, we must protect those who in foreign ports display the flag or wear the colors of this govern-

learn, no other explanation of this bloody work has been suggested than that it had its origin in hostility to those men as sailors of the United States, wearing the uniform of their government, and not in any individual act or personal animosity. The attention of the Chilean government was at once called to this affair, and a statement of the facts obtained by the investigation we had conducted was submitted, accompanied by a request to be advised of any other or qualifying facts in the possession of the Chilean government that might tend to relieve this affair of the appearance of an insult to this government. The Chilean government was also advised that if such qualifying facts did not exist, this government would confidently expect full and prompt reparation. It is to be regretted that the reply . . . was couched in an offensive tone. To this no response has been made. This government is now awaiting the result of an investigation which has been conducted by the criminal court at Valparaiso. It is reported unofficially that the investigation is about completed and it is expected that the result will soon be communicated to this government, together with some adequate and satisfactory response to the note by which the attention of Chile was called to this incident. If these just expectations should be disappointed or further needless delays intervene, I will by a special message bring this matter again to the attention of Congress for such action as may be necessary."

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIII, p. 5660.

ment against insult, brutality, and death inflicted in resentment of the acts of their government and not for any fault of their own. . . . It must be understood that this government, while exercising the utmost forbearance toward weaker powers, will extend its strong and adequate protection to its citizens, its officers, and to its humblest sailor when made the victims of wantonness and cruelty." This display of implacable determination promptly achieved its aim. Without the necessity for recourse to force—which a less unyielding fidelity to tradition would have invited—the entire episode was honorably composed.¹

With the administration of William McKinley, himself a valiant soldier who knew the horrors of war and prayed that they might never return to plague his people, came the Spanish-American conflict which established Cuba in her own independence, thrust America into the Philippines and the far Pacific, and generally broke down whatever barriers of physical "isolation" may have been deemed theretofore to have existed. "It may be said that the most pronounced exception ever made by the United States, apart from cases arising under the Monroe Doctrine, to its policy of non-intervention, is that which was made in the case of Cuba," declares one eminent authority.

¹ "Promptness and thoroughness are characteristics of Harrison's whole career, professional and political."—Wilson's *Lives of the Presidents of the U. S.*, p. 499.

² John Bassett Moore in *American Diplomacy*, p. 205.

It would be difficult to quarrel with this conclusion. Yet the essence of this tradition which we are trailing is, after all, in no sense a matter of physical "isolation"; neither is it a proscription of rugged humanitarian enterprise when time, conditions and events conspire, within our normal spheres of contiguity, to challenge our legitimate attention. Rather, the essence of the tradition is the preservation of our absolute and untrammelled right of self-decision—free of all alien entanglement or contact or right of dictation—whenever these occasions arise: the essence is this preservation of undiluted, unhampered independence of thought and action—plus a determination that our positions, when once taken, shall be honorably and unflinchingly sustained. In this light, President McKinley did not depart from tradition; he sustained it. The doctrine of non-intervention declined partisan participation in the factional quarrels of other peoples beyond our jurisdiction. But it might be questioned whether Spanish oppressions in Cuba, under "Butcher Weyler," did not rise to a magnitude out-stripping the limits of "factional quarrels," and whether the enforced suspension of these atrocities at our very doors was not within, rather than without, our jurisdiction.

Certain it is that President McKinley was no swash-buckler rushing to war to the music of jingo tunes. Just as Grant had held us aloof during the Ten Years War in Cuba in 1868-78, and just as Cleveland had declined participation in the final

struggle—though his final message of December 7, 1896,¹ had foreseen an approaching situation “in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations”—so McKinley, a man of God-given patience as well as patriotism, sought the decisions of peace so long as honorably possible.² That, speaking parenthetically, is a part of the American tradition. With Cleveland at the White House on the evening of his inauguration, he said: “Mr. President, if I can only go out of office at the end of my term with the knowledge that I have done what lay in my power to avert this terrible calamity, with the

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIV, p. 6146.

² Cuba figured in our diplomacy as early as 1854, when the slave-holding interests of the South, under Pierce as President and Buchanan as Minister to England, reached out for the “Pearl of the Antilles.” Buchanan—along with Minister Mason in France and Minister Soule in Spain—met at Ostend, in response to the orders of Pierce, and framed what became notorious as the “Ostend Manifesto” which declared that if Spain would not sell Cuba to the U. S., “then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power.” This was not a humanitarian gesture in behalf of Cuba. It frankly was a move to “prevent it from being Africanized” independently. “This amazing piece of effrontery would have committed the U. S. to a foreign policy utterly at variance with her many pretensions of right and justice.”—Adams’ *Foreign Policy*, p. 266. “The Ostend Manifesto . . . forms one of the most disgraceful records in American diplomacy.”—Lossing’s *Eminent Americans*, p. 434.

success that has crowned your patience and persistence, I shall be the happiest man in the world.”¹ But history rushed him to a different, though no less honorable destiny. His first annual message to the Congress² announced successful enforcement of neutrality, and asked suspended judgments upon Spain pending reforms promised by its new ministry. Meanwhile, riots in Havana suggested the persuasive value of an American battle-ship in this key-harbor. The U.S.S. “Maine”—with Spain’s consent—was despatched upon this errand. Then, quickly, came two historic catastrophes. The first—the publication of a private letter in which the Spanish Minister, de Lome, spoke in insulting disparagement of McKinley and his annual message³: the second—the blowing up of the Maine at 9:40 P. M. on February 15, 1898, while lying peacefully at anchor in the harbor. The former untoward episode was closed by the prompt resignation of de Lome. But the latter never was closed until outraged American public sentiment had forced and fought a war. A Court of Inquiry promptly and unanimously reported

¹ James Ford Rhodes’ *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 41.

² *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIV, p. 6251.

³ In this letter McKinley was spoken of as a “weak bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party.”—Rhodes’ *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 49.

that the battle-ship had been "destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines."¹ The Court declared that it was unable to obtain evidence to fix the responsibility "upon any person or persons." But the country, by now tremendously inflamed, put the responsibility upon Spain and her cruel Cuban over-lords. "Remember the Maine" became the invincible battle shout of a crusade.

Events were rushing to a crisis. A congressional committee had visited the Island and reported insufferable conditions. "To me," said Senator Proctor to his colleagues, "the strongest appeal is not the barbarity practiced by Weyer, not the loss of the Maine, terrible as are both these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge." On March 29, President McKinley's ultimatum was presented at Madrid by American Minister Woodford. That, at least, is what it proved to be. Expressly disclaiming any American desire to acquire Cuba, the President "suggested" an immediate armistice lasting until October 1st, an immediate revocation of the reconcentration

¹ Thirteen years later when the wreck of the Maine was raised and minute examinations became possible, this verdict was confirmed.—House Docs., 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, No. 310.

order¹ and immediate negotiations looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents through the friendly offices of the President himself. It was a delicate hour which brooked no evasions or finesse—one illy suited to Spain's "fatal habit of procrastination."² Washington, in true reflection of the country's sentiment, was seething with the spirit of war. Even Secretary of State Day cabled Woodford that "there is profound feeling in Congress and the greatest apprehension on the part of most conservative members that a resolution for intervention may pass both branches in spite of any effort that can be made." McKinley was struggling for pacific victory; the country was crying for martial vengeance. Roosevelt, impatient for the action which he declared inevitable from the hour of the news of the Maine,³ was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Eight days after the transcendental tragedy on the bosom of Havana's bay he had ordered Dewey to Hong Kong with these instructions: "Keep full of coal; in the event of war, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."⁴ McKinley was all but surrounded with this type of belligerence, straining at

¹ Under this barbarous order all Cubans were herded into central camps for easier Spanish surveillance.

² Rhodes' *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 54.

³ *Autobiography*, p. 232.

⁴ Dewey's *Autobiography*, p. 179.

the leash. "It isn't the money that will be spent nor the property that will be destroyed, if war comes, that concerns me; but the thought of human suffering that must come into thousands of homes throughout the country is almost overwhelming," he said to Senator Fairbanks of Indiana.¹ But Spain failed to comply promptly with the American demands of March 29—although a little time might have accomplished every desired end through mediation.² McKinley reluctantly cast the fateful die. He postponed his war message to the Congress from April 4 until April 11 because of an urgent appeal from the American legation at Havana for time to insure the safe departure of American citizens from Cuba, and in the interim firmly repulsed an urgent appeal from the six ranking diplomatic officers of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy who unitedly sought further negotiation. "We must end a situation," he said to them, "the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable." On the eleventh, his ringing message went to the House and Senate. "With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace," he said, referring to the Woodford ultimatum, "and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort." Referring to the disaster which had cost the lives of two

¹ Olcott's *Life of McKinley*, p. 400.

² Rhodes' *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, pp. 61-64.

naval officers and 258 men, he said: "The destruction of the *Maine*, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressible proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there." "The issue is now with Congress," he concluded, "I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."¹ On April 19, 1898—the anniversary of the Battle of Lexington—the "action" came, and in the spirit of the Minute Men of old. The stirring resolution of Congress, signed the next day by McKinley, who having committed himself to the forward march, was eager that it should be pressed with maximum and resistless vigor, encompassed four objectives; first, that the people of Cuba "are and of right ought to be free and independent"; second, that Spain relinquish her authority in Cuba and withdraw all land and water forces; third, that the President be empowered to use "the entire land and naval forces of the United States . . . to carry these resolutions into effect; four, that "the United States disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XIV, p. 6281.

pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people." This final paragraph, faithfully observed in subsequent events, marks the resultant war as one of the loftiest purposed acts in the history of civilization. We set up the Cuban Republic without the exaction of a penny's compensation. Whatever other relationship the enterprise may bear to American tradition, it compliments the altruism of a nation which, though objecting to the arbitrary rituals of Leagues and Alliances and kindred agencies of benignant dictation, is prepared to serve human-kind in its own way and on its own initiative with a purity of dedication unmatched in any other government on earth.¹

¹ President McKinley presented the pen with which he signed this famous Act of Congress—the same pen which Vice-President Hobart and Speaker Thomas B. Reed had used in the same connection—to his confidant and friend, ex-United States Senator William Alden Smith of Michigan, who contemplates the early presentation of this historic relic to the Cuban Republic. Senator Smith was then a member of the lower House and had been a member of the Congressional Committee which had visited Cuba, intimately inventoried its horrible troubles, and reported in a fashion which inevitably calculated to stress intervention. "I was President McKinley's first caller the morning after the Maine went down," says Senator Smith, to whom this volume is dedicated. "'This means war,' he solemnly declared. 'I dread it only because I know the suffering that war entails. But we shall meet our duty, come what may.' President McKinley was a patriot of matchless courage.

Spain answered this Congressional Resolution with a formal declaration of war on April 24, 1898; and America, in turn, answered Spain with a resistless celerity which brought an honorable and triumphant peace within four months. We cannot concern ourselves with the military record—punctuated though it was with many brilliant exploits. The fighting was over in 113 days. The protocol was signed August 12, the commissioners—sensibly including three Senators on the part of the United States—met in Paris on October 1; the treaty was signed on December 10. Chief argument involved the status of the Philippines. McKinley's first thought was to take only the island of Luzon. His final thought was that we must take all or none; that the latter contingency was unthinkable because it meant either the reversion of these islands to the barbarities of Spain, or their cession to some rival power, or their premature independence without the capacity for it. Under the Treaty we took all.¹ At the same time we took title to a delicate problem which still remains upon our hands. Varied were contemporary views as to the wisdom of this course.

Three horses had been shot from under him when as a youth he served heroically in the Union armies. But he was also a man of inestimable patience—a characteristic that had been emphasized by his long and perfect devotion to his invalid wife. No finer American ever lived. No safer or sturdier Executive ever occupied the White House."

¹ Spain was paid \$20,000,000 on this account.

Varied they remain today. But Porto Rico and Guam—essential Caribbean outposts—became American territory and the Republic of Cuba was launched to freedom. The trail of the tradition widened at this point until it might have seemed almost lost in its own expansion. But, it may be said again, if, after all, the essence of the tradition is an independent right of national self-decision, unhampered by foreign influence and unentangled with foreign fortunes, President McKinley was one of the spectacular demonstrators of its self-sufficiency. Yet, physically, "the adoption of the treaty marked a turning point in our international policy; the country had assumed responsibilities that made it impossible for it to cling longer to its old self-centered habits."¹ But, politically and governmentally, we remained as distinct as ever. Wherefore, in its realities, the tradition was actually emphasised by this experience.

Many other events disclosed President McKinley's intense though practical "Nationalism." Under him Secretary Hay established the famous "open door" policy for China—accepted by Britain, Germany, Russia France, Japan and Italy—which was, in effect, our traditional neutrality expanded into Asiatic zones of commerce which "business" required us to enter but which "tradition" required us—in terms of political competition—to avoid. Under him, we dealt with the Boxer Rebellion in China in a stern yet friendly fashion

¹ Forman's *Our Republic*, p. 686.

which respected our traditional declination to interfere in Old World turmoils, yet which took energetic and effectual measures to rescue our imperilled citizens. Under him, the honor and the essence of Americanism were safe.

When dastardly assassination sent President McKinley to his honored, but untimely grave, inscrutable destiny tricked the politicians who had thought to entomb Theodore Roosevelt in the Vice-Presidency. He moved up into the higher place and straightway dominated the imagination and the thought of his age. If it was true, as he said at a banquet honoring the memory of his predecessor,¹ that McKinley was one of those "thrice-favored men to whom it was given to take so marked a lead in the crises faced by their several generations that thereafter each stands as the embodiment of the triumphant effort of his generation," it was doubly true of the rare eminence to which Roosevelt—whether in or out of the White House—was destined to rise. As the late Senator Henry Cabot Lodge once said: "He was no Greek actor with a hollow voice from behind a mask." He was always the positive, courageous, dynamic force of articulating candor—always pre-eminently genuine—always the embodiment of sagacity, faith and resolution. As an apostle of "Nationalism," he was perhaps the surest tribune since Washing-

¹ At Canton, Ohio, January 27, 1903. Reported in *Roosevelt's Addresses and Messages*, p. 100.

ton and Hamilton.¹ He believed in America—not only “America First,” but first and last: yet he lived “the square deal,” internationally as well as nationally. “As a nation, if we are to be true to our past, we must steadfastly keep these two positions—to submit to no injury by the strong, and to inflict no injury on the weak,” he declared.² “We must keep in our hearts the rugged, manly virtues which have made our people formidable as foes and valuable as friends throughout the century and a quarter of our national life.” Yet no idle, chauvinistic “boast and bluster” recommended themselves to him. He wanted his Uncle Sam neither to carry chips on each shoulder nor both arms in a sling. Said he³: “There is a homely old adage which runs: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.’ If the American nation will speak softly and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest efficiency a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far.” His motto has been paraphrased as—“Fear God and take your own part.” Yet he was essentially a man of peace. He wanted preparedness simply because he wanted national muscle equal to nat-

¹ In his book, *The Greatest American*, the author undertakes to sustain the thesis that, all things considered, the three “greatest Americans” were Hamilton, Franklin and Roosevelt.

² Speech at Waukesha, Wisconsin, April 3, 1903—*Roosevelt's Address and Messages*, p. 125.

³ Chicago, April 2, 1903. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

tional ideals; he wanted it to discourage wars upon us by others, rather than to encourage wars by us upon our neighbors. "As civilization grows," he once declared,¹ "warfare becomes less and less the normal condition of foreign relations. . . . Wherever possible arbitration or some similar method should be employed in lieu of war to settle difficulties between civilized nations." Again²: "A just regard for national interest and honor will not in all cases permit of the settlement of international disputes by arbitration; but by a mixture of prudence and firmness with wisdom, we think it is possible to do away with much of the provocation and excuse for war." Yet again³: "We desire the peace which comes as of right to the just man armed; not the peace granted on terms of ignominy to the craven and the weakling." One of his greatest achievements was his pacific triumph in bringing Russia and Japan together to terminate their war and compose a peace amid the granite hills of old New Hampshire. For these services Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize. Martens, who was an adviser of the Russians, wrote: "The man who had been represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness displayed a gentleness, a kindness and a tactfulness mixed with self-control that only a truly great man can command."⁴ Yet behind this practical pacifism was an iron

¹ Message to 57th Congress, 2nd Session—*Ibid.*, p. 358.

² *Ibid.*, p. 396.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁴ Rhodes' *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 310.

fidelity to the destiny of America and a ceaselessly unflinching determination to sustain the traditions—all of them—which made us what we are. “As long as I am President,” he declared, “the Monroe Doctrine will be lived up to. . . . Each nation has its own difficulties. We have difficulties enough at home. Let us improve ourselves; lifting what needs to be lifted here, and let others do their own; let us attend to our own and keep our hearthstone swept and in order.” Even remotely to attempt a catalog of Roosevelt’s repeated acts and utterances—all faithful to the tradition which we trail—would require a “five foot book shelf,” instead of a page or two in passing. His whole life was the personification of the “Americanism” which his living tradition bespeaks.

Roosevelt considered the Panama Canal his greatest achievement.¹ This project of bisecting the Isthmus and marrying the oceans had been a long-time dream. As early as 1848 Polk was making a treaty with New Granada for trans-isthmian transportation.² Two years later Anglo-American ri-

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 553.

² Were it not for the fact that the treaty was dictated by paramount national concerns, and validated by the spirit of the “Monroe Doctrine,” the treaty made by the United States with New Granada in 1848 might seem a departure from tradition. Under it, we assumed an obligation—later withdrawn—in the following language: “The United States guarantees positively and efficaciously to New Granada the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus. . . . the

valries over this putative enterprise resulted in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which pledged commonality of rights therein. But it was decades ere dreams came true. In 1878 a private French company obtained a concession from Colombia to dig a canal under the inspiration of DeLesseps, who had just built the Suez Canal. In 1883 DeLesseps and his adventurers actually embarked upon their futility. This renewed American interest in the problem. Under Harrison, efforts were made to loose the Clayton-Bulwer bonds which tied America's hands. Under Cleveland, a Nicaraguan canal plan was withdrawn because in contravention of these bonds. Under McKinley, Secretary of State Hay negotiated a British agreement abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer constrictions and substituting a new program. It failed of Senate ratification chiefly because, as Roosevelt—then Governor of New York—pointed out,¹ it prohibited fortification of an American canal and because it was a virtual invitation to foreign powers to a joint guarantee tending to invalidate the Monroe Doctrine. Under Roosevelt as President, a second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty accomplished the desired American release from foreign partnership, without the sacrifice of any essentialities. Then the long-time quarrel between a

United States also guarantees in the same manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.”

¹ Thayer's *Life of Hay*, Vol. II, p. 339.

Nicaraguan route and a Panama route—the old French company's rights and operations being the latter's nucleus—was resolved in favor of Panama. The Hay-Herran Treaty with Colombia followed in 1903, under the terms of which Colombia should be paid \$10,000,000 bonus and an annual subsidy of \$250,000 a year for nine years, in return for America's license to proceed. Colombia, wanting more money—and particularly hoping to postpone decision until the old French company's franchises expired when their share of the proceeds of the transaction would revert to Colombia—refused to ratify the Treaty. "Take it all in all, the action of Colombia was blackmail and aroused all the fighting qualities in Roosevelt's nature; a true convert to the Panama Canal, he determined that the Canal should there be built."¹ Panama was a land where revolutions were epidemic—in fact, in the previous fifty-three years there had been fifty-three revolutions or near revolutions.² At this particular and fortuitous moment came another.³ There can be no denial that its inspiration was the refusal of Colombia to license the completion of the great canal which was Panama's age-old aspiration—particularly with Philippe Bunau-Varilla, chief legatee of the old French company interests,

¹ Rhodes' *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 267.

² *Adams' Foreign Policy*, p. 288.

³ "The people of Panama felt they had the same sort of a grievance against Colombia as the American Colonies had against England in 1776."—Haskin's *Panama Canal*, p. 236.

openly leading the adventure for the specific purpose of creating a new government with which America might deal. But that Roosevelt and Hay connived at the revolution is a slur too often and too easily repeated by erudite historians. They sympathized—as well they might—but they did not initiate. They readily supported the new Republic—probably too readily to save the mischief of Pan-American suspicions and misunderstanding—and they thus became responsible for its maintenance. It was too much of an opera bouffe revolution to have stood up without this American support. But Roosevelt made this positive statement in his Congressional message of January 4, 1904: “No one connected with this Government had any part in preparing, inciting or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama.” When it occurred, Roosevelt recognized the new Republic and promptly made with it the Treaty which Colombia had rejected, and under it the Panama Canal was built—to the eternal credit of the United States and all concerned. Subsequent administrations—those of Taft, Wilson and Harding—sought to balance any possible Colombian umbrage by the payment of \$25,000,000 to her in liquidation of this argument about the proprieties of Roosevelt’s course, and this finally was done. To his dying day, Roosevelt protested any such confession of a stain upon the integrity of our title to the Panama Canal. To his last breath, he charged it to a continuation of that same grasping

blackmail which caused Colombia's initial rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty. This is one of those historic quarrels which will be debated so long as human emotions and purposes are submitted to analysis. But even those who think there was a cloud upon our title must now concede that, even from their view-point, it now has been removed. Meanwhile, the great canal—triumphant over the barriers of Nature, the battalions of Pestilence, and the fallibilities of Man—stands as an eternal monument not alone to its physical builders, but also to the President without whose indomitable purpose it might still be lingering among the speculations of tomorrow. It is American-built, American-manned, American-protected—a monument to constructive "Nationalism"—instead of being an entangled international partnership affair. Yet it is open to the pacific commerce of the earth on terms of absolute equality, and no world power can justly say that we have not shared the prodigal fruits or our enterprise with others. It is not only a canal between two oceans: it is a water-link in the trail of a tradition. Elihu Root was in the Roosevelt Cabinet which made the initial record—a further validation, if any be needed, of its integrity.¹ He succeeded

¹ Writing to the Colombian Minister on February 10, 1906, Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, dismissed the suggestion of arbitration in relation to the Panamanian situation in the following significant language: *Messages of the Presidents*, p. 7854.

Hay as Premier in 1905 and in this high capacity represented his President at the Third International Conference of Pan-America in Brazil in 1906. If there were any of the much-stressed Pan-American suspicions of American motive which many commentators urge as a result of the building of the canal, they were conspicuous only by their absence upon this happy occasion. If there was a disposition to resent its mooted implications, it was not evidenced by the Brazilian government's graceful compliment in christening

"The real gravamen of your complaint is this espousal of the cause of Panama by the people of the United States. No arbitration could deal with the real rights and wrongs of the parties concerned unless it were to pass upon the question whether the cause thus espoused was just—whether the people of Panama were exercising their just rights in declaring and maintaining the independence of Colombian rule. We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question. We assert that the ancient state of Panama, independent in its origin and by nature and history a separate political community, was confederated with the other States of Colombia upon terms which preserved and continued its separate sovereignty; that it never surrendered that sovereignty; that in the year 1885 the compact which bound it to the other States of Colombia was broken and terminated by Colombia, and the Isthmus was subjugated by force; that it was held under foreign domination to which it had never consented; and that it was justly entitled to assert its sovereignty and demand its independence from a rule which was unlawful, oppressive and tyrannical. We cannot ask the people of Panama to consent that this right of theirs, which is vital to their political existence, shall be submitted to the decision of any arbitra-

the building in which the Conference met as the "Palacio Monroe." And if there were any lingering Pan-American misgivings, they should have been dispelled by Secretary Root's address. He spoke for the American tradition when he declared "We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves."

There are numerous other major events that could be brought to testify to Roosevelt's uncompromising allegiance to the traditional independence of this country. But we must content ourselves with one additional external exhibit.

tor. Nor are we willing to permit any arbitrator to determine the political policy of the United States in following its sense of right and justice by espousing the cause of this weak people against the stronger Government of Colombia, which had so long held them in unlawful subjection. There is one other subject contained in your note which I can not permit to pass without notice. You repeat the charge that the Government of the United States took a collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising upon the Isthmus of Panama which ultimately resulted in the revolution. I regret that you should see fit to thus renew an aspersion upon the honor and good faith of the United States in the face of the positive and final denial of the fact contained in Mr. Hay's letter of January 5, 1904. You must be well aware that the universally recognized limitations upon the subjects proper for arbitration forbid that the United States submit such a question to arbitration. In view of your own recognition of this established limitation, I have been unable to discover any justification for the renewal of this unfounded assertion."

The Roosevelt ultimatum of 1904, carrying the American flag to the defense of an American citizen who had been kidnapped by Moroccan bandits, is an historic epic which needs but to be noted to recall it vividly to the mind of modern generations. In it, the President again exemplified that rare power of swift and courageous decision—plus a precise appreciation of the psychological authority of dramatic and spectacular action—which made him superbly unique among all statesmen. In it, too, he vividly re-emphasised the creeds of a "Nationalism" which insists that American rights—as personified in the humblest individual citizen—shall not be subordinated to any alien exigency. Ion H. Perdicaris, an American citizen, was seized by Raizuli, a famous Moroccan bandit chieftain and carried to the African hills where he was held for high ransom. He refused all demands of American Consul Gummere for his release and announced that Perdicaris would be killed if tribute was not promptly paid. It was a case where history turned back its pages for a century and reverted to the days when this Barbary Coast took toll of all civilization. On June 22, 1904, after White House consultation, Secretary of State Hay cabled this terse mandate to Gummere: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead!" The Republican national convention was in session in Chicago at the time—preparing to give Roosevelt the unanimous presidential nomination which his hold upon the American imagination emphatically

commanded; and when this ultimatum was reported to it, it thrilled with an enthusiasm beyond expression. Traditional American patriotism was touched as with a torch. Likewise, the better judgment of a barbarous Moroccan bandit responded to bared teeth. Let Secretary Hay's official diary chronicle the outcome¹: "June 23—My cable to Gummere had uncalled for success—It is curious how a concise impropriety hits the public;" "June 24—Gummere cables he expects Perdicaris tonight;" "June 25—Perdicaris wires thanks." The episode was closed; but a legend was born which will survive the ages. It was Roosevelt's belief that aggressiveness, in righteousness, was the key to pacific results. His theory "worked" in Morocco—just as it "worked" the same year when he sent the fleet to Smyrna² upon receipt of the news that the American Consul at Beirut had been assassinated. Events disclosed the fact that the attempted homicide had been unsuccessful; but the President's authoritative messengers prevented further trouble and cleared an atmosphere surcharged with grave possibilities of menace.

"Roosevelt had a wonderful brain; an indomitable capacity for work. His mistakes were few; his accomplishments many," writes James Ford Rhodes.³ "Rudyard Kipling wrote thus to Brander Matthews in 1910: "I saw him for a hectic

¹ Bishop's *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, Vol. I, p. 320.

² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

³ *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 399.

half hour in London and a little at Oxford. Take care of him. He is scare and valuable.'"¹

President William Howard Taft, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, brought to his high responsibilities a wealth of capacity and experience—not only in domestic concerns, but also in numerous critical foreign engagements in which he had participated in behalf of his predecessor. It would be difficult to conjure a President of finer integrity, loftier aims or more mollifying temper. As a result, the files of the State Department, during the four years of his regime, were blessed with numerous new treaties with equally numerous signatories looking toward the pacific amelioration of frictions, and the judicial rather than martial treatment of future controversies. International arbitration—long a favorite topic of American interest, and in no sense hostile to the traditions of "Nationalism" because it always involved voluntary action on the part of unimpaired sovereigns—took a large advance under his inspiration and that of his able Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox. While the President refused to participate in an international conference to devise remedies for conditions in the Spitzbergen Islands, except with the reservation that "this government would not become a signatory to any conventional arrangement concluded by the European members of the conference which would imply contributory participation by the United States

¹ Bishop's *Roosevelt*, Vol. LXXXVIII, p. 259.

in any obligation or responsibility for the enforcement of any scheme of administration"—a traditional reservation faithful to the best precedent—yet "in recognition of the manifold benefits to mankind in the extension of the policy of the settlement of international disputes by arbitration rather than by war,"² he was glad and proud to lead in the "important general movement on the part of the powers for broader arbitration." It was notable contribution to human welfare—and in no degree antagonistic to the most faithful conservation of the tradition with which we are concerned. On the contrary, that tradition is born of defended justice—and justice never fears to face arbitral facts in a justiciable issue. It was in the same spirit that Taft insisted³ that the "Monroe Doctrine" created under "apprehensions" which "may be said to have nearly disappeared," must not "be permitted to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations, or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States." Not John Quincy Adams himself could quarrel with this excision of sinister objectives from the curtilage of his "Doctrine's" domicile. On the contrary, correct principles—and this great tradition of ours is a body of correct traditions—grows stronger in the light of correct interpretations and correct understandings.

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVII, p. 7413.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7656.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7415.

President Taft, meanwhile, was entirely firm when dealing with the necessities for a positive assertion of the tradition's vitalities. "A citizen himself cannot by contract or otherwise divest himself of the right, nor can this government escape the obligation, of his protection in his personal and property rights when these are unjustly infringed in a foreign country," he declared.¹ The barbarities of the Zelaya government in Nicaragua resulted in the prompt termination of diplomatic relations and the effectual promise "to take such future steps as may be found most consistent with this government's dignity, its duty to American interests, and its moral obligations to Central America and to civilization."² Panama was led amply to indemnify the relatives of "the American officers and sailors who were brutally treated, one of them having indeed been killed, by the Panama police."³ Mexico, in another of its congenital flares, was faced with the mobilized forces of the government along the border. In the beginning of his term, President Taft personally went to this border and exchanged greetings with President Diaz in a spectacular entente. He told Congress he hoped this "signalized close and cordial relations" between the two countries.⁴ As events fell out, these relations proved more "close" than "cordial." Indeed, when stray bullets—from Mexican fighting across the line—fell into

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, p. 7415.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7418.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7416.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7416.

Douglas, Arizona, and wounded five Americans, it became the subject of peremptory representations to the Mexican government. The imminence of trouble soon temporarily subsided and the troops were withdrawn. But the plague only slumbered. It soon was to break out in greater virulence than ever.

In his final message of December 6, 1912,¹ President Taft presented a general "conclusion" in relation to our contacts with the world. This "conclusion" can be read with mingling emotions. One analyst might say it modernizes tradition. Another might say that it repudiates tradition as a thing out worn and archaic. In degree, as one may think upon these things, depends one's reaction. That it parenthetically seems to break the trail of a tradition is a text easily sustained. That it intends only to fit old truths to new conditions, on the other hand, might also be well argued. In either event, it contributes an important exhibit which cannot be ignored—though uttered by the President after his disastrous defeat for re-election and, therefore, of no actual authority—political "obiter dictum," as it were. Certainly it lacks the traditional spirit which has been found in most state papers of prior Presidents—and in the administrative acts of President Taft himself. We quote:

"Congress should fully realize the conditions which obtain in the world as we find ourselves at the threshold of our middle age as a Nation. We

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7790.

have emerged full grown as a peer in the great concourse of nations. We have passed through various formative periods. We have been self-centered in the struggle to develop our domestic resources and deal with our domestic questions. The nation is now too matured to continue in its foreign relations those temporary expedients natural to a people to whom domestic affairs are the sole concern. In the past our diplomacy has often consisted, in normal times, in a mere assertion of the right to international existence. We are now in a larger relation with broader rights of our own and obligations to others than ourselves. A number of great guiding principles were laid down early in the history of this Government. The recent task of our diplomacy has been to adjust those principles to the conditions of today, to develop their corollaries, to find practical applications of the old principles expanded to meet new situations. Thus are being evolved bases upon which can rest the superstructure of policies which must grow with the destined progress of this Nation. The successful conduct of our foreign relations demands a broad and a modern view. We cannot meet new questions nor build for the future if we confine ourselves to outworn dogmas of the past and to the perspective appropriate at our emergence from colonial times and conditions. The opening of the Panama Canal will mark a new era in our international life and create new and world-wide conditions which, with their

vast correlations and consequences, will obtain for hundreds of years to come. We must not wait for events to overtake us unawares. With continuity of purpose we must deal with the problems of our external relations by a diplomacy, modern, resourceful, magnanimous, and fittingly expressive of the high ideals of a great nation."

The administration of President Woodrow Wilson, destined to embrace eight of the most momentous years since Lincoln and to bring us closer to "foreign entanglements" with Europe than at any time since the War of 1812, was chaptered with such ultimate paramount concerns—which shall require subsequent attention because of their key-place upon this trail of a tradition—that its lesser difficulties nearer at home sink into comparative insignificance. Yet, were it not for the later cataclysm which shook not only America but the whole world to its utter foundations, the procession of Mexican crises which marched across the Wilson presidential career would loom tremendously large in import and admonition, and would set mixed markers—some signalling safety zones, some signalling washouts—upon this trail and deserve a special emphasis which, comparatively, must be reserved for the relatively more serious event. For four years "he kept us out of war"¹ so far as Europe was concerned: but during those four years, with a philosophy frequently

¹ The Democratic campaign slogan in the elections of 1916.

reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson, he plunged us into varying Mexican vicissitudes which ran the gauntlet between the extremes of summary combat upon the one hand and of abject pacifism upon the other. Sometimes it was an ultimatum which roused American patriotism to fever pitch: but oftener it was one more temporizing "note" which drove American sensibilities to anger. "Watchful waiting" was the President's own phrase describing the alternating processes which he mustered in meeting a variety of insufferable affronts. That he failed to protect American life and property—even within our own borders—is a statement of obvious fact. That he failed to impress Mexico with the importance of her international obligations is the result confessed by events themselves. That he won "the good will of Latin America" is claimed by some; denied by others.¹ That he conscientiously pursued a purpose which he believed to be just is a reasonable verdict. That he added drama to the story of our international collisions is an axiom. That he was a very great man—an intellectual giant—a dominating leader—an ultimate martyr to his country and his ideals just as thoroughly as though he had fallen upon a field of battle—these are indisputable entries upon the record of his public life. Even yet, we are too close to his era to give him the judicial estimate which perspective alone can yield. Certainly, however, world history is bound to take note of

¹ Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 210.

him long after it has forgotten many other Presidents. But it will not be for his Mexican policies—shifty, vacillating, indecisive, impractical, unimpressive, often fatal; nor will it be for his “Nationalism”—his eminence in serving a tradition’s faith—that he will be thus remembered.

Between Mexico and the United States there had been, of course a century of misunderstanding. Wilson’s recital of outrages upon our rights and indignities upon our honor could have borrowed Polk’s precise language of seven decades previous and been exact in its descriptions. We have heard Hayes’s vigorous protest against this same perennial perfidy and pillage. Under Porfirio Diaz, “President” by electoral conquest for seven terms, an iron hand had been relatively successful in ordering peace and decency—at the price of internal exploitations—from 1876 to 1910. Then the pent-up lava of Mexico’s suppressed volcanoes erupted revolution after revolution and poured its molten menace across the countryside, across the Rio Grande, into the United States and—figuratively speaking—into the very White House at Washington. It is a complex tale. Again we can but touch conclusions.

An insurrectionary provisional government under Madero challenged Diaz’ regime 1910–11. On May 18, 1911, peace by agreement was proclaimed, under apprehension of American intervention. An ad interim administration conducted an “honest election” on October 15, 1911, and Madero was

"unanimously" chosen President. Despite this "unanimity," Zapata stayed upon the war-path and a rival "President"—one Gomez—established himself in the North. On March 14, 1912, President Taft approved a Congressional resolution stopping the export of arms to the revolutionists. It was our traditional policy—sustaining the existing government. On February 8, 1913, General Huerta—commanding Madero's forces—deserted him. Madero was arrested, forced to resign then killed. It was not an unusual Mexican ritual. By a nice pretense of Constitutional regularities—a succession of Cabinet appointments and resignations—Huerta promptly reached the Presidency himself. He was recognized by European powers and by some of the American; but not by the United States. President Taft, with a high-minded consideration for his successor who within a few weeks would have to become responsible for eventualities, took no steps which might tie Wilson's hands. President Wilson himself promptly challenged the integrity of Huerta's claims to power.¹ Meanwhile, Carranza, on March 26, 1913, organized the Constitutionalist Army and started the next counter-revolution. He was joined by numerous bandit leaders of peon gangs.

¹ In this respect, Adams points out in his *Foreign Policy*, p. 205, Wilson differed from Jefferson and his notion that "any revolution was a popular thing and that any revolutionary government represented the people against the tyrants."

President Wilson sent former Governor Lind of Minnesota to Mexico as his "personal spokesman and representative" to attempt the negotiation of peace between factions—his specific aims, as the President explained to Congress in his address of August 27, 1913,¹ being an immediate armistice, "an early and free election," and a pledge by Huerta not to be a candidate. The mission failed. As Gamboa, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, explained in an official note, the terms were "humiliating," the demand for Huerta's exclusion were "strange and unwarranted," and this hostility to Huerta "might be interpreted as a matter of personal dislike." Yet the President was protesting that his policy was an exhibition of "true neutrality." He banned the exportation of arms to either faction and announced to Congress that there would be no peace until Huerta got out.² This was in his opening message of December 2, 1913, after Huerta had assumed dictatorial powers. "We shall not be obliged," said he, "to alter our policy of watchful waiting."

But on April 9, 1914, some sailors from the U. S. S. "Dolphin," landing at Tampico, were arrested utterly without warrant. It was so obvious an insult to our sovereignty, that they were promptly released and Huerta equally promptly apologized. Rear Admiral Mayo, commanding

¹ Moore's *American Diplomacy*, pp. 218-219.

² J. B. Scott's *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 23-29. Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 206.

the American fleet, demanded in addition a salute to the flag. Huerta refused. The United States insisted upon compliance. On April 15, 1914, Rear Admiral Fletcher arrived with the North Atlantic squadron and took possession of Vera Cruz in a battle involving numerous casualties. "We seek to maintain the dignity and the authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever it may be employed for the benefit of mankind," said the President to Congress. He asked for a declaration of war on Huerta. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, privately pointing out the impropriety of any such personal vendetta, amended the declaration to the approval of the use of armed forces "to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends," at the same time disclaiming "any purpose to make war on Mexico." General Funston with 9,000 regulars occupied Vera Cruz. The same week the ambassadors of Argentine, Brazil and Chile offered mediation which was accepted. On June 14th a protocol was signed providing for a new Mexican government, constituted by mutual agreement between Mexican factions, and forgiving any American demands for indemnities. On July 15, 1914, Huerta resigned. President Wilson succeeded in driving him from power; but he did not get the salute to the flag. Funston, having marched into Vera Cruz, marched out again.

Carranza, Zapata, Villa, Gutierrez and Obregon now quarreled for power. On June 2, 1915, President Wilson issued a public statement again warning Mexico to set its house in order or suffer the possibilities of another America intervention. It produced no composition. On October 19, we formally recognized Carranza as the most likely of pretenders. But Carranza was unequal to the tasks of pacification. Villa now took the war-path in barbarous guerilla style. Without compunction he raided the border, stole American property, killed American citizens on their own soil and under their own drooping flag. On March 9, 1916, a particularly aggravating attack on the town of Columbus, New Mexico, resulted in numerous American deaths, including some soldiers. President Wilson immediately announced a punitive expedition to capture Villa and stop his forays. Five days later it started South under General Pershing. Mexico objected to an invasion of its sovereignty. Long parleys occurred. On May 5, another band of Villistas raided Glenn Springs, Texas, twenty miles north of the border. Another American column started South in punitive pursuit. Mexico demanded "the immediate withdrawal of the American troops which are now in Mexican territory." Secretary of State Lansing replied that the United States "could not recede from its settled determination to maintain its national rights and to perform its full duty in preventing further invasions of the territory of the

United States and in removing the peril which Americans along the international boundary have borne so long with patience and forbearance.”¹ On June 22, a Pershing detachment clashed with Mexican troops at Carrizal, with several casualties. Seventeen Americans were taken prisoners—and subsequently released upon American demand. Then followed an interminable barrage of reciprocal notes. A mixed commission undertook another settlement. American interests were so helpless that they frequently resorted to the purchase of immunities by paying private tribute to bandit leaders for their protection. By now we were drifting into the World War. Our troops were gradually withdrawn—having got Villa neither “dead nor alive,” as was the initial object of a stumbling quest. Carranza established a new “Constitution” under which he proceeded to confiscate nearly everything in sight. Our accomplishments, upon the trail of a tradition, were exactly zero. It is difficult for men of strong convictions to deal judicially with the contemplation. Inevitably, it co-mingles with the influences of party politics—and shades itself in harmony with the affections or the antipathies which so positive a personality as Wilson’s inevitably invites. There are those who insist that his idealism was justified and that he merely was guilty of refusing to put the forces of the government behind America’s acquisitive

¹ Moore’s *American Diplomacy*, p. 236.

foreign investments.¹ But it is hard to assess such character to the victims of murder at Columbus and Glenn Springs. There are those who applaud his perspicacity in avoiding an intervention which would have united all Mexico against "the Yankees who had despoiled Mexico of half her national domains in 1848."² The Democratic national platform of 1916 applauded this presumption of non-intervention and the "stubborn resistance of the President and his advisers to every demand and suggestion to enter upon it." Yet it is fair to ask whether we did not actually "intervene" repeatedly, winning all the contumely but none of the utility therefrom. In the light of traditional American policy and purpose it is difficult to escape the indictment laid down by the unimpassioned mind of ex-Supreme Court Justice Charles E. Hughes, in his telegram accepting the Republican nomination for President in 1916, and declaring that the country had "suffered incalculably from the weak and vacillating course which has been taken with regard to Mexico, a course lamentably wrong with regard to both our rights and our duties. We interfered without consistency; and, while seeking to dictate when we were not concerned, we utterly

¹ "The question which confronted Wilson was the same that confronted Andrew Jackson: does the flag follow the investor?" Adams' *Foreign Policy*, p. 209.

² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

failed to appreciate and discharge our plain duty to our own citizens."

In 1920, Carranza went the way of his predecessors—counter-revolution—death. He was succeeded by General Alvaro Obregon, who seriously undertook pacification. He pensioned Villa, who thereupon disappeared from the picture. In 1924, President Coolidge despatched a special embassy to Mexico City to compose American claims, liquidate damages, and arrange adequate acknowledgment for legitimate American rights. The embassy was a pronounced success. Whether eventualities will validate its labors is still conjectual as this summary concludes.¹ Already Secretary

¹ Summarizing the immediate results of the mission, Hon. Charles Beecher Warren of Detroit, a distinguished American statesman who headed the negotiations, said to the 1925 convention of the American Bar Association at Detroit that "the practical effect" of the arrangements made and arising "from the mutual desire of both governments that justice be done," is that commissions have been instituted to liquidate "in accordance with the principles of International Law, justice and equity" any claims properly chargeable to governmental responsibility, and both governments are "committed to abide by the decisions." Said he: "Amity has made these conventions between the two Republics whose physical situation makes economic co-operation desirable and has created these High Judicial Commissions. It must be the hope of this body of lawyers believing in the rule of law within the State, and in the relations between Sovereign States, that these Judicial Agencies may, while administering justice, mark a way which will lead to that mutual helpfulness neighboring States can

of State Kellogg has had to sharply utter warning that America means business and will not be denied. It will be miraculous if these hundred years of misunderstanding have reached journeys' end. It is "traditional" that we should be in intermittent difficulties with Mexico; but it is not "traditional" that we should subordinate our independence to her vagaries.

Before leaving the crux of President Wilson's administration to a subsequent chapter, it would be unjust to neglect his fine-spirited efforts, supported by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, to encourage the peace of the world by so-called "cooling off" treaties "by which it shall be agreed that whenever differences of interest or of policy arise which cannot be resolved by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they shall be publicly analyzed, discussed and reported upon by a tribunal chosen by the parties before either nation determines its course of action."¹ Said he: "It has been the privilege of the State Department to gain the assent, in principle, of no less than 31 nations, representating four-fifths of the population of the world" to this undertaking.² It was an ambitious project—and wholly in keeping with

render each other and to that moral co-operation which is the life of the Law of Nations."

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 7907.

² "Both men hated war with an almost religious fervor, reminiscent of the days of Thomas Jefferson."—Adams, *Foreign Policy*, p. 364.

tradition because born, so far as we were concerned, of "two compounded elements, our own honor, and our obligation to the peace of the world." But the President was destined for the supreme bitterness of contact with the most terrible of all wars ere he evolved the peace program for which he will be dominantly remembered in the history not only of America but of the world.

PART VIII

Wilson, War, Peace, League, and After

Wilson, War, Peace, League, and After

WHEN a fanatical young Serbian student assassinated an Austrian arch-duke in the streets of Sarajevo in June, 1914—an event at the moment which registered on the American mind only as “one more Hapsburg tragedy”—a powder-train ignited which soon touched off the dynamite of European imperialism and intrigue, and ultimately all but piled the resulting debris into a tragic terminal upon this trail of an American tradition. The World War is still seared upon contemporary minds and consciences. In a crucible of blood and sacrifice, it all but re-made the boundaries of the earth and all but fused America in the world's amalgamated fates. Once more we must resist the temptation to turn from our specific quest and to march with the khaki-hosts who answered reveille, who sustained the flag across the seas, who wrote new and imperishable glory upon the diaries of time, and who made the independence of the United States so powerful and so self-sufficient a reality that it will never again be lightly challenged by any foreign chancellory which reckons with liability. This military record—under the

high auspices, by strange anomaly, of a "Peace President" who rose to his sublimest heights in the incomparably inspiring and unifying messages of war through which he led his people and their armies to their Armageddon—is a thing of incalculable credit. It is the monitory picture of the awful wrath of an outraged democracy. It is the eternal warning—another anomaly—that we are not "too proud to fight." But our concern, in the assessments of this volume, are with the relationships between this forward march to Old World battle-lines and the historic tradition against such enterprise. Our objective is the proof that when we crossed these treacherous seas, it was in the keeping, not in the ravishment, of this tradition. Tradition won the war. But, then, tradition almost lost the peace. Our cartography primarily must map this latter trail—demonstrating that the people of the United States, though invited to impractical, idealistic error, ultimately insisted that tradition, like the flag itself, must be unsundered.

Austria's contemptuous ultimatum to Serbia and Germany's insidious but dominating support of this obvious *casus belli*, brought cataclysmic tragedy to swift climax. Despite eternally honorable efforts by those European powers whose secret appetites required no satisfaction at the price of conspiracies in conquest, the continent burst into flame. The whole welter of age-old hates and hopes and fears—the same, identical disastrous

complex against which Washington and Hamilton had warned as being a thing apart from the motives and the aspirations of America—renewed its desperate plague. Within a few days after the German Kaiser had committed the unspeakable crime of ravishment upon unoffending Belgium—in black violation of a neutral guaranty of which he was one of the trustees—the awful lines were drawn for four and one-half years of living Hell. Germany, Austria and Turkey were at war with Great Britain, France, Belgium, Russia and Serbia—and ere armistice suspended these destructions, most of the civilized world was sleeping on its arms and burying its martyred dead. True to American tradition, President Wilson promptly issued his first neutrality proclamation on August 4, 1914.¹ It dealt with the initial belligerents. One day later, a second neutrality proclamation set us apart from the British-German clash.² Two more days, and a third neutrality proclamation dealt with Austria and Russia.³ On August 13, a fourth proclamation proclaimed American neutrality as between Britain and Austria; the following day a fifth proclamation proclaimed neutrality as between France and Austria.⁴ On August 24, a sixth proclamation dealt with Belgium and Germany; and the following day, a seventh considered Japan and Germany.⁵ On August 27, an eighth proclamation applied tradi-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 7969.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7974.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7974.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7975.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7976.

tion to our posture in the war between Japan and Austria; five days later, in the war between Belgium and Austria.¹ Thus did an unprecedented parade of American neutral mandates parallel the corresponding columns of foreign warriors as they unmasked their martial batteries. It was as impressive a demonstration of sustained American tradition as could be conceived.²

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 7977.

² That this attitude at the time had the full sanction of ex-President Roosevelt, is indicated in a significant footnote which Moore reproduces in his *American Diplomacy*, p. 441. While declaring that, when Belgium was invaded, "every circumstance of national honor and interest forced England to act precisely as she did act," and quoting in this relation passages referring to England's position as a party to the neutralization of Belgium under the Treaty of 1839, Colonel Roosevelt said: "A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to invoke our assistance in the time of their dreadful need. What action our government can or will take I know not. It has been announced that no action can be taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other. . . . We have not the smallest responsibility for what has befallen her (Belgium), and I am sure that the sympathy of this country for the suffering of the men, women, and children of Belgium is very real. Nevertheless, this sympathy is compatible with full acknowledgment of the unwisdom of uttering a single word of official protest unless we are prepared to make that protest effective; and only the clearest and most urgent national duty would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of

At the same time, not content with the mere formality, President Wilson addressed a public appeal to the citizens of the Republic. No finer state paper ever came from a presidential pen. No more robust assertion of America's traditional independence was ever uttered. "The effect of the war upon the United States," said he, "will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the spirit of true neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. . . . The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. . . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. . . . The United States must

neutrality and non-interference." *The World War: Its Tragedies and Its Lessons, The Outlook*, Sept. 23, 1914, pp. 169-170, 173.

be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. . . . My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a Nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a Nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps her fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world."¹

That final sentence, with its nobility of expression and dedication should have been graven on the very heavens of the Capitol. It would not have held us, eventually, from the firing-line—because such a Nation as President Wilson described is as implacable in self-defense as it is in avoiding unwarrantable quarrel. But it would have saved subsequent diplomatic tragedies which resulted from attempted covenants that negatived every element of this apostrophe in its letter and its spirit.

That the country, shaken to its ethnic roots by this red panorama over-seas, could not quell its competitive internal partialities, was probably inevitable. The President coined a word to fit their status—"hyphenated citizens"; and when, event-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 7978.

ually, the government itself had traded neutrality for belligerence, the country coined another phrase—since then too often parodied—to stigmatize those who still bisected their allegiance. They were less than “100% Americans.” But America’s official policy undertook to be scrupulously faithful to the neutrality which its government had proclaimed in multiple.

But it also was inevitable—because history recorded no exemption from such frictions—that our status of neutrality should prove difficult to preserve from impeachment by the belligerents themselves. All the delicate complexities of commercial interpretations—the whole gamut of the maritime rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas—were bound to raise tinder-issues chiefly involving the United States as the greatest free market left in the world. Discriminations were bound to be suspected even where none proved to exist. The United States announced that it would act under the existing rules of international law and in harmony with its existing treaties. It purposed the pursuit of its traditional independence—no favorites—a square deal and its own unhampered right to uninterrupted commerce in non-contraband. But the world’s eruption was too great. We soon had to choose between surrender of this right and surrender of the independence out of which it grew. The story can be but set down as in an index. Space forbids tarrying with particulars.

Britain delimited the North Sea as a "military area" and practically closed it to neutral commerce. Germany retaliated in February, 1915, setting off the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as a "war zone" wherein every enemy merchant-ship would be destroyed, "even if it may not be possible always to save their crews and passengers," and even neutral ships would be in kindred danger—plain notice that international law was soon to be submarined. President Wilson despatched protests to England, France, and Germany, dealing with the interruption of neutral maritime commerce. The German submarine being the deadliest offender, and the German threat being the one of actual challenge to established rote, the note to Germany was sharp and pointed. If German war vessels should "destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens," it flatly was announced, "the government of the United States would be constrained to hold the imperial government of Germany to a strict accountability . . . and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."¹ There was an interchange of communications, but Germany did not desist. With colossal impudence, the German Ambassador at Washington published a warning to all prospective passengers not to sail on the

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8056.

"Lusitania"—about to leave the harbor of New York. A more insulting piece of business was not credited even to Citizen Genet. On May 7, 1915, the "Lusitania" was torpedoed and sunk without warning off the coast of Ireland. Over 100 American citizens lost their lives. It was as cruel an act of wanton piracy as ever disgraced alleged civilization. No German protestations that the "Lusitania" carried contraband could excuse the summary fiendishness with which her helpless, innocent, neutral, non-combatant passengers were sent like plummets to the ocean's floor. After this wholesale murder—obviously scheduled with exact official knowledge, as witness the German Ambassador's warning—it was easy for Americans to believe any charges of atrocity that were ever subsequently leveled at "the Hun." There was a heavy clamor for an immediate declaration of war in the United States. Indeed, it might not be an exaggeration to say that the shot which sank the "Lusitania" was the shot that sounded the beginning of the German end.

The President still wanted peace—if honorably possible. Indeed, this same week, he issued further neutrality proclamations, Italy by now having entered the equation. On May, 13, 1915, he demanded Berlin's disavowal of the sinking of the "Lusitania," reparation for the injury inflicted, and immediate guaranty against recurrence. "The imperial German government," said he, "will not expect the government of the United States to omit

any word or act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.”¹ The German reply expressed sorrow for the loss of American lives, but argued justification for the attack. A second time the President sounded his demands—this time with such decisiveness that Secretary of State Bryan, who had declared that so long as he was Secretary, the country would not engage in war, resigned.² Yet a third note asked for acceptable action—lest Germany appear “deliberately unfriendly.” There was momentary break in these gathering clouds when Germany gave assurances that “liners will not be sunk without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.” But it was only the calm before the storm.

In March, 1916, the “Sussex”—an unarmed vessel—was torpedoed in the English Channel and several Americans lost their lives. Germany immediately was notified that only “immediate abandonment” of its submarine methods could prevent the severance of diplomatic relations. Congress was advised of conditions in a special message, April 19, 1916. Speaking of his ultimatum, he said: “We owe it to a due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a repre-

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8064.

² Forman's *Our Republic*, p. 770.

sentative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now and with the utmost solemnity and firmness.”¹ The result was another temporary diplomatic victory in which Germany agreed to abide the established rules of international law, but insisted that her enemies must be held to equal accountability. This the President was constantly endeavoring to do—although the situations lacked parity because in all these latter controversies the British government constantly emphasized the distinction between acts affecting “life” and those affecting “property.”² Meanwhile, that the President was sturdily faithful to traditional American principles was evidenced by his protest against the “McLemore Resolution,” through which the American Congress practically would have warned American travelers off the belligerent seas. “To forbid our people,” he declared, “to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. . . . Once accept a single abatement of right and many more humiliations would follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands, piece by piece.”

In December, 1916, after his re-election, President Wilson essayed the rôle of peace-maker, but to no avail. Here it was that he said the war must end in “peace without victory”—as he reported

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8124.

² Moore's *American Diplomacy*, p. 80.

in a special message to Congress, January 22, 1917.¹ But neither belligerent was ready for so substantial a surrender. On the contrary, war now sped forward under new impulse and acceleration. It was in this January message that the President first broached the nucleus of a "covenant of co-operative peace"—undoubtedly he had his eventual League of Nations in mind; but there was to be much shedding of much more blood ere any phase of peace could enjoy receptive consideration. Indeed, within nine days of the delivery of this optimistic, idealistic message, Germany announced the most insufferably insulting of all its tyrannical bans. Vast areas of the sea were proscribed, as if Neptune himself were a pro-consul of the Kaiser's. All merchantmen, both belligerent and neutral, within this zone were to be sunk without warning except that one American ship would be allowed to pass through the zone each week, provided that it clung to a designated lane, was marked with zebra stripes, and bore no contraband. The exception was worse than the contemptuous rule itself because its acceptance or observation by America would be the abject subordination of our sovereign rights to the whim and exigency of an alien overlord. Any such surrender would have marked the miserable end not only of the particular tradition which we trail, but also of the whole body of tradition which constitutes the priceless inheritance of the people of the United States. On

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8199.

February 3, 1917, diplomatic relations with Germany were severed. On February 26, the President asked Congress for authority to use armed vessels to protect American rights.¹ Then came publication of the news that Germany was offering Mexico and Japan a partition of the United States as a reward for turning upon us in the event that we forsook neutrality. "I have the honor to state that the government is in possession of evidence which establishes the fact that the note published in the public press is authentic," Robert Lansing, now Secretary of State, reported to Congress.² It was the last straw for both public and private patience. On April 2, 1917, abandoning all further hopes of peace, the President personally appeared before the Congress upon an historic evening which will never leave the memories of those assembled and asked for war. On April 6, 1917, the Act of War was completed and declared.³

¹ *Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8209.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8216.

³ It should not be inferred that there were not American controversies with other foreign governments during this trying period. There were many. Indeed, the United States found itself between two fires of competitive proscriptions highly reminiscent of the Franco-British quarrel under which we suffered a century before. But the questions with Britain were essentially questions of law interpretation and questions of alleged violation of property rights. They were not questions of murder and they thus did not involve problems—as in the German case—which cost human lives for which ultimate money damages could never pay.

And, thus, for the first time in the story of this New World, the Republic prepared to join issue on foreign soil and send its troops across the sea.

But it was no abandonment of American tradition to take this portentous step. On the contrary, if this tradition means the rigid maintenance of American independence, it must mean the maintenance, the protection, the preservation of that independence against every challenge which cannot honorably be avoided or composed. If it is a tradition of self-sufficient peace, it must, if needs be, recommend war for the sake of ultimate pacific realities. If it is a tradition of defended citizenship, it must be a tradition that is ready for whatever consequence this defense entails. If it is a tradition of "Nationalism," it must be a tradition which holds "Nationalism" inviolate—at any cost—against invasion or infraction. Entering upon this common war, we did not assume "entangling alliances" committing us to arbitrary eventualities. As a matter of fact, President Wilson's own aspiration, early conceived, to be the great peace-maker when a propitious hour should arrive, never could have been even remotely contemplated except as our traditional policy of non-alliance and non-entanglements with Europe had given us an independent vantage. His highest peace hopes, as he looked forward to the eventual composition, were born of our political "isolation"—a thing, let it be said again, entirely different from geographical or other physical "isolations." Ambassador Walter Hines

Page wrote from London as early as August 2, 1914¹—"Ours is the only great government in the world that is not in some way entangled: how wise our no-alliance policy is!" If the peace which President Wilson ultimately organized undertook to set this "no-alliance policy" at nought, nevertheless, the opportunity which he enjoyed to make his eventual program dominant at Paris was born of the precise "no-alliance policy" thus deserted. We were not even of the "Grand Alliance." We were independent co-operators—acting on our own volition, committed to our own intents. We were not "taking sides" in European quarrels. We were not even launching an altruistic crusade to "make the world safe for democracy" or "to end all war"—though these collateral aspirations later became subjects of unremitting stress. There was one reason, and one reason only, why we made our declaration and took up the sword—and that one reason was the defense of violated American independence and the legitimate security of American life and property thereunder. It is manifest that if these rights had not been ruthlessly and persistently violated, we would not have entered the war. It is obvious that President Wilson himself was eager to postpone the hour of fateful decision, and that he would have leaped to the embrace of any honorable alternative if the Central Powers had made the slightest pretense of consideration. Upon this fundamental proposition

¹ *World's Work* for September, 1925.

there should be no mistake. It is the validation of tradition. President Wilson's address upon that solemn night—an address worthy to be bracketed, in the grandeur of its appeal and in the simple power of its expression, with Lincoln's words at Gettysburg—is its own proof of this assertion. While the President naturally emphasized the larger measure of the world-wide complex into which we were about to enter—and while he did not omit generalities addressed to such objects as the vindication of “the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles”—nevertheless, his own statement of the actual martial motive impelling us to arms, was this:

“There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are not common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life. With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragic character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my Constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war

against the government and people of the United States . . . and to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. . . . To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."

Tradition? What else is the body of those "principles" that gave America "her birth and her happiness"? Self-defense? What else is there involved in the repulsion of those who "war against the government and the people of the United States"?

In no degree would we depreciate the lofty spirit of world service which came to rest upon our standards and to occupy our hearts when once the dreadful die was cast. These other elements came rushing in to fill us with the zeals of the Crusades after war had been engaged. But, when all is said and done, the independence of the United States was our primary stake—as it should have been—and it was to defend America that "100% Americans" took up their arms.¹ If corroboration of this asser-

¹ Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin, speaking in the Senate July 24, 1919, said: "We entered the World War primarily to save the liberties and the independence of the United

tion be desired, it may be found in the President's own words uttered on Flag Day within two months after the war declaration. Said he:

"It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf.

"When they found they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance, and some of these agents were connected with the official embassy of the German Government itself here in our own Capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her, and that not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the foreign office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas, and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our

States of America, threatened by Germany, and any statement to the contrary by whomsoever made is not correct."
—Congressional Record, 66th Congress, First Session, p. 3091.

people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe."

We went to war in self-defense. We went to war to preserve our independent rights. We went to war at the behest of "Nationalism," serving a sacred tradition.¹ This emphasis is necessary if our subsequent judgments shall be justly discriminating—because the President who led us in, upon such distinct bases, led us out, two years later, into a putative peace which would have cost us these very elements which we fought to save. And that now becomes the next great milestone upon this trail which we pursue.

We have not discussed the exasperating detail

¹ Speaking to the States' Defense Council Meeting at the White House, May 2, 1917, President Wilson said: "A certain passion comes into one's thoughts and one's feelings as one thinks of . . . the opportunity that America has now to show to all the world what it means to have been a democracy for 145 years and to mean every bit of the creed which we have so long professed."—*Messages of the Presidents*, Vol. XVIII, p. 8248. The *Red, White and Blue Book*, published by the Committee on Public Information, June 25, 1917, and describing "How the War Came to America," opened by a succinct statement of fidelity to two great American traditions—avoidance of foreign entanglements and freedom of the seas. But at its conclusion it forsakes the former by its initial apostrophes to a League of Nations. *Ibid.*, p. 8282. Just before we entered the war, President Wilson told the Civilian Advisory Board of the Navy that their common objective was not "to change anything of America," but only "to safeguard everything in America." *Ibid.*, p. 8077.

of the long negotiations which ushered us to the Rhine. We have not discussed the embarrassments attendant upon our efforts to sustain the letter of neutrality—not only with Germany, but equally with England.¹ We shall not now discuss the war itself—although the “tradition” of American heroism and bravery is at least one tradition which no sane-minded person would care to deny was superbly vindicated. The trail of the particular tradition which engages us, now leads to those secret Cabinets at Versailles—after the complete defeat of the Central Powers—where President Wilson sat in person as the super-spokesman for his democracy and as one of the dictatorial quartette which proposed an arbitrary re-creation of the alignments of the earth; where he dissipated the cardinal elements of his famous “fourteen points” upon which the peace supposedly was to be composed; where he lost all precise recollection of the actual war-issue which sent us from neutrality to belligerence; where he deserted the paramount tradition which had dominated America’s foreign contacts from Washington down to the middle of his own presidential term; where he permitted untoward bargains to be driven, in return

¹ “The historian of the future is likely to agree with Ambassador Page that the role played by the United States in her diplomacy with England in the years 1914-1917 is not one of which we have any reason to be proud. . . . This is a chapter of American history which we would rather omit.” Adams’ *Foreign Policy*, pp. 372-73.

for the acceptance of his supreme theory for perpetuating peace; where, without pretense of counsel with his Constitutional partners in the American treaty-making powers, he undertook the committal of his country not only to an entangling League, but also to a frankly defensive alliance that should make us permanent sentries on the frontiers of France; where he laid the unfortunate foundation for a decade of bitter domestic politics, and for the greatest disappointment of his brilliant life. This observation, seeming harsh, aims—it should be remembered—at a specific target; namely, the fate of a tradition which the President, if he had had his way, would have terminated forever. It is not intended to deny collateral credits to this tremendous American who was spurred on by a magnificent ideal and who contributed immeasurably to the lofty philosophies of men, but who chose a form of international expression for that ideal and for those philosophies which his country was bound to repudiate unless it turned away from the fundamentals of its “Nationalism,” its complete independence, and its time-tried faiths. He envisioned a super-government—a world parliament that should legislate the disciplines of earth. Indeed, its initial framework significantly was called a “Constitution.” The President was roundly criticised for going to Paris in person—though the active heads of every major European power thus attended. He was criticised for creating an accompanying “Commission” which ignored

the Senate and was destined chiefly for the role of rubber-stamp. He was criticised for a censorship which largely closed the trans-Atlantic cables to any definite information as to the aims or the aspirations being voiced in the process of negotiation and which kept both Congress and the country in unfortunate ignorance of these events. He was criticised for encouraging false hopes in other lands by his foreign addresses stressing "self-determination of peoples." All these were moot matters which multiplied the difficulties surrounding his immediate tasks and which always will complicate the judgments of history. But this, certainly, is a statement of inexorable fact: he left the trail of American tradition in the peace-covenants he welded, and he threatened, perhaps unmeditatedly, the "self-determination" of his own United States in the theoretical emancipations which he plotted for the world. The day may come when he will be canonized for his implacable fidelity to the germ of a great idea—the close association of nations in the mutual consideration of international concerns and in the friendly eye-to-eye intercourse which makes for tolerations and for pacific contacts. But, so far as the United States and its master-tradition in foreign relations are concerned, this co-operation can be only between sovereign powers, retaining all their legitimate autonomies, unless the people of the United States shall reverse the verdict they have rendered in "solemn referendum"—President Wilson's own phrase—when

they repudiated the arbitrary bonds he forged in his labors at Versailles.

That the President had ample notice of the American Senate's intention to cling to the essentials of tradition, is evidenced by the fact that on his first trip home from Paris he was directly and emphatically apprised of Senate feelings. Indeed, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, veteran Chairman on Foreign Relations and one of the finest minds ever dedicated to this responsibility, publicly announced that 37 Senators had pledged themselves to oppose the League of Nations, as drafted, and directed the Peace Conference to separate the Treaty of Peace and the League. But the President took little count of this warning. While a few obviously necessary amendments, to cure patently unpalatable weaknesses, were conceded, the President clung tenaciously to his own uncounseled purpose, and particularly he insisted upon weaving the Treaty and the League into an inextricable unit. He was bent upon forcing the substitution of new American traditions for old. That he finally failed—where willingness to harmonize his views with dominant American thought might easily have saved him a scheme of general and legitimate international co-operation—proved that his country continues to keep to the historic trail.

When President Wilson presented the joint Treaty and League Covenant to the Senate on July 10, 1919, he said: "It was not an accident

or a matter of sudden choice that we are no longer isolated and devoted to a policy which has only our own interest and advantage for its object. It was our duty to go in, if we were indeed the champions of liberty and of right. We answered to the call of duty in a way so spirited . . . that the whole world saw at last, in the flesh, in noble action, a great ideal asserted and vindicated, by a nation they had deemed material and now found to be compact of the spiritual forces that must free men of every nation from every unworthy bondage. It is thus that a new role and a new responsibility have come to this great nation. . . . The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us in his way. We cannot turn back. We only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else."¹

Whether or not the President was denying his own words of two years previous, when his war message had disclosed us driven to reluctant combat by self-defense, may be interestingly argued. Whether he was justified in attributing the League to direct Providential imposition may be questioned by rationalists who found the pen of authorship usually in the President's own hand.

¹ Congressional Record, First Session, 66th Congress, p. 2339.

Whether a hard-and-fast defensive alliance with France, submitted as part of the Presidential plan,¹ could be properly attributed to the "dreams at birth" of a nation whose first foreign policy was the repudiation of an alliance with France is doubtful allegory. And whatever "path" it was upon which "the light streams," manifestly it was not the trail of a tradition. But let this be said, even from the critic's view-point. The President was absolutely sure, in his own mind, of the virtue and the propriety of his idea. He stood by it with a stubborn loyalty which took no counsel of expedients and brooked no compromise. Occasionally the lexicon of his defense was intemperate—as when he pilloried "contemptible quitters" who ought to be "hung on a high gibbet"²—but in the main he held to his lofty apostrophes and, with numerous of his Democratic partisans in the Senate, contributed immensely to the illuminating debates which monopolized the attentions of Congress and the country for many vivid months.

The League of Nations Covenant proved unacceptable to "traditional" Americans for several specific reasons—all, however, reflecting a refusal to subordinate legitimate "Nationalism" to emotional "Internationalism"—none bespeaking "iso-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3078.

² Discussed at length in an editorial of *The Grand Rapids Herald* reproduced in the Congressional Record, First Session, 66th Congress, pp. 5557-5558.

lation," but all demanding the traditional preservation of our traditional independence. The most serious objections challenged famous "Article X" reading as follows: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League: in case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Although every rhetorical effort was made by League defenders to soften the implications of this contract, apparently making us co-guarantors of every boundary line on earth, there was no escaping the nature of the pledge. Indeed, when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations quizzed the President at a White House Conference, this colloquy occurred:

Senator Knox of Pennsylvania: "Mr. President, allow me to ask this question. Suppose that it is perfectly obvious and accepted that there is an external aggression against some power, and suppose it is perfectly obvious and accepted that it cannot be repelled except by force of arms, would we be under any legal obligation to participate?"

President Wilson: "No, sir, but we should be under an absolutely compelling moral obligation."

This question of "legal" versus "moral" obligations speedily became an important part of the debate. It was rightly insisted that the United

States must accept no "moral" obligation to police the earth if it intended, upon occasion, to escape therefrom by appeal to "legal" literalism; equally, that we should want to escape probably the first time we were assessed for troops to help the King of Hedjas or the Pooh-bah of Siam. It was insisted that the Constitution made Congress the exclusive war-making power in the United States and that this prerogative could not be, either "legally" or "morally," sub-let in any degree to an alien parliament. The implications of "Article X" became, indeed, insurmountably objectionable—particularly when, in reply to a searching question from then-Senator Harding, the President declared that "a moral obligation is, of course, superior to a legal obligation, and, if I may say so, of greater binding force."

But this was not the only infringement upon independence and tradition against which heavily dominant public opinion slowly but surely mobilized. In a previous chapter we have discussed the emasculation of the "Monroe Doctrine." Equal objection registered against the possibility that purely "domestic questions"—questions such as those of immigration and tariff—which always had been recognized, under international law, as within any nation's sovereign autonomy, might be dragged within the jurisdiction of the League—at least to the extent of a League decision as to whether they were "domestic" and, therefore, by propriety and precedent, excluded. There was ob-

jection to the difficulties in the way of withdrawal from the League in the event of dissatisfaction—since withdrawal could be consummated, after two years notice, only if the League itself was satisfied to say that all of a nation's "international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled." The right of independent action was thus specifically impaired. There was objection to Great Britain's "six League Assembly votes" for herself and her Commonwealths, as compared with "one vote" for the United States. We list but a typical few of the antipathies. In a word, there was firm protest against the general tendency of a new international contract which should vitiate our essential independence and our traditional autonomy; which should average down American standards to meet the standards of the world; which should automatically seat us as a perpetual arbiter in the alien quarrels of alien peoples, exposing us to all the intrigue and entanglement of Old World politics; which should trespass upon numerous of our most cherished rights; and which should bind us upon the wheel of a general foreign alliance, dedicated to the ordering of peace through force rather than through justice.¹

¹ As Senator George Wharton Pepper of Pennsylvania put it, June 14, 1919, in an address before the New Jersey Bar Association at Atlantic City: "What is really proposed is that we should vest executive, legislative and judicial power for the government of the world in a voting trustee-

It would be false inference that these conclusions were not challenged. On the contrary, brilliant effort ceaselessly attempted to dissuade the country from its fears. President Wilson defended the Covenant in a tremendous pilgrimage across the country and, with his matchless power of homily and inspiration, rallied thousands upon thousands to his standards ere he was physically stricken and sank ultimately to a death which was universally mourned all round the globe. Numerous attempts were made to find a middle ground—usually through “American Reservations”—which should admit the United States to legitimate international co-operation without surrendering her traditional independence and involving her in ceaseless foreign frictions. But all failed. Neither Treaty nor Covenant were approved.

Scores of able Senatorial speeches set forth the opposition to this intrusion upon American “self-determination”—sounded the protest against leaving the trail of a tradition. It will serve our purpose to summarize but one—that of the splendid statesman and historian who was completing a lifetime of stalwart, patriotic public service as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations

ship dominated by two or three men. What we are actually contemplating is an offensive and defensive political alliance for the permanent control of international affairs, coupled with a liberal guaranty of American force to make the alliance effective and a pledge of American capital to finance the wars of the world.”

in the Upper House. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts spoke, in part, as follows¹:

"I object in the strongest possible way to having the United States agree, directly or indirectly, to be controlled by a league which may at any time, and perfectly lawfully and in accordance with the terms of the covenant, be drawn to deal with internal conflicts in other countries, no matter what those conflicts may be. We should never permit the United States to be involved in any internal conflict in another country, except by the will of her people expressed through the Congress which represents them. . . . In Article Ten the United States is bound, on the appeal of any member of the League, not only to respect but to preserve its independence and its boundaries, and that pledge if we give it must be preserved. . . . There is to me no distinction whatever in a treaty between legal and moral obligations. . . . No doubt a great power impossible of coercion can cast aside a moral obligation if it sees fit and escape from the performance of the duty which it promises. The pathway of dishonor is always open. I for one, however, cannot conceive of voting for a clause of which I disapprove because I know it can be escaped in that way. Whatever the United States agrees to, by that agreement she must abide. . . . The greatest foundation of peace is the scrupulous

¹ Congressional Record, 66th Congress, First Session, pp. 3778-3784.

observance of every promise, expressed or implied, of every pledge, whether it can be described as legal or moral. . . . The Monroe doctrine was the corollary of Washington's neutrality policy and of his injunction against permanent alliances. It reiterates and re-affirms the principle. . . . It is as important to keep the United States out of European affairs as to keep Europe out of the American Continents. . . . Whenever the preservation of freedom and civilization and the overthrow of a menacing world conqueror summons us, we shall respond fully and nobly, as we did in 1917. He who doubts that we should do so has little faith in America. But let it be our own act, and not done reluctantly by the coercion of other nations, at the bidding or by the permission of other countries. . . . Any analysis of the provisions of this league covenant brings out in startling relief one great fact. Whatever may be said, it is not a league of peace; it is an alliance, dominated at the present moment by five great powers, really by three, and it has all the marks of an alliance. The development of international law is neglected. The court which is to decide disputes brought before it fills but a small place. The conditions for which this league really provides with the utmost care are political conditions, not judicial questions. . . . Such being its machinery, the control being in the hands of political appointees whose votes will be controlled by interest and expediency, it exhibits that most marked characteristic of an al-

liance—that its decisions are to be carried out by force. Those articles upon which the whole structure rests are articles which provide for the use of force; that is, for war. . . . We are told that, of course, nothing will be done in the way of war-like acts without the assent of Congress. But as it stands, there is no doubt whatever in my mind that American troops and American ships may be ordered to any part of the world by nations other than the United States—and that is a proposition to which I for one can never assent. It must be made perfectly clear that no American soldiers, not even the crew of a submarine, can ever be engaged in war or ordered anywhere except by the Constitutional authorities of the United States. . . . The lives of Americans must never be sacrificed except by the will of the American people expressed through their chosen Representatives in Congress. . . . I believe that we do not require to be told by foreign nations when we shall do work which freedom and civilization require. I think we can move to victory much better under our own command than under the command of others. Let us unite with the world to promote the peaceable settlement of all international disputes. Let us try to develop international law. Let us associate ourselves with the other nations for these purposes. But let us retain in our own hands and our own control the lives of the youth of the land. Let no American be sent into battle except by the constituted authorities of his own

country and by the will of the people of the United States. . . . We may set aside all this empty talk about isolation. Nobody expects to isolate the United States or to make it a hermit Nation, which is a sheer absurdity. But there is a wide difference between taking a suitable part and bearing a due responsibility in world affairs and plunging the United States into every controversy and conflict on the face of the globe. By meddling in all the differences which may arise among any portion or fragment of humankind, we simply fritter away our influence and injure ourselves to no good purpose. We shall be of far more value to the world and its peace by occupying, so far as possible, the situation which we have occupied for the last 20 years and by adhering to the policy of Washington and Hamilton, of Jefferson and Monroe, under which we have risen to our present greatness and prosperity. . . . We are asked in the making of peace to sacrifice our sovereignty in important respects, to involve ourselves almost without limit in the affairs of other nations and to yield up policies and rights which we have maintained throughout our history. We are asked to incur liabilities to an unlimited extent and furnish assets at the same time which no man can measure. . . . Never forget that this League is primarily—I might say overwhelmingly—a political organization, and I object strongly to having the politics of the United States turn upon disputes where deep feeling is aroused, but in which we have no direct interest.

. . . Let us beware how we palter with our independence. We have not reached the great position from which we were able to come down into the field of battle and help to save the world from tyranny by being guided by others. Our vast power has all been built up and gathered together by ourselves alone. . . . Those policies and those rights on which our power has been founded should never be lessened or weakened. It will be no service to the world to do so and it will be of intolerable injury to the United States. We will do our share. We are ready and anxious to help in all ways to preserve the world's peace. But we can do it best by not crippling ourselves. I am as anxious as any human being can be to have the United States render every possible service to the civilization and the peace of mankind, but I am certain we can do it best by not putting ourselves in leading strings or subjecting our policies and our sovereignty to other nations. The independence of the United States is not only more precious to ourselves but to the world, than any single possession. . . . It is well to remember that we are dealing with nations every one of which has a direct individual interest to serve, and there is grave danger in an unshared idealism.¹ . . . We, too, have our ideals, even

¹ Letter from Senator Lodge to A. H. Vandenberg, Editor of the *Grand Rapids Herald*, dated July 15, 1919: "I do not know whether you were the first to propose a program of reservations or not, but certainly you have for a long time carried on a fine contest on that line. I read your

if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism. Our first ideal is our country, and we see her in the future as in the past giving service to all her people and to the world. Our ideal of the future is that she should continue to render that service of her own free will. . . . We would not have our politics distracted and embittered by the dissensions of other lands. We would not have our country's vigor exhausted, or her moral force abated, by everlasting meddling and muddling in every quarrel, great and small, which afflicts the world. Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and better and finer, because in that way alone, as we believe, can she be of the greatest service to the world's peace and to the welfare of mankind."

This great address was a paraphrase of the historic principles upon which the independence of the United States was founded and upon which, through more than a century and a quarter, it has been preserved. It breathed the spirit of the Fathers, the faith of the years, and the traditions of inherited "Nationalism." It bespoke the dominant spirit and purpose and determination and fidelity of a people dedicated to the preservation of their heritage.

articles always with the greatest satisfaction and in this one you give me a point which I shall unscrupulously steal. It is that part in which you say: 'There is a menace in unshared idealism.'"

One additional exhibit, bearing not alone upon the historic decisions of 1919, but also upon future events, is worth while. Thus, on the floor of the Senate, spoke Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, who succeeded Senator Lodge in the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee and who serves in that capacity today¹:

"I stand for the policy of this government as it has existed for 150 years; that is good enough for me. I prefer to take my chances with this Republic and the people who shall govern it and direct its policies rather than to embarrass it and entangle it with the Governments of Europe. I take this position for two principal among many reasons. Entangling alliances with Europe—I do not care what you put on paper or how beautifully you phrase your league covenants—mean war for our people about things which are of no or only remote concern to our people. It means that our young men will be called upon to suffer and sacrifice in those racial, territorial and dynastic quarrels, 23 of which are going on now. Your league will not bring peace. The causes of war cannot be removed by the mere writing of a covenant, nor can those causes be controlled by any five or nine men. The causes of war lie deep in the structure of European society, and this treaty which lies before

¹ Congressional Record, 66th Congress, First Session, p. 3143.

us has done much to perpetuate and keep alive those causes.

"I take this position for the further reason that you cannot enter this league, or any league worthy of the name, without surrendering some of the self-governing powers of the American people, without forfeiting some of the independence of this Republic. These are things, our right to govern ourselves untrammelled by foreign powers and our complete independence as a Nation, which we have always been willing to defend even with arms. I shall never vote to surrender or even jeopardize them. No one will ever have power by my vote to shape the policies or determine the course or the obligations of the United States other than the people of the United States themselves."

Congress refused to link America with Europe in any political entanglements or military alliances. In subsequent popular elections, the country, by overwhelming majorities, sustained this decision. It was the greatest and the most serious of all contests to decide whether tradition should "carry on." It was not a mandate for "isolation"—indeed, if we may be permitted a gratuitous opinion, the country overwhelmingly favors legitimate and unentangling international co-operation particularly in the expansion of international law and the liquidation of justiciable disputes in a World Court to which litigants shall come as volunteers and from which they shall depart under the compulsion of international public opinion and morality.

This sentiment was quite evident even while the League debates were going on. But the verdict of Congress and the country, while not for "isolation," was a powerful mandate for the vigilant maintenance of every essential element of American independence. It was another forward march down the trail of a tradition.

In the midst of this post-bellum conflict over the terms and contracts that should guide the peace, the country chose another President—and, in the glow of League debates and Covenant argument, it gave an unprecedented majority to one of the very Senators who had helped "make the world safe for American tradition." President Warren G. Harding was summoned to their spokesmanship. It would be idle to trespass upon the final limits of this work with the detail of subsequent history, still part of all immediate memories. Suffice it to say that President Harding composed independent peace with those powers with whom we had warred; that he exhibited high constructive statesmanship—with Secretary of State Hughes in active command of the diplomacy—when he brought the great powers of earth into concert with us not only for the mutual limitation of naval armaments, but also for the pacification of the Western ocean; and that he did these things without a suspicion of infringement upon the essential and traditional independence of the United States. He kept to the trail from first to last. He believed in a World Court—peace through justice, not through force;

and just as the Court idea is, in reality, an American conception, fought for by America at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, so President Harding proved it to be a conception in keeping with his avowed Nationalism and with the long-time record of his own party faiths. This was in a brilliant address at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in 1922. But lest there be some remote measure of unmeditated entanglement in our adherence to the World Court initiated by the League, the President and his Secretary of State proposed a clarifying declaration of purpose and reservation of unimpinged rights coincident with this adherence.¹ For the purposes of our record, it is enough to set down President Harding's own exposition of his own general views as offered to the country when he accepted his nomination.²

"The Republicans of the Senate halted the barter of independent American eminence and in-

¹The so-called "Harding-Hughes Reservations" provided that if we entered the Court we entered on condition that the entry should not involve us in any legal relation to the League of Nations nor in the assumption of any obligations under the Covenant of the League; that we shall participate on an equality with other States in the election of the Judges; that the Court statute shall not be amended without our consent; and that we shall not be bound by any advisory opinion unless we were one of the nations that asked for it.

²Speech at Marion, Ohio, July 22, 1920.

fluence, which it was proposed to exchange for an obscure and unequal place in the merged government of the world," said he, indicating the repudiated League of Nations. "Our party means to hold the heritage of American nationality unimpaired and unsundered. The world will not misconstrue. We do not mean to hold aloof. We do not mean to shun a single responsibility of this republic to world civilization. . . . We hold to our rights and . . . we mean to sustain the rights of this nation and our citizens alike, everywhere under the shining sun. Yet there is the concord of amity and sympathy and fraternity in every resolution. There is a genuine aspiration in every American breast for a tranquil friendship with all the world. . . . One may readily sense the conscience of our America. I am sure I understand the purpose of the dominant group of the Senate. We were not seeking to defeat a world aspiration, we were resolved to safeguard America. We were resolved then, even as we are today, and will be tomorrow, to preserve this free and independent republic. Let those now responsible, or seeking responsibility, propose the surrender, whether with interpretations, apologies or reluctant reservations—from which our rights are to be omitted—we welcome the referendum to the American people on the preservation of America and the Republican party pledges its defense of the preserved inheritance of national freedom. . . . I promise you formal and effective peace so quickly as a Repub-

lican Congress can pass its declaration for a Republican executive to sign. Then we may turn to our readjustment at home and proceed deliberately and reflectively to that hoped-for world relationship which shall satisfy both conscience and aspirations and hold us free from menacing involvement. . . . It is better to be the free and disinterested agent of international justice and advancing civilization, with the covenant of conscience, than be shackled by a written compact which surrenders our freedom of action and gives to a military alliance the right to proclaim America's duty to the world. No surrender of rights to a world council or its military alliance, no assumed mandatory, however appealing, ever shall summon the sons of this republic to war. Their supreme sacrifice shall only be asked for America and its call of honor. There is a sanctity in that right we will not delegate. . . . Ours is an outstanding, influential example to the world, whether we cloak it in spoken modesty or magnify it in exaltation. We want to help; we mean to help; but we hold to our own interpretation of the American conscience as the very soul of our nationality. . . . We mean to be Americans first, to all the world."

While this was couched, at the moment, in the language of a party creed, its realities reflected the full fruition of the best and the purest in all the composite admonitions and precedents of the tradition which it has been this volume's poor but earn-

est effort to trail down to date. If the trail had darkened in the fogs of "internationalism," it once more was illuminated by the high-lights of an age-old faith. Though the President's words were uttered as a partisan, they bespoke the dedication of "Nationalism," faithful to the past, confident of the future.

Death put its tragic hand upon President Harding before his work was done. Succeeding him came a quiet, modest, unperturbable New Englander who—while so unimpressive as Vice-President that he probably would have been denied re-nomination even for second place, had his Chief survived—has captured the well-nigh universal imaginations of the people in his unruffled, common sense dependabilities in the higher station which he now occupies in his own right. The character of President Calvin Coolidge partakes the atmosphere of those granite hills that gave him birth. He never shirks a rendezvous with duty. He came to his maturity in a sector of the nation which not only is rich in intimate tradition, but also believes in keeping green the laurel of these patriotic memories. It is inevitable that all worthy tradition in his keeping shall be safe. It is certain that the trail will not wander while his compass points the onward press. Already he has demonstrated his discriminations. On the one hand, he has loaned Europe those voluntary and untrammelled counsels which have pointed the economic realities of the continental situation

and produced the first "plan" promising practical liquidation of the war's inheritance of trouble. On the other hand, he has required Europe's acknowledgment of just debts to us and insisted—with firmness, yet with generosity—that there can be no emotional compromise with the doctrine that we are entitled to be paid. This is not a picture of "isolation"; but it is a picture of "independence"—and the far-flung implications of unsapped "independence" are the genius of American tradition. He, too, believes in a World Court—peace through voluntary justice, not through arbitrary force. No better gauge of his sentiments could be available than his own pronouncement accepting his presidential charge.¹

"We must remember that every object of our institutions of society and government will fail unless America be kept American. . . . I shall avoid involving ourselves in the political controversies of Europe, but I shall do what I can to encourage American citizens and resources to assist in restoring Europe, with the sympathetic support of our government. . . . The foreign policy of America can best be described by one word—peace. Our actions have always proclaimed our peaceful desires, but never more evidently than now. We covet no territory; we support no threatening military array; we harbor no hostile intent. We have pursued, are pursuing, and shall continue to pursue with untiring devotion the cause of peace. . . .

¹ Speech at Washington, D. C., August 14, 1924.

We have been unwilling to surrender our independence. . . . We must necessarily proceed upon the principle of present co-operation without future entanglement."

If further indications of the immediate trends be desired, they may be gathered from the personality and views of Vice-President Charles G. Dawes—direct descendant, in blood and philosophy, from that William Dawes who rode with Paul Revere on the night that awoke the world. Such a heritage would find it impossible to desert legitimate tradition. Listen while he speaks.¹ Again, not the codes of "isolation"—because, indeed, he himself is primary author of that European "Plan" to which we have just referred. Not "isolation"; but unabated, unrebated, undebated "independence":

"In the United States, in regard to the question of foreign relations, general public opinion seems to have settled upon two great fundamental principles: first, that whatever be our form of contact and conference with foreign nations, the independence and sovereignty of the United States, with the right to determine its own course of action, must at all times and under all circumstances, not only be preserved by it, but recognized by all other nations; and second—that, with its sovereignty always unimpaired, the United States should undertake to meet its international duties unflinchingly, exhibiting no moral cowardice and welcoming, in the interests of universal peace and progress, that

¹ Speech at Evanston, Illinois, August 19, 1924.

contact with other nations by which alone relevant facts can be fully developed and common sense methods adopted for the solution of questions of common interest. . . . The American people are a proud people. They will tolerate no leadership which will surrender an iota of their independence or sovereignty to any other nation or combination of nations. Such an action on the part of any of our representatives would be regarded as treason and dealt with accordingly."

Here, for time being, endeth the trail of a tradition. It threads straight through the romance of the United States. It is a continuous, unbroken highway from yesterday to now. The Fathers surveyed it for posterity. Sometimes it has been uncertain, traversing a doubtful fog. Sometimes it has wavered in a momentary maze. But always it has blazed on through—the more remarkable for these hazardous vicissitudes. It is solidly paved with the triumphant experiences of some seven generations. It is flanked by the blessings of the years. Upon it have marched the feet of the finest, surest statesmen whom it has been America's benediction to possess. They have bequeathed to us this unmortgaged right of way. Along its sovereign roadstead are the markers and the mile-stones to make safe and sure the journeys of tomorrow's pilgrims—except they be blind pilgrims, having eyes, yet seeing not. It is a rugged trail of hard-bought freedom. No toll-road, this—with unwelcome

and unbidden mercenaries making alien levies on our liberties and rights. It is a shining trail of honor—the honor of a great self-determining democracy which has traversed it to righteous glory. Reckless adventurers with nought to cherish and nought to lose—soldiers of doubtful political fortune for whom speculation is a trade—may leave this highway for the by-paths and the detours and the proscribed entanglements of international experiment. High-purposed theorists, scorning the admonitions of yesterday, may clothe their call to other roads in all the habiliments of an evangelical crusade. But this independent Nation of justly proud Americans will meddle with such vagary only at its peril. The trail of a tradition beckons to the safer, surer way. It has been tried by prophets, patriots and patriarchs. It is wrought of the rock whence we are hewn.

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